The WSJ article on Wednesday (Challenge of Spying on China) is a sad reminder of the United States Intelligence Community’s apparent failure to accomplish any broad covert or clandestine penetration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in recent history. The lack of HUMINT human intelligence sources (HUMINT) with meaningful access and placement deprives us of insight into Chinese decision making, immediate strategic threat intelligence and perhaps more importantly, gravely impairs U.S. offensive counterintelligence operations.
Moving beyond the obvious difficulties with HUMINT operations within the PRC, reminiscent of the Cold War hostile operational environments, the Intelligence Community is overdue for a paradigm shift in human asset recruitment methodology. For the better part of the last century, the United States Intelligence Community relied on a steady flow of “walk-ins”, volunteers from opposing foreign intelligence services or governments that offered their countries’ secrets. Intelligence officers enjoyed a large degree of success based on a fairly global perception that Americans were the “good guys”, representatives of the land of fairness, equality and justice, qualities that stood in stark contrast to the ruthless and despotic republics from whence they came. Unfortunately, the mystique has faded leaving outsiders to wonder if the values that we promote to the world are nothing more than a hypocritical farce. Mass diffusion of the “Big Lie” throwing fair elections into question, an attempted coup d’etat by an outgoing president, and military involvement under highly questionable intelligence assessments erode the view once held that the United States is the “shining beacon to the oppressed”.
Chinese citizens enjoy a better standard of living than at any time in China’s history. China can rightfully boast that it is a world power and its population can justifiably be proud of its progress. Personal financial success and pride in country promote loyalty. That there is no broad internal rejection of onerous mass surveillance, social credit controls and ethnic cleansing as is the case with the Uyghurs, is a testament to the PRC’s ability to deny facts, deceive its population and prevent the import of non-PRC approved “truths” about freedom and justice within China. The Chinese cultural tendency to identify with the collective rather than the individual is likewise amplified by the PRC’s massive social control machine, with opposing or antagonistic perspectives effectively blocked by the Great Firewall or simply drowned out of public discourse by the volumes of Party-approved propaganda. The PRC’s strategy has created an environment that is more resistant to traditional intelligence recruitment techniques such as economic coercion, ideology exploitation and ego-stroking. Chinese intelligence service recruiters lean on the cultural affinity of ethnically Chinese living in the United States to turn them into spies, coerce them by alluding to what might become of their families living in China or deploy the time-tested technique of guanxi to achieve intelligence asset recruitments. United States intelligence officers do not enjoy a parallel or equivalent.
FBI Director Wray stated, “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours.” The threat is grave and our twentieth-century countermeasures, techniques and tradecraft are not appropriate for what many in the Intelligence Community deem the greatest threat to United States national security. Retooling, reimagining the intelligence recruitment cycle and modernizing the way that we approach the recruitment of sources is imperative.