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Tierras raras en la República Dominicana: de entusiasmo político a la viabilidad industrial

tierras raras, Republica Dominicana, inteligencia, contrainteligencia, seguridad nacional, economia, C. Constantin Poindexter Salcedo

Tierras raras en Pedernales y la Sierra de Bahoruco, evidencia geológica, confiabilidad de laboratorios internacionales, factibilidad de extracción y procesamiento, y por qué la República Dominicana debe acelerar su ruta hacia una explotación responsable y estratégica.

La afirmación de que la República Dominicana posee un potencial amplio de tierras raras, en poco tiempo ha pasado de ser un tema técnico de geología económica a convertirse en un asunto de soberanía productiva, estrategia industrial y posicionamiento internacional. El presidente Luis Abinader ha sostenido públicamente que estudios preliminares apuntan a depósitos brutos superiores a ciento cincuenta millones de toneladas en la provincia Pedernales, con la promesa de completar evaluaciones y certificar reservas en el corto plazo (Reuters, 2026). Mi posición es coincidente con el sentido de urgencia de esa postura. La ventana geopolítica y económica para integrarnos a una cadena de suministro crítica no permanecerá abierta indefinidamente. Sin embargo, moverse rápido no significa improvisar. Significa acelerar con método, transparencia y disciplina de ingeniería, para convertir un indicio geológico en una oportunidad industrial real y no en un titular pasajero.

Conviene empezar por precisar el lenguaje. En minería, no es lo mismo hablar de “depósito bruto” o “material mineralizado” que hablar de “reserva” económicamente explotable. Un volumen total de material puede ser enorme, pero si las concentraciones recuperables son bajas, si la mineralogía dificulta la separación, o si los costos ambientales y energéticos crecen más rápido que los ingresos, el proyecto se estanca. Por eso, incluso en el mismo reporte sobre la declaración presidencial, se subraya que aún no está claro qué parte del volumen anunciado sería viable para comercialización (Reuters, 2026). Esta distinción no reduce el valor estratégico del anuncio, más bien lo ubica en la fase correcta del ciclo minero: exploración avanzada, caracterización, pruebas metalúrgicas y luego una secuencia de estudios económicos y ambientales que permitan convertir recursos en reservas bajo estándares internacionales.

Dicho lo anterior, la idea de que Pedernales y, en particular, la Sierra de Bahoruco, puedan hospedar concentraciones significativas de elementos de tierras raras no surge de la nada. Existe literatura científica revisada por pares que describe bauxitas kársticas en esa región con contenidos elevados de tierras raras y de itrio, con rangos que llegan, en algunas muestras, a valores notablemente altos para este tipo de depósito, además de una mineralogía portadora relevante para el procesamiento, como monacita y fases tipo bastnasita, entre otras (Villanova de Benavent et al., 2023). También hay investigación más reciente que examina características geoquímicas de depósitos de bauxita kárstica de la Sierra de Bahoruco y los discute explícitamente como un recurso potencial para el país (Chappell et al., 2025). En otras palabras, el fundamento técnico existe. Lo que falta es completar el camino industrial y regulatorio que separa un hallazgo científico de una operación sustentable.

En este contexto aparece el debate sobre la confiabilidad de los “laboratorios internacionales” a los que suelen referirse comunicados y notas periodísticas. En minería moderna, la credibilidad no depende de la nacionalidad del laboratorio, sino de su trazabilidad metrológica. Un resultado es confiable cuando se puede auditar: acreditación del laboratorio, métodos analíticos adecuados, límites de detección, controles de calidad con estándares certificados, duplicados, blancos y cadena de custodia de muestras. Sin esa información, la frase “laboratorios internacionales” es un argumento de autoridad incompleto. No es que sea falso, es que no es suficiente para sostener decisiones de cientos de millones de dólares. Por eso, si queremos movernos rápido con legitimidad, el Estado y los actores técnicos deben publicar, en la medida permitida por la estrategia de negociación, resultados estructurados con protocolos QA y QC y un resumen claro de incertidumbres. La velocidad verdadera no proviene de ocultar datos, sino de estandarizarlos y validarlos desde el empiezo.

Ahora bien, incluso si las concentraciones son prometedoras, la pregunta decisiva es si es factible extraer y, sobre todo, procesar. Las tierras raras se distinguen por un problema central: su química es parecida entre elementos, lo que hace la separación compleja. El verdadero cuello de botella global no suele ser la roca, sino la capacidad de beneficio, refinación y separación en productos comercializables. Este punto es crítico para la República Dominicana porque define dónde quedará el valor agregado. Exportar concentrado y comprar óxidos separados o imanes terminados es la fórmula clásica de pérdida de soberanía económica. Las tendencias internacionales, documentadas por organismos especializados, apuntan a que la demanda de minerales clave, incluyendo tierras raras, sigue creciendo impulsada por la transición energética, vehículos eléctricos, redes eléctricas y otras aplicaciones industriales, lo que incrementa el premio estratégico de participar en la cadena de valor y no solo en la extracción (IEA, 2025). Por la misma razón, los países y empresas fuera de China están invirtiendo con intensidad para reducir vulnerabilidades, porque el control sobre el procesamiento y la refinación sigue muy concentrado (Reuters, 2025).

En el plano de la factibilidad técnica, la Sierra de Bahoruco ofrece una oportunidad pero también una responsabilidad. Si parte de las fases minerales portadoras incluye monacita u otras que pueden asociarse con torio y uranio, entonces la minería y el procesamiento generan residuos con TENORM, es decir, material radiactivo de origen natural tecnológicamente mejorado, lo cual eleva exigencias de manejo, disposición y comunicación pública (EPA, 2025). Este no es un detalle menor. En jurisdicciones con experiencia en refinación, la gestión de residuos y la licencia social han sido determinantes. Un ejemplo contemporáneo es el caso de operaciones de procesamiento de tierras raras donde las autoridades han impuesto condiciones explícitas ligadas a residuos y riesgos radiológicos, reflejando la sensibilidad regulatoria y comunitaria de estos proyectos (AP News, 2026). La conclusión práctica para la República Dominicana es simple: el proyecto debe nacer con ingeniería de residuos y estrategia ambiental desde su fase inicial, no como un apéndice para el final.

La factibilidad económica exige, además, comprender qué “mezcla” de tierras raras contiene el depósito. No todos los elementos tienen el mismo valor. Neodimio y praseodimio suelen sostener la economía de imanes permanentes, mientras disprosio y terbio, considerados más escasos, son críticos para el desempeño térmico de esos imanes y hoy están sujetos a tensiones de suministro. Precisamente por ello, diversos análisis han subrayado la dificultad occidental para cubrir la demanda de tierras raras pesadas y la persistencia de cuellos de botella fuera de China, aun con nuevas inversiones y políticas industriales (Reuters, 2025). Para Pedernales, esto implica que la caracterización debe ser fina, no basta con un total de óxidos de tierras raras. Debe informarse la distribución por elemento, asociaciones minerales, recuperaciones metalúrgicas y costos de separación por producto.

Debemos hablar de soberanía industrial . Los datos de comercio y suministro muestran que, al menos para Estados Unidos, una parte dominante de importaciones de compuestos y metales de tierras raras proviene de China. Esto ilustra la fragilidad de cadenas de suministro concentradas (USGS, 2025). Ese mismo diagnóstico es el que crea una oportunidad para proveedores emergentes en el hemisferio occidental. Si la República Dominicana confirma recursos, define reservas y establece un marco de extracción responsable, su posicionamiento puede ser estratégico para acuerdos de offtake, inversión y transferencia tecnológica. Pero esa ventaja se captura solo si el país ofrece previsibilidad institucional: reglas de concesión claras, estándares ambientales exigentes, mecanismos de transparencia y un plan para que el valor se quede, al menos parcialmente, en territorio dominicano.

“Moverse rápido” (cosa nos incumbe ya) significa diseñar una hoja de ruta con etapas paralelas. Primero, un programa acelerado de exploración y definición de recursos con muestreo representativo, control de calidad robusto y auditoría independiente. Segundo, un paquete de mineralogía y metalurgia con pruebas de laboratorio y planta piloto, orientado no solo a extraer un concentrado, sino a evaluar rutas de separación hasta óxidos individuales o productos intermedios con mercado. Tercero, una arquitectura ambiental desde el inicio: balance hídrico, manejo de relaves, evaluación de TENORM si aplica y trazabilidad de impactos en ecosistemas sensibles. Cuarto, el componente social: consulta temprana, acuerdos de beneficio compartido, empleo local calificado y mecanismos de queja y reparación. Quinto, una estrategia industrial, porque sin política industrial el país corre el riesgo de convertirse en proveedor de bajo margen. El Estado bien puede estructurar incentivos para instalar etapas de valor, por ejemplo, separación o producción de sales u óxidos, en esquemas de asociación público privada con estándares internacionales.

Para ser claro, la prudencia no debe confundirse con lentitud. Los costos de oportunidad de posponer decisiones son reales. El mercado y la geopolítica de minerales críticos se están reconfigurando a velocidad, y los proyectos se alinean hoy con quienes pueden ofrecer certidumbre y cronogramas plausibles. Además, si la República Dominicana espera a que otros definan estándares y rutas de suministro, entrará tarde y negociará desde la debilidad. El anuncio presidencial de acelerar la evaluación y certificación de reservas, aunque todavía condicionado por lo preliminar, apunta en la dirección correcta porque reconoce que el siguiente paso es la certificación técnica, no la retórica (Reuters, 2026). Aun así, lo más inteligente es que el país traduzca esa voluntad en entregables verificables que sostengan confianza, e.d., resultados analíticos auditables, reportes técnicos, estudios económicos preliminares y un marco de gobernanza minera compatible con mejores prácticas.

Ahora bien, que me he desahogado sin pedir permiso, estoy de acuerdo con Abinader en el imperativo de actuar con rapidez hacia la explotación de estos recursos naturales, pero insisto en una precisión. Debemos movernos rápido hacia la explotación responsable y hacia la industrialización, no solo hacia la extracción. La riqueza real de las tierras raras está en la cadena de transformación, y la legitimidad de esa cadena se gana con ciencia reproducible, ingeniería rigurosa y gobernanza transparente. Pedernales puede ser un hito de desarrollo regional y un activo estratégico del Estado dominicano, siempre que la premisa sea clara desde el inicio. La República Dominicana no solo debe tener tierras raras, debe saber convertirlas en valor económico, tecnológico y social sin hipotecar su patrimonio ambiental.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación U.S. DoD/DoS BFFOC, Dipl. Diplomacia Global, Dipl. Derechos Humanos por USIDHR

Bibliografía

  • AP News. (2026). Malaysia renews Lynas Rare Earths’ license for 10 years, orders end to radioactive waste by 2031.
  • Chappell, M., et al. (2025). Geochemical exploration of rare earth element resources in highland karstic bauxite deposits in the Sierra de Bahoruco, Pedernales Province, Southwestern Dominican Republic. PLOS ONE.
  • EPA. (2025). TENORM: Rare Earths Mining Wastes. United States Environmental Protection Agency.
  • IEA. (2025). Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025. International Energy Agency.
  • Reuters. (2025). West scrambles to fill heavy rare earth gap as China rivalry deepens.
  • Reuters. (2026). Dominican Republic has over 150 million tons of rare earth deposits, president says.
  • USGS. (2025). Mineral Commodity Summaries 2025, Rare Earths. United States Geological Survey.
  • Villanova de Benavent, C., et al. (2023). REE ultra rich karst bauxite deposits in the Pedernales region, Dominican Republic. Ore Geology Reviews.
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The Takaichi “Prompt Exploit” as Novel Tradecraft: A Counterintelligence Operator’s View of AI Enabled Influence Operations

disinformation, information operations, espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence, psyops, C. Constantin Poindexter, CIA, DIA, NSA

AI Enabled Smear Operations and Counterintelligence Detection: Lessons from the Attempted ChatGPT Exploit Targeting Sanae Takaichi

The attempted exploitation of ChatGPT to support a covert smear campaign against Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is not a novelty story about AI gone wrong. It is a clear operational vignette of how modern state-linked actors or FIS attempt to compress the intelligence cycle and accelerate influence effects with generative tools. OpenAI’s February 25, 2026 threat reporting describes a now banned ChatGPT account linked to an individual associated with Chinese law enforcement who attempted in mid October 2025 to leverage the model to plan and execute a covert influence operation aimed at discrediting Takaichi, followed by later requests to edit “cyber special operations” status reports after the model refused the original operational ask (OpenAI, 2026). Public reporting based on that disclosure adds that the actor’s plan included coordinated negative commentary, impersonation techniques, and wedge framing designed to mobilize resentment around U.S. tariffs and immigration narratives (Jiji Press, 2026; Reuters, 2026; Axios, 2026). From a counterintelligence perspective, this is a case study in how an adversary treats a commercial large language model as a low-friction staff officer: ideation, drafting, message discipline, and iterative refinement, all without needing to recruit a human asset or expose internal tradecraft through overt tasking channels.

What makes the episode analytically valuable is the specificity of the improper tasking. Reporting indicates that the actor asked ChatGPT to draft a multi part plan to discredit Takaichi, to generate and help post and spread negative comments attacking her stances including immigration, to polish narratives and recurring status reports describing ongoing cyber special operations, and to inflame wedge grievances by amplifying anger over U.S. tariffs on Japan (Jiji Press, 2026; Axios, 2026; OpenAI, 2026). These requests form a recognizable information operations workflow: design the campaign, manufacture content, distribute content, or at least create distribution-ready material, and assess and iterate based on reporting. In classical counterintelligence terms, the operator sought to maximize plausible deniability, minimize cost, and raise tempo, substituting generative capacity for time-consuming human copywriting while reducing the number of personnel who must be read into the narrative engineering function (CISA, 2022; ODNI FMIC, 2024).

The most important counterintelligence observation is that the exploit is not primarily technical. It is procedural and behavioral. Operators do not need to jailbreak a model to gain advantage. They can ask for adjacent assistance such as language polishing, translation, formatting, summarization of internal memos, and audience-tailored variations. OpenAI’s reporting explicitly notes the actor returned after an initial refusal and asked for edits to operational status reports, which is precisely how professional services are laundered in many influence pipelines: when direct enablement is blocked, pivot to editorial support and documentation hygiene (OpenAI, 2026). This aligns with U.S. government’s framing of foreign malign influence as subversive, undeclared, coercive, or criminal activity that uses multiple pathways and intermediaries, often blending overt platforms with covert personas and synthetic content (ODNI FMIC, 2024; DOJ, n.d.). The model is not the operation. It becomes a friction reducer within the operation.

Seen through the lens of the intelligence cycle, the actor’s approach collapses collection, analysis, production, and dissemination into a tight loop. The multi-part plan request is campaign design, meaning objective, target audience, narrative lines, channels, and timing. The post-and-spread request is dissemination planning and, at minimum, the production of ready-to-publish material. The status report editing request is assessment: codifying observed effects, identifying what resonated, and deciding next moves (OpenAI, 2026; Axios, 2026). When an influence apparatus scales, this loop becomes industrialized: many accounts, multi-platform content seeding, and iterative narrative tuning. Reporting around the OpenAI threat case underscores that these efforts can be large-scale, resource-intensive, and sustained, consistent with a bureaucracy rather than hobbyist trolling (Reuters, 2026; CyberScoop, 2026). As Ben Nimmo has emphasized, the intent is to apply pressure everywhere, all at once, which is characteristic of FIS or state-linked coercive information operations rather than organic political discourse (Axios, 2026).

The operational targeting of Takaichi is also instructive for counterintelligence because it sits at the intersection of influence operations and transnational repression. While this case focuses on a smear campaign against a Japanese political figure, OpenAI’s broader description of the actor’s uploaded materials suggests a wider ecosystem aimed at suppressing dissent and silencing critics, including tactics such as forged documentation and intimidation narratives (OpenAI, 2026; CyberScoop, 2026). The FBI defines transnational repression to include online disinformation campaigns, harassment, intimidation, and abuse of legal processes, exactly the kinds of tools that can be amplified or routinized by AI-assisted content generation (FBI, n.d.). In counterintelligence risk terms, that convergence matters. When an adversary blends influence effects, shaping attitudes, with coercive effects, punishing or deterring speech, the target set expands from voters to voices, and the operational threshold for harm drops.

The wedge grievance element, stoking resentment over U.S. tariffs, illustrates classic influence tradecraft. Hijack a real grievance, inflate it, and attach it to the target as a blame object. This is not persuasion via factual argument. It is agitation via emotional mobilization. CISA guidance on foreign influence operations describes how adversaries exploit mis, dis, and malinformation narratives to bias policy and undermine social cohesion, often by inflaming divisive issues (CISA, 2022). The tariff frame is particularly useful because it can be pitched simultaneously as anti-U.S., blaming Washington, and anti-target, blaming Takaichi’s posture for provoking friction, with variants tailored to different audiences. In counterintelligence vocabulary, this is narrative multi-casting: the same kernel is repackaged into mutually reinforcing storylines for disparate communities.

The cross platform distribution pattern referenced in public reporting, activity on X and other sites, with relatively low engagement but persistent output, resembles the known Chinese influence pattern commonly labeled Spamouflage or Dragonbridge: high volume, mixed quality, low authentic engagement, but sustained presence and periodic tactical evolution (Reuters, 2026; NATO StratCom COE, 2023; Graphika, 2025). Low engagement does not mean low intent or low risk. It can indicate poor tradecraft, early-stage testing, or a campaign optimized for secondary effects such as search pollution, narrative seeding for later pickup, or creating “evidence” of public sentiment that can be cited elsewhere. Counterintelligence professionals should treat low engagement content as potential scaffolding. The objective may be to build a lattice of posts, screenshots, and proof artifacts that can later be laundered into higher credibility channels.

From the defender’s side, the case clarifies what model refusal can and cannot do. OpenAI reports that ChatGPT refused overtly malicious prompts, yet the actor appears to have proceeded using other tools and later used ChatGPT for editing (OpenAI, 2026). This reveals a strategic limitation. Safety filters reduce direct enablement. They do not eliminate the underlying operational capability of a state apparatus that can shift to domestic models, human copywriters, or alternative platforms. Effective mitigation requires a layered approach: model-side safeguards, platform-side enforcement, and inter-organizational intelligence sharing that treats AI as one component in a broader influence toolkit (OpenAI, 2026; CISA, 2024). The IC’s Foreign Malign Influence Center has emphasized that foreign malign influence is multi-actor and multi-pathway by design, which implies countermeasures must also be multi-pathway. Detection in one node rarely collapses the whole network (ODNI FMIC, 2024).

For counterintelligence operators, three takeaways are operationally salient. First, generative AI is best understood as an accelerant of existing influence doctrine rather than a replacement. It speeds up drafting, localization, and A B testing of narratives while enabling bureaucratic reporting to be produced faster and with greater stylistic consistency (OpenAI, 2026; CISA, 2022). Second, the human factor remains the decisive vulnerability. The actor’s interaction with ChatGPT created an evidentiary trail that allowed defenders to correlate intent, post-and-spread negative commentary with observed online activity. This is a reminder that operational security failures frequently occur in routine administrative behavior (OpenAI, 2026; CyberScoop, 2026). Third, influence and repression are increasingly convergent lines of effort. When disinformation is used not only to persuade but to intimidate, deplatform, or socially punish, the problem set expands to include civil liberties impacts, diaspora targeting, and sovereignty challenges (FBI, n.d.; DOJ, 2023).

In countermeasures terms, the Takaichi case underscores the value of structured analytic techniques in attribution and mitigation. Analysts should separate narrative content, behavioral signals such as posting cadence and account creation patterns, infrastructure signals such as hosting and coordinated link sharing, and procedural artifacts such as templated emails, repeated phrasing, and report formats. OpenAI’s account-level disruption, combined with open-source correlation to online hashtags and posts referenced in operational materials, is a template for fusion analysis that pairs platform telemetry with OSINT validation (OpenAI, 2026). NATO-aligned research similarly emphasizes that state-sponsored or FIS information operations exploit differences across platforms and jurisdictions. Defenders should expect rapid lateral movement when friction increases on any single platform (NATO StratCom COE, 2023).

The attempted exploit is best characterized as an “AI-enabled influence operation reconnaissance and production cycle, with the model treated as a drafting cell embedded in a broader state-linked apparatus”. The key question is not whether a model can be tasked with dissemination directly. It is whether it can generate dissemination-ready content, standardize narrative discipline, and reduce the time and training required to run a coordinated smear campaign. In this case, it could at least partially, until refusal controls forced the actor to route around and repurpose the model for editing and reporting (OpenAI, 2026; Jiji Press, 2026). For counterintelligence professionals, that reality demands a posture shift.. We must defend not only against disinformation artifacts but against the process improvements that AI grants adversaries. Faster cycles, lower labor costs, and more plausible linguistic camouflage are the new norm. The Takaichi operation appears to have underperformed in engagement, yet it is a forward indicator of how state-backed influence operational tradecraft is adapting to generative systems. They are persistent, multi-platform and procedurally agile (Reuters, 2026; Graphika, 2025).

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Axios. (2026, February 25). Reporting on OpenAI’s disclosure of a China linked attempt to use ChatGPT to plan and refine a smear campaign targeting Japan’s Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.
  • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2022). Preparing for and mitigating foreign influence operations (CISA Insight).
  • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2024, April 17). Guidance for securing election infrastructure against tactics of foreign malign influence (Joint guidance release with FBI and ODNI).
  • CyberScoop. (2026, February 25). Reporting on OpenAI’s threat report and Chinese law enforcement linked “cyber special operations” materials uploaded for editing.
  • Federal Bureau of Investigation. (n.d.). Transnational repression (Overview page describing tactics including online disinformation campaigns, harassment, and intimidation).
  • Graphika. (2025). Chinese state influence (Selected insights from Graphika ATLAS reporting, November 2024 to January 2025).
  • Jiji Press. (2026, February 27). Reporting summarized by Nippon.com on OpenAI’s claim that a Chinese law enforcement official asked ChatGPT to draft a plan to discredit Takaichi and to post and spread negative comments.
  • NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. (2023). Dragons roar and bears howl: Convergence in Sino Russian information operations in NATO countries.
  • OpenAI. (2026, February 25). Disrupting malicious uses of AI (Threat report describing disruption of accounts, including an influence operation attempt targeting Sanae Takaichi).
  • Reuters. (2026, February 25). Reporting on OpenAI’s threat report detailing misuse of ChatGPT for scams and influence operations, including a smear campaign targeting Japan’s prime minister.
  • Reuters. (2026, February 26). Reporting on a Foundation for Defense of Democracies analysis of China linked influence operations targeting Japan’s elections and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, consistent with Spamouflage and Dragonbridge patterns.
  • U.S. Department of Justice. (2023, April 17; updated 2025, February 6). Press release describing charges tied to transnational repression schemes and the use of fake online personas to harass dissidents and disseminate state narratives.
  • U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Foreign Malign Influence Center. (2024). FMI Primer (Public release defining foreign malign influence and its pathways).
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Tariff Refund Litigation Post Learning Resources v. Trump: Merits, Remedies, and the Jurisprudence

tariffs, customs, tariff law, customs law, tariff litigation, lawyer, attorney, law firm, C. Constantin Poindexter

Tariff Refund Lawsuits After the Supreme Court’s IEEPA Ruling: How Importers Can Prove Entitlement, Preserve Claims, and Win Reliquidation With Interest in the Court of International Trade

The Supreme Court decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump materially changes the litigation calculus for corporate plaintiffs seeking refunds of duties collected under emergency tariff programs that relied on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, commonly called IEEPA. On February 20, 2026, the Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs and remanded for further proceedings. (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 2026).

That holding is not simply incremental statutory interpretation. In practical litigation terms, it removes the government’s strongest defense on liability for the challenged tariff authority. It also raises an unusually large remedial question, because economists at the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimated that up to 175 billion dollars in tariff collections are potentially subject to refunds following the Supreme Court ruling. (Penn Wharton Budget Model, 2026).

Pondering the likelihood of success, the analysis must separate two questions that non-litigator customs folk often collapse into one. Will plaintiffs prevail on the illegality of the IEEPA tariffs? If plaintiffs prevail, what procedural and remedial doctrine will determine whether a particular importer actually obtains a money judgment or a reliquidation-based refund? Post Learning Resources, the first question trends strongly in plaintiff’s favor. The second question will decide outcomes across industries and will drive the next phase of jurisprudence.

Likelihood of success on liability: high for the core IEEPA tariff bucket

On liability, the Supreme Court has already answered the threshold statutory question for the contested measures. The Court held that IEEPA does not authorize tariff imposition. (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 2026).

Accordingly, for companies whose duty payments are traceable to the IEEPA-based tariff lines at issue, the probability of success on the merits is high, subject to ordinary plaintiff-side requirements such as standing, proof of payment, and proper party status. Reporting framed the litigation as a wave of refund suits rather than a re-litigation of authority, and that framing is consistent with the legal posture after the merits ruling. (Reuters, 2026; Penn Wharton Budget Model, 2026).

A key operational overlay is that Customs and Border Protection announced it would stop collecting the IEEPA tariffs effective February 24, 2026, deactivating the relevant tariff provisions while leaving open the question of how refunds will be processed. (Reuters, 2026). This step is not itself a merits concession, but it reinforces that the live dispute is shifting from prospective relief to backward-looking monetary remedies.

Where the litigation will be won or lost: jurisdiction, timing, liquidation finality, and remedial power

The Court of International Trade is the central tribunal for most tariff refund litigation because Congress gave it specialized subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions arising out of laws providing for tariffs and duties. In these cases, plaintiffs commonly proceed under the court’s residual jurisdiction provision, 28 U.S.C. section 1581(i), when ordinary administrative routes are inadequate for constitutional or ultra vires challenges to the tariff program. (Miller Chevalier, 2025).

The key attorney task is to align each plaintiff’s fact pattern with a jurisdictional lane that the court will accept as both available and adequate. While the details vary by importer posture and entry status, the same strategic fact keeps recurring in practitioner guidance. A plaintiff who filed early and preserved claims against liquidation risk has a cleaner path to an effective refund remedy than a plaintiff who waited until after liquidation became final.

The liquidation problem: why entry status is the gating fact for refunds

In customs law, liquidation is the administrative act that finalizes duty assessment for an entry. Once final, liquidation can function as a procedural bar, not because the tariff becomes lawful, but because finality limits what can be corrected and through what vehicle. That is why many importers sought to prevent liquidation pending Supreme Court review and why the post-decision disputes will focus on whether the Court of International Trade can order reliquidation and refunds even after liquidation events occurred. (Court of International Trade, Slip Op. 25 154, 2025).

The Court of International Trade addressed this issue in a December 15, 2025, opinion associated with the refund litigation posture. The court emphasized that where jurisdiction under section 1581(i) has attached, it has authority to order reliquidation and remedial relief, and it rejected the claim that plaintiffs would necessarily be denied a refund remedy solely because liquidation might occur. (Court of International Trade, Slip Op. 25 154, 2025).

This is a pivotal building block for any attorney’s averments because it supplies the doctrinal hinge between illegality and money. Plaintiffs can cite it to argue that the court possesses remedial tools sufficient to make the Supreme Court’s position consequential. The government can still narrow application by arguing about jurisdictional attachment, timeliness, and scope of relief for non-parties, but the foundation is favorable to plaintiffs who properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction while their claims were live.

Statutory refund mechanics and interest: money is available, but only through the correct sequence

Even after an illegality finding, refunds typically flow through the liquidation or reliquidation process as corrected by judicial order. The interest component is not trivial, and it becomes significant at the scale economists are describing. The customs statute governing interest on overpayments, including excess moneys deposited, is 19 U.S.C. section 1505. (19 U.S.C. § 1505).

In practical terms, corporate plaintiffs seeking judgments should frame their requested relief in a way that maps onto customs mechanics, seeking orders that direct correction of entries and payment of excess duties with statutory interest where applicable. That framing tends to reduce judicial hesitation, because it presents the court as ordering the agency to execute a legally required administrative correction rather than awarding free-standing damages.

What jurisprudence will dominate the next phase? Separation of powers and clear authorization for tariff-like taxation

Learning Resources will be cited as the controlling authority for the proposition that a broad tariff regime requires clear congressional authorization and cannot be derived from general emergency powers. (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 2026). It is important to note that the decision is likely to be read as both a statutory holding and a structural warning. Courts often treat tariffs as taxation in effect even when administered through customs schedules, and that characterization pulls the analysis toward congressional primacy.

Court of International Trade remedial authority under section 1581(i)

The most litigated doctrinal issue will likely be the scope of the Court of International Trades remedial authority under section 1581(i), especially after liquidation events. The December 2025 decision contains language that plaintiffs will use to argue that the court can order reliquidation and refunds once jurisdiction attaches. (Court of International Trade, Slip Op. 25 154, 2025). The Supreme Court did not itself order refunds, which pushes companies into complex post-merits proceedings in the Court of International Trade to translate illegality into payment. (Reuters, 2026).

Timeliness and the preserve your claim theme

Expect extensive litigation on accruals and limitations. Practitioner analyses emphasize that importers pursued protective actions because section 1581(i) is commonly treated as subject to a two-year limitations period and because entry status can become outcome determinative. (Mayer Brown, 2025; Orrick, 2025). This matters for the likelihood of success. Big corporations now suing are likely doing so with sophisticated counsel precisely to avoid being trapped by accrual arguments. Those who delayed without a protective filing face a higher risk that the government will litigate procedural bars even if the tariffs were unlawful.

A realistic success forecast for corporate plaintiffs seeking judgments. High probability for plaintiffs with clean importer posture and timely Court of International Trade filings

For plaintiffs who can prove importer of record status, document duty payment, and link the paid duties to the invalid IEEPA tariff provisions, the probability of obtaining meaningful relief is strong, provided they timely invoked the court’s jurisdiction and framed remedies through reliquidation and refund mechanics. Customs stopping collection shortly after the decision underscores that the contested authority is not expected to survive. (Reuters, 2026).

Moderate and contested probability for plaintiffs seeking broad, non-party, or nationwide refund relief

The largest uncertainty is not whether the tariffs were illegal but whether relief will be plaintiff-specific or broader. Courts are often cautious about converting an invalidation into an automatic entitlement for every affected importer without individualized claims, especially when liquidation status differs across many entries. Those practicalities will incline courts toward structured remedies such as test cases, consolidated dockets, and relief limited to parties who preserved claims. (Skadden, 2026; Reuters, 2026).

The macro number is real, but the micro path is procedural

The Penn Wharton Budget Model’s estimate of up to 175 billion dollars in potential refunds is a credible macro framing for the stakes. (Penn Wharton Budget Model, 2026). But litigation outcomes will be entry by entry and plaintiff by plaintiff, shaped by jurisdictional posture and the ability to obtain an operative court order that compels reliquidation or refund processing. That is why the most important jurisprudence for an attorney essay is not only Learning Resources but also the Court of International Trade decisions clarifying remedial authority and the procedural preservation doctrines that control customs disputes. (Court of International Trade, Slip Op. 25 154, 2025).

What is our best argument? A strong merits hand, with refunds decided by procedure and remedy

For major corporations now suing for tariff refunds, the path to success is materially favorable on liability because the Supreme Court has held that IEEPA does not authorize the tariffs at issue. (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 2026). The decisive contest will occur in the Court of International Trade over jurisdictional fit, timeliness, liquidation finality, and the court’s remedial power to order reliquidation and refunds. The most prudent attorney forecast is therefore this. Plaintiffs with timely preserved claims and clean entry documentation have a high likelihood of prevailing and obtaining refunds with interest through reliquidation mechanics. Plaintiffs who did not preserve claims, or who seek expansive relief not tethered to individual entry posture, face materially higher litigation risk even in a post-merits environment where the underlying tariff authority has already been rejected. Further, the author sayeth not.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Court of International Trade. (2025, December 15). Slip Opinion 25 154.
  • Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 24 1287. (2026, February 20). Opinion of the Court. Supreme Court of the United States.
  • Mayer Brown. (2025, December 16). Court of International Trade Provides Clarity on Potential IEEEPA Tariff Refunds.
  • Miller Chevalier. (2025). Trade Compliance Flash: IEEEPA Tariff Litigation Refunds and Preserving Importer Claims.
  • Orrick. (2025, December). What Importers and Claim Purchasers Need to Know About Preserving Tariff Refund Claims.
  • Penn Wharton Budget Model. (2026, February 20). Supreme Court Tariff Ruling: IEEEPA Revenue and Potential Refunds.
  • Reuters. (2026, February 20). U.S. tariff revenue at risk after Supreme Court ruling tops 175 billion, Penn Wharton estimates.
  • Reuters. (2026, February 23). U.S. Customs agency to stop collecting tariffs deemed illegal by Supreme Court.
  • Reuters. (2026, February 24). Prices investors will pay for tariff refund claims surge after Supreme Court decision.
  • Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom LLP. (2026, February). The Supreme Court Ends IEEEPA Tariffs, Bringing Fresh Uncertainty for Companies.
  • United States Code. (n.d.). 19 U.S.C. § 1505.
  • United States Code. (n.d.). 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).
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A U.S. Attack on Iran, a Catastrophic Unforced Error

war, warfighter, Iran, U.S., intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, C. Constantin Poindexter, CIA, NSA

Public and Congressional Support: The Decisive Constraint That Can Turn U.S. Military Dominance Over Iran Into Strategic Defeat

The United States retains overwhelming advantages in the material and operational prerequisites of high-end conventional warfare. In any prospective conflict with Iran, Washington can assume advantages in air and naval superiority, intelligence and surveillance coverage, precision strike capacity, suppression of enemy air defenses, long-distance logistics, and advanced cyber and electronic warfare. Yet those advantages do not automatically translate into strategic success. The decisive variable is not whether the United States can destroy targets faster than an adversary can replace them, but whether the United States can sustain the political mandate to keep fighting after the initial shock of combat wears off, the costs become visible, and the enemy adapts.

This is the core vulnerability of a discretionary war with Iran. Public support and congressional support are not merely background noise or messaging challenges. They are strategic enablers. When they are absent or brittle, they shape rules of engagement, constrain time horizons, narrow acceptable costs, and fracture coalition cohesion. In that environment, even tactically brilliant operations can fail to achieve the most important objectives because political will collapses sooner than the enemy’s capacity to resist. Vo Nguyen Giap articulated this logic explicitly. A belligerent can leave enemy forces partly intact if it can destroy the enemy’s will to remain in the war. (PBS, n.d.) That insight was operationalized against the United States in Vietnam, echoed in Afghanistan, and remains relevant to any prospective United States-Iran war.

The Strategic Center of Gravity: Legitimacy and Endurance

Clausewitz argued that war is a continuation of politics by other means. In American practice, the political character of war is inseparable from constitutional structure and democratic consent. A war that begins without clear congressional authorization, or that proceeds amid broad public skepticism, can win battles while steadily losing its domestic foundation. The War Powers Resolution codifies Congress’s position that the President introduces U.S. forces into hostilities only pursuant to a declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States or its forces. (50 U.S.C. § 1541, 1973) In a discretionary strike campaign that grows into sustained hostilities, the gap between executive action and legislative consent becomes a recurring legitimacy crisis rather than a one-time procedural dispute.

Recent reporting underscores that this institutional fault line is not theoretical. Reuters reported that the U.S. Senate rejected a bid to curb presidential Iran war powers, reflecting a live and lively, contested debate over authority and oversight in potential Iran hostilities. (Reuters, 2025) That debate matters operationally because contested legitimacy does not remain in Washington. It affects allied basing decisions, overflight permissions, intelligence sharing, escalation thresholds, and the credibility of U.S. signals to both adversaries and partners. A campaign that looks unilateral, politically improvised, or domestically unpopular becomes harder to sustain and easier for Iran and its proxy network to frame as illegitimate aggression.

Material Superiority Versus Political Fragility

From my perspective (military/intelligence), the United States can plausibly execute many of the classic prerequisites you listed. But those capabilities do not eliminate the central political question: what is the concrete objective, and how long will the American public accept the costs required to achieve it?

Public sentiment data indicates a serious constraint. A University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll found only 21 percent favor the United States initiating an attack on Iran, with 49 percent opposed and 30 percent unsure. (University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, 2026) A YouGov report covering an Economist YouGov poll likewise found Americans more likely to oppose than to support using military force to attack Iran, with 49 percent opposing and 27 percent supporting, and with significant partisan and independent resistance. (YouGov, 2026) Meanwhile, an AP NORC poll found that while many Americans view Iran as an enemy and express concern about Iran’s nuclear program, they have low trust in presidential judgment on the use of military force, with only about three in ten expressing high trust and more than half expressing little or no trust. (Associated Press NORC, 2026)

The former being said, all of this has strategic implications. They suggest that domestic consent is not merely divided. It is structurally thin, with a large, uncertain middle and a relatively small affirmative mandate for initiating war. Low confidence in the decision maker’s judgment means that early setbacks or civilian casualties can rapidly convert uncertainty into opposition. Further, thin consent invites legislative confrontation, and legislative confrontation invites operational constraints. This is exactly the kind of environment in which an adversary designs a strategy of political attrition rather than symmetrical military competition.

Vietnam: Giap’s Theory of Victory Was Political

The claim that “North Vietnam did not win the Vietnam War” can be true in a narrow kinetic sense. The United States inflicted vast battlefield losses and dominated many tactical engagements. Yet North Vietnam and the Viet Cong were able to outlast the United States by targeting the political will that sustained American participation. Giap described the objective as breaking “the American will to remain in the war,” using operations intended to force de-escalation and reshape the political calculus in Washington. (PBS, n.d.) The point is not that one event alone decided the outcome. The point is that the adversary’s theory of victory treated American domestic endurance as the center of gravity. Once that center weakened, America’s material advantages could not convert into a stable political settlement on acceptable terms.

For an Iran scenario, the parallel is not an exact replay of Vietnam’s terrain or insurgency structure. The parallel is “strategic method”. Iran does not need to win a conventional air-sea contest. It needs to ensure that the United States does not achieve its most important objectives at a politically acceptable cost. If Iran can force Washington into a cycle of escalation and retaliation, or can trigger regional proxy pressure that steadily raises the price of engagement, then the war becomes a contest of domestic patience more than a contest of platforms.

Afghanistan and the Logic of “Time”

The Afghanistan experience reinforces the same strategic logic through a different mode of war. A saying widely attributed to Taliban fighters captures the asymmetry of time horizons: “You have the watches, we have the time.” (Maclean’s, 2017) The exact provenance of the phrase is less important than its strategic meaning. The U.S. Administration is about fall into the same bullshit trap. Democracies fight under time constraints produced by elections, news cycles, budget politics, and public casualty sensitivity. Insurgent and revolutionary actors often fight under generational horizons, with lower sensitivity to near term losses and a stronger tolerance for prolonged hardship.

Iran’s leadership and its proxy network have repeatedly demonstrated a long-horizon approach to regional strategy. In a conflict, Iran can employ calibrated escalation through proxies, maritime harassment, missile and drone pressure, and political warfare aimed at eroding coalition cohesion (a “coalition” of states that have already publicly objected to U.S. warplanning). The objective is not necessarily to defeat U.S. forces in the field. It is to make the conflict feel indefinite, morally ambiguous, and strategically distracting, which are precisely the conditions that drain public support in the United States.

“Shock and Awe” Does Not Solve the Political Problem

Advocates of rapid strike campaigns often argue that overwhelming early force can preempt political attrition by ending the conflict quickly. History offers caution. Initial public support (pretty clearly NOT the case today) can be high at the onset of a war, but it can erode sharply as the war’s duration and costs expand, particularly if the rationale becomes contested. The Iraq example is instructive: Gallup reported 72 percent support for the war against Iraq in late March 2003. (Gallup, 2003) Yet Gallup later documented substantial erosion in perceived worth and support over time as realities on the ground diverged from initial expectations. (Gallup, 2006) The Brookings analysis of early Iraq war opinion similarly underscores the rally effect and its limits. (Kull, Ramsay, and Lewis, 2003)

For Iran, the political risk is heightened because current polling suggests the United States would begin without anything like the 2003 level of public backing. (University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, 2026) (YouGov, 2026) (Associated Press NORC, 2026) Without a broad initial mandate, the usual pattern reverses: instead of rallying, creating a cushion against early shocks, early shocks can collapse a narrow coalition of support. Moreover, Iran is structurally capable of generating early shocks through proxy responses and regional disruption, meaning that the political challenge may begin immediately, not after months or years.

Congress as a Strategic Actor, Not a Background Variable

In a system where Congress controls funding and has constitutional war powers, the legislative branch becomes a de facto strategic actor. When Congress is divided, when authorization is ambiguous, or when the public is skeptical, Congress can constrain the war through funding restrictions, reporting requirements, and political signaling that affects allied behavior. Reuters reporting on war powers debates around Iran illustrates that these conflicts are not hypothetical. (Reuters, 2025) Even the sycophants are likely to run out of patience for another endless foray, largely due to constituent pressure rather than disloyalty to their cult.

This really matters. Strategic clarity requires durable political consensus. If objectives are unclear or expand, congressional opposition becomes more likely and more intense. Further, Iran can exploit visible domestic division through information operations, propaganda, and calibrated escalation intended to polarize U.S. politics. In that sense, a weak domestic mandate is not merely a constraint on U.S. freedom of action. It becomes a targetable vulnerability. The North Vietnamese knew it. The Afghans knew it, and the more sober members of the Department of Defense know it.

A Missing Ingredient: Defined, Credible Political Objectives

Even if the United States can strike nuclear facilities, degrade air defenses, and disrupt command networks, the strategic question remains what “winning” means and what settlement conditions are realistically attainable. If the objective is limited, such as delaying nuclear capabilities, the question becomes whether limited objectives justify the costs and risks of regional escalation. If the objective expands to regime change, the problem becomes far harder because military destruction does not automatically produce political legitimacy, stable governance, or a non-hostile successor regime. Here, the user’s final criterion is decisive. Post-conflict planning, a wicked difficult peril that we have botched over and over again, will repeat itself. History shows that military victory without a stabilization strategy yields strategic failure, and the public tends to punish wars that feel open-ended, morally muddled, or poorly planned.

In the Iran case, this risk is amplified because a strike campaign can trigger proxy retaliation in multiple theaters, raise energy and shipping risks, and produce unpredictable political reverberations, all of which can be framed domestically as an optional war of choice rather than a necessary act of self-defense. When a war’s necessity is contested, public support becomes the decisive front.

Dominance in Combat Power Does Not Guarantee Strategic Success

The United States may indeed be dominant across many of the operational categories that matter for battlefield performance. Yet wars are not won solely by platform superiority. They are won by aligning military means with politically sustainable ends. Current public opinion suggests a narrow and fragile mandate for initiating an attack on Iran, combined with low confidence in executive judgment about the use of force. (University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll, 2026) (YouGov, 2026) (Associated Press NORC, 2026) In that environment, congressional contention over authorization and war powers becomes a predictable friction point, not an occasional procedural dispute. (50 U.S.C. § 1541, 1973) (Reuters, 2025) Iran and its proxy network do not need to defeat the United States conventionally to succeed strategically. They need to prolong, complicate, and regionalize the conflict until the United States loses the will and domestic legitimacy to continue, echoing Giap’s theory of victory in Vietnam and the time horizon logic captured by the Afghanistan aphorism. (PBS, n.d.) (Maclean’s, 2017)

A United States attack on Iran will NOT end well. We’ll have tactical dominance paired with a complete strategic disaster. Without sustained public and congressional support, the United States will fail to achieve its most important objectives (if the Administration can even articulate them) at an acceptable cost. The venture will not end with a clear victory, but with political exhaustion and a forced search for exit ramps. That is not my political critique. It is a strategic assessment rooted in how democratic states actually choose war and wage war. My call? Don’t f. do it. Exaggerations about “days from completing a nuclear weapon” coupled with no clear objective or endgame is a movie that we’ve seen before.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Associated Press NORC Center for Public Affairs Research. 2026. “Most Americans see Iran as enemy but doubt Trump on military force: poll.” Associated Press.
  • 50 U.S.C. § 1541. 1973. War Powers Resolution, “Purpose and policy.” Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School.
  • Gallup. 2003. “Seventy Two Percent of Americans Support War Against Iraq.” Gallup News Service, March 24, 2003.
  • Gallup. 2006. “Three Years of War Have Eroded Public Support.” Gallup News Service, March 17, 2006.
  • Kull, Steven, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis. 2003. “Rally Round the Flag: Opinion in the United States before and after the Iraq War.” Brookings Institution.
  • Maclean’s. 2017. “Fighting in Afghanistan: ‘You have the watches. We have the time’.” September 2, 2017.
  • PBS. n.d. “Peoples Century: Guerrilla Wars: Vo Nguyen Giap Transcript.” Public Broadcasting Service.
  • Reuters. 2025. “US Senate rejects bid to curb Trump’s Iran war powers.” June 27, 2025.
  • University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll. 2026. “Do Americans Favor Attacking Iran Under the Current Circumstances? The Latest Critical Issues Poll Findings.”
  • YouGov. 2026. “Few Americans support U.S. military action against Iran, but a majority think it’s likely.” Economist YouGov poll, February 20 to 23, 2026.
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AI as a Force Multiplier in Recent Intrusion Operations

AI, artificial intelligence, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, hacker, cyber, cyber security, C. Constantin Poindexter

AI as a Force Multiplier in Cyber Intrusions: Counterintelligence Lessons from the Amazon Threat Intelligence FortiGate Campaign, AI-Assisted Attack Planning, and Scalable Post-Exploitation Tradecraft

From a counterintelligence professional’s perspective, I read Amazon Threat Intelligence’s February 2026 report less as a novelty story about “hackers using AI” and more as a warning about a structural change in operational economics. The important point is not that a threat actor used a large language model. It is that a presumably low-to-medium skill, financially motivated Russian-speaking actor was able to scale intrusion activity across more than 600 FortiGate devices in over 55 countries in roughly five weeks by integrating commercial AI services into every phase of the attack workflow (Moses, 2026). In counterintelligence terms, this is a capability amplification event. AI did not make the actor sophisticated. It made the actor productive (Moses, 2026).

That distinction matters. Amazon’s analysis is unusually valuable because it documents both sides of the phenomenon. On one hand, the actor used AI to generate attack plans, write tooling, sequence actions, and coordinate operations at a tempo that would traditionally imply a larger team. On the other hand, the same actor repeatedly failed when facing hardened environments, patched systems, or nonstandard conditions. Amazon explicitly notes that the actor could not reliably compile custom exploits, debug failures, or creatively pivot beyond straightforward automated paths (Moses, 2026). This is exactly what a counterintelligence officer should expect from a force multiplier: improved throughput without equivalent gains in judgment, tradecraft, or adaptability.

The Amazon case is especially useful because it separates hype from mechanism. The campaign did not depend on exotic zero-days. Amazon states that no FortiGate vulnerability exploitation was observed in the campaign it analyzed; instead, the actor exploited exposed management interfaces, weak credentials, and single-factor authentication, then used AI to execute these known methods at scale (Moses, 2026). That is a profound lesson for defenders. AI is not changing the laws of intrusion. It is compressing the time and labor required to exploit organizations that still fail at fundamentals.

From a counterintelligence perspective, this changes how we should think about indications and warnings. Historically, broad multi-country infrastructure access, custom scripts in multiple languages, and organized post-exploitation playbooks would often suggest a resourced team such as an FIS, state-supported private operator, or at least a mature criminal crew. Amazon’s report shows that this inference is no longer reliable. The actor’s infrastructure contained numerous scripts and dashboards with hallmarks of AI generation, and Amazon concluded that a single actor or very small group likely produced a toolkit whose volume would previously imply a development team (Moses, 2026). In intelligence analysis, this is a warning against legacy heuristics. Scale is no longer a clean proxy for organizational size or skill.

Amazon’s “AI as a force multiplier” section is the core of the matter. The actor used at least two distinct commercial LLM providers in complementary ways. One served as the primary tool developer and operational assistant, while another was used as a supplementary planner when the actor needed help pivoting inside a compromised network (Moses, 2026). In one observed instance, the actor reportedly submitted a victim’s internal topology, hostnames, credentials, and identified services to obtain a step-by-step compromise plan (Moses, 2026). For counterintelligence professionals, this is not just a cyber issue. It is a tradecraft issue. The actor is externalizing planning and decision-support functions to commercial platforms, effectively outsourcing parts of the “staff work” that junior operators or analysts would otherwise perform.

This pattern aligns with broader reporting from major providers and threat intelligence teams. Google Threat Intelligence Group’s February 2026 AI Threat Tracker documents growing adversary integration of AI across reconnaissance, phishing enablement, malware/tooling development, and post-compromise support, while also emphasizing that it has not yet observed “breakthrough capabilities” that fundamentally change the threat landscape (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026). That is highly consistent with the Amazon case: AI is improving speed, coverage, and consistency more than it is producing genuine operational innovation (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026; Moses, 2026). Microsoft’s Digital Defense Report 2025 similarly describes adversaries using generative AI for scaling social engineering, reconnaissance, code generation, exploit development support, and automation of exfiltration-to-lateral movement pipelines (Microsoft, 2025). The convergence across independent sources is notable. Different organizations are observing the same pattern from different vantage points.

Anthropic’s 2025 report on “vibe hacking” extends this trend in a particularly important direction. Anthropic described a disrupted criminal operation in which an actor used an AI coding agent not only as a technical consultant but as an active operator embedded into the attack lifecycle, supporting reconnaissance, credential harvesting, penetration, and extortion-related tasks (Anthropic, 2025). Whether one agrees with every framing choice in vendor reports, the operational implication is clear: AI-enabled actors are increasingly turning language models and coding agents into workflow engines. They are not merely asking for snippets of code. They are building repeatable campaign infrastructure around AI-assisted execution (Anthropic, 2025; Moses, 2026).

For counterintelligence practitioners, the strategic concern is not limited to criminal ransomware precursors. The same force-multiplier logic applies to espionage, access development, insider targeting, and influence preparation. Google’s reporting notes that government-backed actors are using AI for technical research, target development, and rapid phishing lure generation, including reconnaissance activities that support subsequent operations (Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026). The FBI has also publicly warned that AI increases the speed, scale, and realism of phishing and social engineering, including voice and video cloning (FBI San Francisco, 2024). In the CI domain, this means hostile services and proxies can expand target coverage, improve linguistic quality, and accelerate social graph exploitation with lower manpower. AI narrows the gap between intent and execution.

There is also an analytical security issue that deserves more attention: data exposure to AI platforms during live operations. Amazon’s report indicates that the actor submitted internal victim topology, credentials, and service data into a commercial AI workflow (Moses, 2026). From a counterintelligence standpoint, this is a double-edged phenomenon. It may increase adversary effectiveness, but it also creates potential collection and disruption opportunities, depending on provider visibility, legal authorities, and industry cooperation. More importantly, it means that operationally sensitive network intelligence is now moving through third-party AI services as part of adversary tradecraft. That should influence how we think about public-private partnerships, lawful reporting channels, and rapid deconfliction.

The Fortinet context reinforces a second CI principle, i.e, adversary success often begins with governance failure, not advanced tradecraft. Fortinet’s January 2026 PSIRT analysis documented abuse of FortiCloud SSO and repeatedly emphasized best practices such as restricting administrative access, disabling vulnerable SSO paths, and monitoring for malicious admin creation and anomalous logins (Windsor, 2026). NIST’s National Vulnerability Database entry for CVE-2026-24858 further confirms the seriousness of the authentication bypass exposure affecting multiple Fortinet product lines when FortiCloud SSO was enabled (NIST NVD, 2026). Even if the Amazon campaign did not depend on that specific exploit path, the environment is the same: internet-exposed edge infrastructure, identity weaknesses, and uneven patching create permissive terrain that AI-enabled actors can mine at scale (Moses, 2026; Windsor, 2026; NIST NVD, 2026).

The practical implication is that counterintelligence and cybersecurity must converge more tightly on defensive prioritization. In many organizations, CI is still treated as a narrow insider-threat or foreign-intelligence problem, while cyber defense handles perimeter hygiene and incident response. That separation is increasingly artificial. AI-augmented threat actors blur the boundaries between criminal and state-adjacent tradecraft, between opportunistic access and strategic exploitation, and between cyber intrusion and intelligence preparation of the environment. Europol’s 2025 organized crime threat assessment reporting, as reflected in major coverage, likewise points to AI lowering costs and increasing the scale and sophistication of criminal operations, including cyber-enabled activity and proxy behavior that can intersect with geopolitical interests (Reuters, 2025). The ecosystem is converging.

In my view, the correct response is not panic over “autonomous AI hackers.” Amazon’s report itself argues against that caricature. The actor remained brittle, shallow, and dependent on weak targets (Moses, 2026). The right response is disciplined adaptation in three areas.

Organizations must treat identity and edge administration as counterintelligence terrain, not merely IT hygiene. Exposed management interfaces, weak credentials, and single-factor authentication are now high-confidence enablers of AI-scaled intrusion campaigns (Moses, 2026). MFA, restricted administration paths, credential rotation, and segmentation are not basic controls anymore; they are anti-scaling controls.

Defenders need telemetry designed for workflow detection rather than malware signatures. Amazon explicitly notes the campaign’s use of legitimate open-source tools and recommends behavioral detection over IOC dependence (Moses, 2026). That aligns with the broader AI-enabled threat model. When AI helps actors orchestrate legitimate tools more efficiently, the artifact footprint looks cleaner while the behavioral pattern becomes more machine-like and more repeatable.

Intelligence organizations and enterprises should expand analytic models for adversary assessment. When a low-skill actor can produce high-volume tooling and broad campaign coverage, we must stop equating output polish with strategic sophistication. The key discriminators will be resilience under friction, adaptation under failure, target discipline, and operational security. In the Amazon case, the actor’s poor OPSEC and inability to improvise revealed the underlying limitations despite impressive scale (Moses, 2026). Those are precisely the indicators that counterintelligence tradecraft has always prioritized.

My take, the AI force multiplier threat is real, but its significance is often misunderstood. It really resembles a “brute force” attack reminiscent of the first generation hackers but on steroids. AI is the “steroid”. So, the immediate danger is not superintelligence. It is operational leverage. AI gives mediocre actors the ability to behave like nation-state FIS against poorly defended targets. It accelerates reconnaissance, scripting, planning, and social engineering. It reduces labor costs and time-to-action. It increases campaign breadth. And it does all of this without solving the deeper human problems of judgment, creativity, and tradecraft. For counterintelligence professionals, that means the threat landscape is becoming more crowded, faster-moving, and harder to triage. The strategic answer remains the same as ever: protect critical access, harden identity, improve detection, and refine analytic tradecraft. What has changed is the speed at which failure to do so will be exploited (Moses, 2026; Google Threat Intelligence Group, 2026; Microsoft, 2025; Anthropic, 2025; FBI San Francisco, 2024).

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Anthropic. (2025, August). Vibe hacking: How cybercriminals are using AI coding agents to scale data extortion operations. Anthropic.
  • Bleiberg, J. (2026, February 25). Hackers used AI to breach 600 firewalls in weeks, Amazon says. Insurance Journal.
  • FBI San Francisco. (2024, May 8). FBI warns of increasing threat of cyber criminals utilizing artificial intelligence. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
  • Google Threat Intelligence Group. (2026, February 12). GTIG AI Threat Tracker: Distillation, experimentation, and (continued) integration of AI for adversarial use. Google Cloud Blog.
  • Microsoft. (2025). Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2025: Safeguarding trust in the AI era. Microsoft.
  • Moses, C. (2026, February 20). AI-augmented threat actor accesses FortiGate devices at scale. AWS Security Blog.
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Vulnerability Database. (2026). CVE-2026-24858 detail. NVD.
  • Reuters. (2025, March 18). Europol warns of AI-driven crime threats. Reuters.
  • Windsor, C. (2026, January 22). Analysis of Single Sign-On Abuse on FortiOS. Fortinet PSIRT Blog.
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Estados Unidos debe excluir a la República Dominicana del gravamen

arancel, gravamen, Republica Dominicana, Trump, antidroga, antinarcotico, C. Constantin Poindexter Salcedo

Cooperación antidrogas, alianza estratégica y comercio bilateral bajo CAFTA-DR: por qué Estados Unidos debe excluir a la República Dominicana del gravamen impuesto por Trump.

La decisión del Presidente Trump de imponer un gravamen temporal de importación de 10% por hasta 150 días, bajo la autoridad de la Sección 122, fue presentada como una medida macroeconómica para responder a un problema de balanza de pagos de Estados Unidos (White House, 2026a; White House, 2026b). Sin embargo, aun si se acepta el argumento general de Washington para aplicar una medida de emergencia, no se sigue de ello que la República Dominicana deba ser tratada igual que socios menos confiables, menos integrados o menos cooperativos. La República Dominicana ocupa una categoría estratégica distinta para Estados Unidos, tanto por su valor económico en el marco de CAFTA-DR como por su papel sostenido en seguridad regional, interdicción antidrogas y cooperación operativa. Penalizar comercialmente a un socio que ha sido consistentemente útil a los intereses estadounidenses en el Caribe sería una señal de política exterior equivocada, una mala decisión de política comercial y una acción contraproducente en materia de seguridad hemisférica (USTR, 2025; International Trade Administration, n.d.; Reuters, 2025).

Quiero precisar el contexto. La proclamación de Trump no fue redactada específicamente contra la República Dominicana, sino como un recargo temporal amplio sobre importaciones, justificado por un déficit serio en la balanza de pagos estadounidense (White House, 2026b). El propio texto de la medida reconoce que pueden existir excepciones por interés nacional, por desabastecimiento doméstico o para evitar dislocaciones serias en la oferta (White House, 2026b). Ese punto es decisivo. Si la proclamación ya contempla excepciones por razones de interés nacional, entonces la República Dominicana es precisamente uno de los casos más fuertes para una exclusión o trato preferencial. No se trata de pedir privilegios arbitrarios, sino de aplicar la lógica de la propia norma: un aliado cercano, geográficamente inmediato, altamente interoperable y estructuralmente integrado con la economía estadounidense debe ser evaluado de manera diferenciada (White House, 2026b; USTR, 2025).

En el plano comercial, Estados Unidos tiene una relación singular con la República Dominicana. Bajo datos oficiales del USTR, el comercio total de bienes entre ambos países alcanzó aproximadamente 20,5 mil millones de dólares en 2024, y Estados Unidos registró un superávit comercial en bienes de 5,5 mil millones de dólares con la República Dominicana (USTR, 2025). Ese dato, por sí solo, debilita el argumento para cargar a la República Dominicana con un gravamen correctivo diseñado para enfrentar desequilibrios externos de Estados Unidos. Si Estados Unidos ya mantiene un superávit importante en bienes con ese socio, castigar la relación con un arancel adicional resulta económicamente incoherente. Más aún, las cifras mensuales del Census Bureau para 2025 muestran una pauta persistente de superávit estadounidense en bienes con la República Dominicana, mes tras mes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2026). En otras palabras, la República Dominicana no es el tipo de contraparte comercial que está “vaciando” la economía estadounidense. Al contrario, es un mercado relevante para exportaciones estadounidenses y una plataforma regional que también sostiene cadenas de suministro útiles para Estados Unidos (USTR, 2025; U.S. Census Bureau, 2026).

Ese patrón económico está respaldado por el diseño institucional de CAFTA-DR. Tanto USTR como la International Trade Administration describen CAFTA-DR como una arquitectura para fortalecer comercio, inversión, prosperidad y estabilidad regional, incluyendo explícitamente el objetivo de promover estabilidad en el vecindario estratégico de Estados Unidos (USTR, 2025; International Trade Administration, n.d.). La lógica geoeconómica de CAFTA-DR nunca fue exclusivamente mercantilista; también fue una apuesta por integración regional, previsibilidad regulatoria y estabilidad política en el Caribe y Centroamérica (International Trade Administration, n.d.). Aplicar un gravamen general sin excluir a la República Dominicana erosiona esa lógica y debilita la credibilidad de Estados Unidos como socio contractual. En términos prácticos, una medida de este tipo encarece comercio legítimo, introduce volatilidad en cadenas de suministro y puede incentivar desvíos de comercio hacia jurisdicciones menos alineadas con Washington, algo contrario al interés estratégico estadounidense (International Trade Administration, n.d.; White House, 2026b).

El segundo eje, y quizá el más importante para su planteamiento, es la seguridad nacional y la lucha contra el narcotráfico. La cooperación dominico-estadounidense en materia antidrogas no es reciente ni superficial. El Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de la República Dominicana mantiene registro oficial de acuerdos bilaterales vigentes, incluyendo el acuerdo de 1995 para suprimir el tráfico ilícito por mar de estupefacientes y sustancias psicotrópicas y el protocolo de 2003 relativo a operaciones marítimas antidrogas entre ambos gobiernos (MIREX, 1995/2026; MIREX, 2003/2026). Esos instrumentos evidencian continuidad institucional y una cooperación formal de décadas, no una improvisación coyuntural. Además, el propio presidente Abinader explicó recientemente que el acuerdo operativo actual con Estados Unidos es una extensión de marcos bilaterales que se remontan precisamente a 1995 y 2003, según reportó Reuters (Reuters, 2025).

La dimensión operativa de esa cooperación también está documentada por agencias estadounidenses. La DEA describe al Caribe como una región históricamente vulnerable al narcotráfico de cocaína hacia Estados Unidos y subraya la coordinación con otras agencias estadounidenses y socios regionales para enfrentar ese flujo (DEA, 2026). Dentro de esa arquitectura, la República Dominicana tiene un peso obvio por geografía, conectividad aérea y marítima, y capacidad de interdicción. A esto se suma que U.S. Southern Command reportó en 2024 una donación de una aeronave a la República Dominicana específicamente para reforzar la lucha compartida contra el narcotráfico, mejorar el control aéreo-marítimo y ampliar la interoperabilidad bilateral (U.S. Southern Command, 2024). Esa donación no fue un gesto simbólico aislado. Fue una inversión estadounidense en capacidad operativa dominicana precisamente porque Washington reconoce el valor de Santo Domingo como socio de seguridad confiable (U.S. Southern Command, 2024).

La cooperación alcanzó un punto particularmente significativo con el permiso reciente para operaciones logísticas estadounidenses en áreas restringidas de la Base Aérea de San Isidro y del Aeropuerto Las Américas. AP reportó que el presidente Abinader autorizó acceso limitado para reabastecimiento y apoyo técnico de personal y equipos estadounidenses, en el contexto de la lucha contra el narcotráfico, y que el secretario de Defensa estadounidense describió a la República Dominicana como un socio que “ha dado un paso al frente” (AP, 2025). Reuters precisó además que el acuerdo fue presentado por Abinader como temporal, logístico y no combatiente, con vigencia hasta abril de 2026, y como parte de una estrategia regional de interdicción más amplia (Reuters, 2025). Desde la perspectiva de política exterior estadounidense, esto es exactamente el tipo de cooperación que Washington suele pedir a sus socios: acceso, coordinación, flexibilidad operacional y respaldo político interno para medidas sensibles (AP, 2025; Reuters, 2025).

Aquí conviene hacer una precisión jurídica importante respecto de su premisa sobre la Constitución dominicana. La Constitución de la República Dominicana no establece una prohibición absoluta y automática de toda presencia de tropas extranjeras. Lo que sí hace es someterla a un control político estricto. El Senado puede autorizar, a solicitud del presidente y en ausencia de convenio que lo permita, la presencia de tropas extranjeras en ejercicios militares, y debe determinar tiempo y condiciones de estadía (Constitución de la República Dominicana, 2015, art. 80.6). Ese texto constitucional demuestra que el tema es altamente sensible y constitucionalmente reglado, no libre ni discrecional (Constitución de la República Dominicana, 2015). A la vez, medios dominicanos han recordado que el Tribunal Constitucional insistió en que cualquier presencia de tropas extranjeras debe estar sujeta a plazo concreto y condiciones puntuales, precisamente para proteger la soberanía y evitar permanencias indeterminadas (Listín Diario, 2025). Lejos de debilitar su argumento, esta precisión lo fortalece. La República Dominicana no solo cooperó con Estados Unidos, sino que lo hizo dentro de un marco legal y político interno que exige cuidado institucional y costos domésticos de legitimación (Constitución de la República Dominicana, 2015; Reuters, 2025; Listín Diario, 2025).

Desde una perspectiva de reciprocidad estratégica, Estados Unidos debería reconocer ese costo político dominicano. En política internacional, las alianzas no se sostienen solo con declaraciones; se sostienen con señales concretas de trato preferente cuando el aliado asume riesgos o cargas para apoyar objetivos comunes. La República Dominicana ha aportado cooperación antidrogas sostenida, ha mantenido tratados vigentes, ha permitido coordinación operativa logística en instalaciones sensibles, y ha respaldado una agenda de seguridad regional que beneficia directamente a Estados Unidos en un corredor clave del Caribe (MIREX, 1995/2026; MIREX, 2003/2026; AP, 2025; Reuters, 2025). Responder a eso con un gravamen uniforme transmite el mensaje opuesto al deseado: que para Washington la lealtad estratégica y la cooperación de seguridad no generan dividendos políticos ni comerciales. Esa señal puede enfriar la voluntad futura de otros socios regionales para otorgar acceso, compartir inteligencia o asumir controversias internas en apoyo a prioridades estadounidenses.

También hay un argumento de eficiencia estratégica. Estados Unidos ya enfrenta un entorno hemisférico más competitivo, con mayor actividad diplomática de potencias extrahemisféricas y presión persistente del crimen organizado transnacional. En ese contexto, la República Dominicana funciona como plataforma de estabilidad relativa y socio institucionalmente capaz en el Caribe. Dañar el vínculo económico mediante un gravamen indiscriminado no fortalece a Estados Unidos; lo hace más dependiente de esquemas de coerción de corto plazo en lugar de consolidar alianzas duraderas (USTR, 2025; DEA, 2026; Reuters, 2025). La mejor práctica de gran estrategia es alinear instrumentos: comercio, seguridad y diplomacia deben reforzarse mutuamente. Si Washington pide cooperación contra el narcotráfico y obtiene resultados, debe evitar medidas comerciales que debiliten la base política y económica de ese mismo socio.

Ok, ¿y entonces? La opción razonable para Estados Unidos no es defender el gravamen “tal cual” frente a la República Dominicana, sino activar una exclusión específica, una dispensa administrativa o un tratamiento preferente compatible con la proclamación y con el interés nacional estadounidense. La propia proclamación ya prevé excepciones; el caso dominicano satisface sobradamente el criterio de interés nacional por tres razones acumulativas: superávit estadounidense en bienes con la República Dominicana, integración estructural bajo CAFTA-DR, y cooperación demostrada en interdicción antidrogas y logística operativa regional (White House, 2026b; USTR, 2025; U.S. Census Bureau, 2026; MIREX, 1995/2026; MIREX, 2003/2026; Reuters, 2025; AP, 2025). En términos de costo-beneficio, excluir a la República Dominicana tendría un costo fiscal marginal para Washington y un beneficio estratégico desproporcionadamente alto.

Estados Unidos debe eliminar o exceptuar el gravamen aplicado a la República Dominicana porque la relación bilateral con Santo Domingo no es una relación comercial ordinaria. Es una relación de vecindad estratégica, integración económica y cooperación de seguridad de largo plazo. La República Dominicana ha sido un socio constante en la lucha contra el narcotráfico y ha demostrado recientemente un nivel de colaboración operativa particularmente sensible y útil para Estados Unidos. Castigarnos un socio fiel y ‘buen amigo’ con un arancel uniforme contradice los datos comerciales, debilita la lógica de CAFTA-DR y envía una mala señal geopolítica al Caribe. Si Washington quiere aliados confiables, debe tratarlos como tales también en su política comercial (USTR, 2025; International Trade Administration, n.d.; DEA, 2026; Reuters, 2025; AP, 2025).

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación U.S. DoD/DoS BFFOC, Dipl. Diplomacia Global, Dipl. Derechos Humanos por USIDHR

Bibliografía

  • AP. (2025, noviembre 26). Dominican Republic grants US access to restricted areas for fight against drugs.
  • Constitución de la República Dominicana. (2015). Presidencia de la República Dominicana, art. 80.6.
  • DEA. (2026). Caribbean Field Division / Foreign Offices in the Caribbean. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration.
  • International Trade Administration. (n.d.). U.S.–CAFTA-DR Free Trade Agreement. U.S. Department of Commerce.
  • Listín Diario. (2025, noviembre 27). En 2015, el Tribunal Constitucional rechazó un acuerdo entre RD y EEUU similar al anunciado por Abinader.
  • MIREX. (2026). Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la República Dominicana y el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América para suprimir el tráfico ilícito por mar de estupefacientes y sustancias psicotrópicas (suscrito 23 de marzo de 1995).
  • MIREX. (2026). Protocolo entre el Gobierno de la República Dominicana y el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América del Acuerdo relativo a las operaciones marítimas antidrogas (suscrito 20 de mayo de 2003).
  • Reuters. (2025, diciembre 1). Dominican Republic’s anti-drug deal with US to run through April, president says.
  • U.S. Census Bureau. (2026). U.S. Trade in Goods with Dominican Republic (monthly trade balance tables).
  • U.S. Southern Command. (2024, febrero 20). US Government Donates Aircraft to Dominican Republic to Combat Narcotics Trafficking.
  • USTR. (2025). Dominican Republic country trade summary.
  • White House. (2026a, febrero). Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Imposes a Temporary Import Duty to Address Fundamental International Payment Problems.
  • White House. (2026b, febrero). Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems (Presidential Proclamation).
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Reforma Minera y la Seguridad Nacional Dominicana

Minerd, CAMIPE, reforma minera, seguridad nacional dominicana, C. Constantin Poindexter Salcedo, Republica Dominicana

Reforma minera, gobernanza territorial y seguridad nacional dominicana en la República Dominicana

La discusión sobre la reforma de la ley minera en la República Dominicana no debe plantearse únicamente como un debate de crecimiento económico o de permisos sectoriales. Debe analizarse también (y para mí, primordialmente) como una cuestión de seguridad nacional, de fortalecimiento institucional y de gobernanza del territorio. Desde esa perspectiva, la aprobación de una reforma moderna y rigurosa resulta no solo conveniente, sino necesaria. Mi posición es que el Estado debe aprobar una reforma legal del sector minero, en línea con la propuesta impulsada por CAMIPE, porque una minería mejor regulada puede aumentar la resiliencia económica del país, ampliar la capacidad del Estado para ejercer control territorial, reducir espacios para economías ilegales y mejorar la protección ambiental mediante reglas más estrictas y fiscalización más efectiva (Forbes Dominicana, 2026; Ministerio de Energía y Minas [MEM], 2025a; EITI-RD, 2024).

Es importante comenzar por una concesión explícita. Sí, existen señales negativas en la experiencia reciente de la minería dominicana. Se han documentado conflictos sociales en torno a grandes proyectos, controversias por reasentamientos, cuestionamientos sobre relaves y denuncias de daños ambientales en actividades extractivas, especialmente en minería no metálica y extracción de agregados (El País, 2025a, 2025b; The Guardian, 2024). También hay evidencia de operaciones ilegales y de incumplimientos en permisos ambientales, como la intervención de una mina de agregados en Nigua por operar tras un cierre definitivo (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales [MIMARENA], 2026). Esas señales son reales y no deben negarse. Sin embargo, la conclusión correcta no es frenar la reforma, sino exactamente la contraria: acelerar una reforma legal robusta que cierre vacíos, eleve estándares y fortalezca el poder regulatorio y sancionador del Estado.

El primer argumento a favor de la reforma es de carácter estratégico y macroeconómico. En un entorno global marcado por competencia geopolítica, volatilidad de cadenas de suministro y creciente importancia de minerales estratégicos, la minería ya no es una actividad meramente extractiva; es una variable de seguridad nacional económica dominicana. Organismos internacionales como la Agencia Internacional de Energía han subrayado que el acceso a minerales críticos se ha convertido en un asunto central para la seguridad energética, industrial y geopolítica de los Estados (International Energy Agency [IEA], 2024). Aunque la matriz minera dominicana no sea idéntica a la de grandes productores de minerales críticos, el principio aplica plenamente: un sector minero formal, productivo y bien gobernado aumenta divisas, fortalece ingresos fiscales y mejora la capacidad de financiamiento del Estado, elementos indispensables para cualquier política seria de seguridad nacional (MEM, 2025b).

En el caso dominicano, el propio Ministerio de Energía y Minas ha sostenido que el sector minero aporta de manera significativa al producto interno bruto, al producto industrial y a los ingresos fiscales, y que una modernización normativa permitiría incrementar su contribución al desarrollo nacional (MEM, 2025a, 2025b). El artículo de Forbes Dominicana que motivó esta discusión recoge precisamente esa tesis sectorial: con una reforma de ley presentada por el sector, la minería podría aumentar sustancialmente su peso en el PIB (Forbes Dominicana, 2025). Desde una lógica de seguridad nacional, esa posibilidad no es menor. Un Estado con mejor recaudación y mayor capacidad exportadora dispone de más recursos para financiar inteligencia, seguridad pública, infraestructura crítica, protección de fronteras y respuesta a emergencias. La seguridad nacional no se sostiene solo con doctrina y fuerza coercitiva; también se sostiene con base fiscal.

El segundo argumento es institucional. Una nueva ley bien diseñada puede transformar la minería de un foco potencial de conflictividad en un campo de fortalecimiento estatal. La República Dominicana ya cuenta con un andamiaje ambiental relevante, con licencias, permisos, evaluaciones de impacto, programas de manejo y mecanismos de fiscalización, como ha documentado EITI-RD (EITI-RD, 2024). El problema principal no ha sido la ausencia absoluta de normas, sino la coexistencia de reglas fragmentadas, procesos lentos, asimetrías de fiscalización y, en algunos segmentos, baja capacidad de enforcement. Una reforma integral permitiría ordenar ese sistema, clarificar competencias, elevar sanciones, estandarizar monitoreo y hacer más exigible el cumplimiento ambiental.

En otras palabras, una reforma no tiene que ser sinónimo de “flexibilización”. Puede y debe ser una reforma de rigor. Este punto es clave para responder a quienes temen que una nueva ley equivalga a una licencia para contaminar. Si el texto legal incorpora estándares modernos de evaluación ambiental, obligaciones de monitoreo continuo, auditorías independientes, trazabilidad de materiales, garantías financieras suficientes para remediación y cierres de mina, y mecanismos de participación comunitaria verificables, la reforma puede reducir el riesgo ambiental respecto del marco actual (EITI-RD, 2024; MEM, 2025a). La pregunta no es si regular más o menos, sino si regular mejor.

El tercer argumento se vincula con la seguridad territorial y el combate a economías ilícitas. En la práctica dominicana, una parte de los mayores daños ambientales y sociales no proviene necesariamente de la gran minería formal bajo escrutinio público, sino de actividades ilegales o semiinformales, especialmente en extracción de agregados. Los reportajes sobre la llamada “ruta de la arena” describen escenarios de destrucción ambiental, violencia, impunidad y penetración criminal que exceden el campo administrativo y entran de lleno en el ámbito de la seguridad interna (El País, 2025b). Ese tipo de fenómeno demuestra que el vacío regulatorio, la debilidad de supervisión y la fragmentación institucional son más peligrosos que un marco legal fuerte.

Pues, aprobar una reforma rigurosa es también una forma de negar espacio operativo a redes ilegales. Una ley moderna puede exigir registros unificados de operadores, georreferenciación de frentes extractivos, interoperabilidad entre autoridades ambientales, mineras, tributarias y de seguridad, y protocolos de inspección más agresivos. Puede tipificar mejor incumplimientos graves y crear consecuencias reales para quienes operen al margen de la ley. La experiencia comparada muestra que los mercados ilícitos florecen cuando el Estado carece de inteligencia regulatoria y capacidad de supervisión. Una reforma bien estructurada fortalece justamente esas capacidades y más ampliamente la seguridad nacional dominicana.

El cuarto argumento, que suele subestimarse, es la seguridad hídrica y de infraestructura crítica. Las preocupaciones sobre contaminación, relaves, uso de agua y afectación de ríos no deben descartarse; deben integrarse al diseño normativo. Allí es donde una reforma puede producir su mayor legitimidad. La lección de los conflictos recientes no es que toda minería sea incompatible con el ambiente, sino que la minería sin monitoreo transparente y sin respuesta estatal creíble erosiona la confianza pública (El País, 2025a; The Guardian, 2024). En consecuencia, una ley reformada debería imponer monitoreo de calidad de agua con datos públicos, protocolos de alertas tempranas, auditorías externas obligatorias y sanciones automáticas por incumplimiento de parámetros ambientales.

De hecho, existen indicios de que la institucionalidad dominicana ya se mueve en esa dirección, con informes técnicos oficiales de monitoreo y con intervenciones administrativas cuando se detectan operaciones irregulares (MEM, 2024; MIMARENA, 2026). Una reforma de ley puede consolidar esas prácticas en obligaciones permanentes y no solo en respuestas puntuales. Eso reduce la discrecionalidad, mejora la trazabilidad de la información y da al Estado un instrumento más sólido para actuar antes de que el daño ambiental se convierta en crisis social o de seguridad.

Un quinto beneficio de la reforma es la reducción de conflictividad social a través de reglas claras. En la minería, buena parte del conflicto nace de percepciones (a veces correctas, a veces disparates) de opacidad, promesas incumplidas o falta de compensación justa. Cuando el marco legal no define con precisión los deberes de consulta, reasentamiento, mitigación y reparación, el conflicto se traslada a la calle, al litigio o a campañas de presión mediática (The Guardian, 2024; El País, 2025a). Una nueva ley con procedimientos claros, cronogramas obligatorios, estándares de compensación, verificadores independientes y canales formales de reclamación puede contener esa conflictividad antes de que escale.

Aquí conviene volver a las “señales negativas” y ponerlas en su justa dimensión. Sí, hay casos que evidencian tensiones serias. Pero no constituyen una prueba de que el sector minero, por naturaleza, sea ingobernable o incompatible con el interés nacional. Constituyen, más bien, una prueba de que el Estado necesita un marco legal actualizado que le permita gobernarlo mejor. En términos de análisis de riesgo, esos episodios son riesgos gestionables, no fatalidades inevitables. La clave está en transformar riesgos difusos en riesgos regulados, con controles, métricas y consecuencias. Una reforma legal rigurosa logra precisamente eso.

Debe considerarse el impacto reputacional y de clima de inversión. La inversión minera de calidad tiende a dirigirse a jurisdicciones con reglas claras, tiempos previsibles y exigencias ambientales comprensibles. Lo contrario —ambigüedad legal, discrecionalidad y aplicación errática— no protege el ambiente: suele expulsar a operadores formales y dejar espacio a operadores de peor perfil. Una reforma moderna, técnicamente sólida y ambientalmente estricta puede atraer inversión más responsable y, al mismo tiempo, elevar el estándar de cumplimiento para todos. Desde la seguridad nacional, eso importa porque un sector formalizable y fiscalizable siempre es preferible a una economía extractiva parcialmente opaca.

Además, la reforma contribuiría a una mejor inteligencia económica y ambiental del Estado. En la actualidad, una parte de la debilidad estatal proviene de información dispersa entre ministerios, permisos, expedientes y fiscalizaciones no integradas. Una ley nueva puede exigir sistemas de reporte estandarizados y datos interoperables, facilitando la detección de anomalías, el seguimiento de riesgos y la priorización de inspecciones. Ese componente de “inteligencia regulatoria” es esencial para la seguridad nacional dominicana moderna. No basta con tener normas; hay que tener visibilidad situacional sobre lo que ocurre en el territorio, en tiempo útil y con datos verificables.

En suma, la reforma de la ley minera debe ser entendida como una política de Estado con tres objetivos simultáneos: desarrollo económico, protección ambiental y fortalecimiento de la seguridad nacional dominicana. Las críticas ambientales y sociales no invalidan ese proyecto; lo hacen más urgente. Precisamente porque existen antecedentes de incumplimiento, conflictividad y minería ilegal, la República Dominicana necesita una ley más clara, más técnica y más exigente. Una reforma bien diseñada no relativiza el ambiente: lo protege mejor al elevar los costos del incumplimiento y al ampliar la capacidad de control del Estado (EITI-RD, 2024; MIMARENA, 2026; MEM, 2025a).

Concluyo declarando mi posición sobre la propuesta de CAMIPE. Opino que la propuesta de CAMIPE debe ser aprobada, siempre que su incorporación legislativa preserve y fortalezca estándares ambientales, de fiscalización y de transparencia. La razón central es que una reforma moderna aumentaría la seguridad nacional al reforzar la base fiscal del Estado, mejorar el control territorial sobre actividades extractivas, reducir espacios para economías ilegales y convertir la gestión ambiental en una función más exigible y verificable. Las señales negativas observadas en años recientes son reales, pero su gravedad puede ser sustancialmente contenida por una nueva ley que regule rigurosamente el sector, integre mejores controles y haga efectiva la responsabilidad de los operadores. En ese sentido, la reforma no representa una concesión al sector minero, sino una oportunidad para que el Estado gobierne mejor un recurso estratégico y lo convierta en una fuente de estabilidad, legitimidad y seguridad nacional dominicana (Forbes Dominicana, 2025; MEM, 2025a; EITI-RD, 2024; IEA, 2024).

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación U.S. DoD/DoS BFFOC, Dipl. Diplomacia Global, Dipl. Derechos Humanos por USIDHR

Bibliografía

  • EITI-RD. (2024). Quinto informe contextual de la Iniciativa para la Transparencia de las Industrias Extractivas en la República Dominicana.
  • El País. (2025a, 31 de enero). El verdadero coste del oro: un nuevo proyecto minero reaviva un viejo conflicto en República Dominicana.
  • El País. (2025b, 8 de agosto). La ruta de la arena: asesinatos, impunidad y destrucción ambiental en República Dominicana.
  • Forbes Dominicana. (2026). La minería podría duplicar su peso en el PIB con la reforma de la ley presentada por el sector.
  • International Energy Agency. (2024). Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024.
  • Ministerio de Energía y Minas (MEM). (2024). Informe técnico de calidad de agua en áreas de incidencia mina Pueblo Viejo (diciembre 2024).
  • Ministerio de Energía y Minas (MEM). (2025a). Ley minera dominicana se prepara para un marco normativo moderno.
  • Ministerio de Energía y Minas (MEM). (2025b). Minería dominicana registra avances clave en inversión, exportaciones y desarrollo comunitario en 2025.
  • Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (MIMARENA). (2026). Medio Ambiente interviene mina de agregados en Nigua por operar ilegalmente tras cierre definitivo.
  • Presidencia de la República Dominicana. (2025). Gobierno informa sobre avances en revisión y reforma de la ley minera.
  • The Guardian. (2024, 21 de mayo). “It’s a barbarity”: why are hundreds of families asking to be moved away from this Dominican Republic goldmine?

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Operation Absolute Resolve, Claude and the Weaponization of A.I.

intelligence, counterintelligence, national defence, war, weaponization, artificial intelligence, Anthropic, Claude, C. Constantin Poindexter

“Anthropic appears to be the “canary in the coal mine.” They are the first in public view to be used in a classified operation, and they are the first to be pushed back against.”

The convergence of artificial intelligence and military strategy has now been a subject of theoretical speculation for quite some time. The operational reality of this convergence is now being written in real-time. The January 2026 mission to capture former Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, codenamed “Operation Absolute Resolve,” stands as the first definitive deployment of Anthropic’s AI model, Claude, within a classified U.S. military operation (Reuters, 2026). This event marks a pivotal moment in the defense sector, moving AI from the realm of administrative support to the front lines of kinetic warfare. By examining the mechanics of Claude’s integration through Palantir, the friction between Anthropic’s safety-first philosophy and the Pentagon’s lethality requirements, and the broader geopolitical implications for AI development, I argue that this operation represents not merely a tactical success but also clearly the “no going back now” weaponization of Large Language Models (LLMs) in modern conflict.

The deployment of Claude in Operation Absolute Resolve was facilitated through a complex network of public and private partnerships. The operation itself was a conventional military endeavor, involving aerial bombardment of multiple sites in Caracas and the deployment of special forces to secure the capture of Maduro and his wife (Reuters, 2026). However, the intelligence and targeting data that informed these decisions were processed and synthesized by Claude, an LLM designed initially for civilian applications. This integration was achieved via Anthropic’s partnership with Palantir Technologies, a data analytics company whose software is a staple in the Defense Department’s infrastructure (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). Palantir’s role was critical, acting as the bridge between the proprietary security environments of the military and the open-source capabilities of commercial AI. This infrastructure allowed for the ingestion of classified intelligence, the rapid analysis of vast datasets, and the generation of actionable strategic recommendations. Claude effectively functioned as a force multiplier for human command.

The significance of Claude’s role in this operation cannot be overstated. It represents a shift in the utility of AI within the military. While earlier iterations of AI in the Pentagon were often relegated to “unclassified” tasks such as summarizing documents or generating routine reports, the use of Claude in a classified, kinetic mission indicates a maturation of the technology (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). The sources suggest that the model was capable of processing the nuanced geopolitical and tactical data required to support a complex operation of this magnitude. This capability suggests that the Pentagon is beginning to utilize LLMs not just as assistants, but as analytical engines capable of processing the “fog of war” (Kania, 2023). The operational success of the mission implicitly validates the Pentagon’s investment in frontier AI, suggesting that the technology is now ready for high-stakes decision-making environments where the margin for error is measured in lives and geopolitical stability.

Despite the operational success, the deployment of Claude exposes a fundamental philosophical conflict within the AI industry and between the AI industry and the U.S. government. Anthropic was founded with a specific mission: to build AI that is “helpful, honest, and harmless” (Anthropic, 2024). This philosophy is codified in their usage guidelines, which explicitly prohibit the use of Claude to “facilitate violence, develop weapons or conduct surveillance” (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). The irony of using a model designed for safety to plan and execute a military operation that involved bombing and the capture of a head of state is stark. This contradiction highlights the tension between the “safety-first” approach championed by Anthropic and the “kill chain” mentality required by the Pentagon. For a company that has built its brand on rigorous safety testing and the prevention of AI harm, being used in a military operation appears to be a double-edged sword. It proves the utility of their model, yet it forces them to participate in the very violence they have spent years trying to mitigate.

This conflict has escalated into a broader strategic battle between Anthropic and the Trump administration. The administration has pursued a low-regulation AI strategy, aiming to rapidly deploy technology to maintain global competitive advantage. In contrast, Anthropic has been vocal about the risks of AI in autonomous lethal operations and domestic surveillance, pushing for greater regulation and guardrails (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). The friction came to a head in January 2026, when Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that the Department of Defense would not “employ AI models that won’t allow you to fight wars” (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). This comment was widely interpreted as a direct rebuke of Anthropic, signaling a preference for models that prioritize speed and lethality over safety. The Pentagon’s Chief Spokesman, Sean Parnell, echoed this sentiment, emphasizing that the nation requires partners willing to help warfighters “win in any fight” (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). For the Trump administration, Anthropic’s insistence on safety protocols was viewed as an impediment to the efficient execution of military strategy.

The potential fallout from this ideological clash is significant, particularly regarding the $200 million contract awarded to Anthropic last summer. Sources indicate that the administration is considering canceling or restructuring this contract due to Anthropic’s reluctance to cede control over AI deployment to the military (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). The contract was awarded as a pilot program to test the integration of frontier AI into the Defense Department, but the resulting friction suggests that the Pentagon is wary of models that might impose constraints on their operational flexibility. This situation places Anthropic in a precarious position. If they adhere strictly to their safety guidelines, they risk losing their most valuable government contracts to competitors who are more willing to accommodate military needs. If they compromise their values to secure the deal, they risk alienating their core customer base and undermining their brand identity as the “safe” alternative to OpenAI and Google (Kaplan, 2024).

The weaponization of AI in Operation Absolute Resolve also highlights the growing competitive landscape among AI developers. While Anthropic was ostensibly the first to be used in classified operations, competitors like OpenAI and Google have already established a foothold in the military sector. Google’s Gemini and OpenAI’s ChatGPT are already deployed on platforms used by millions of military personnel for analysis and research (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). The deployment of Claude in the Maduro mission positions Anthropic as a contender in this emerging arms race, but it also underscores the speed at which the military is adopting these technologies. The fact that other tools may have been used for unclassified tasks alongside Claude suggests that the military is conducting a wide-scale evaluation of available AI capabilities (The Wall Street Journal, 2026). For Anthropic, the pressure is on to demonstrate that their model offers unique advantages that justify their safety constraints in a combat environment.

The operation sheds light on the broader trend of AI integration into the “kill chain.” The military is increasingly interested in using AI for everything from controlling autonomous drones to optimizing supply chains and predicting enemy movements. The use of Claude in a high-profile operation like the capture of Maduro serves as a proof-of-concept for these more advanced applications. It demonstrates that LLMs can handle the complex, multi-variable problems inherent in modern warfare. However, it also raises difficult questions about accountability. If Claude were to make a mistake in targeting that resulted in civilian casualties or mission failure, who would be held responsible? The military or the AI company? This question is central to the debate over the weaponization of AI and highlights the need for clear protocols and liability frameworks as these systems become more integrated into military operations (Scharre, 2018).

The operational details of the Maduro mission also suggest a new level of integration between data analytics and kinetic action. The bombing of several sites in Caracas indicates a coordinated effort to eliminate potential escape routes and secure the perimeter (Reuters, 2026). The use of AI in this phase of the operation implies that the targeting data was processed rapidly and accurately, allowing for a synchronized military response. This level of coordination would have been difficult to achieve without advanced data analytics and AI-driven decision support systems. So, the success of this mission can be partially attributed to the technological edge provided by Claude and Palantir ecosystem. This success will likely encourage further integration and deployment of AI in warfighting, creating a feedback loop where operational victories drive further technological adoption (Belfiore, 2022).

The geopolitical implications of this extend beyond the immediate success of the Maduro snatch. As other nations observe the U.S. military’s effective use of AI in a real-world conflict, they are likely to accelerate their own AI development programs. The “Absolute Resolve” mission serves as a demonstration of power, not just in terms of military force, but in terms of technological superiority. This will most assuredly trigger an arms race in AI. Nations and non-state actors will compete not just on the size of their armed forces, but on the sophistication of their AI models. For the United States, maintaining this technological edge is a strategic imperative. Successful deployment of Claude is a step in that direction but it is also a shrill alarm of the risks of an AI arms race. The potential for miscalculation, warfighting error and the erosion of ethical norms in warfare is high (Yuan et al., 2023).

Operation Absolute Resolve represents a transformative moment in the history of both warfare and artificial intelligence. The deployment of Claude in the capture of Nicolás Maduro demonstrates the growing capability of LLMs to support complex military operations. It also highlights the tension between safety-focused AI development and the demands of national security. While the mission was a tactical success, it has exposed the friction between Anthropic’s philosophical commitment to “no use in violence” and the Department of Defense’s need for lethality. As the Pentagon reviews its contracts and the competitive landscape of AI continues to evolve, the lessons learned from “Absolute Resolve” will in no small part shape the future of AI in the military. The weaponization of AI is no longer theoretical. It is real, and it is redefining the nature of conflict. The question that remains is whether the military will continue to prioritize speed and capability over safety and ethical considerations, or whether it will find a way to integrate the two to create a new paradigm of intelligent warfare.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Anthropic. “Anthropic’s Mission and Approach to AI Safety.” Anthropic Blog. Accessed February 17, 2026. https://www.anthropic.com/index/anthropics-mission-and-approach-to-ai-safety.
  • Belfiore, E. (2022). Technological Warfare: The Future of AI in Military Conflict. Oxford University Press.
  • Kania, J. (2023). “The Fog of War and the Rise of Algorithmic Command.” Journal of Military Strategy, 15(3), 45-62.
  • Kaplan, A. (2024). “The Safety Paradox: How AI Companies Balance Ethics and Growth.” MIT Technology Review, 127(1), 22-31.
  • Reuters. “U.S. military used Anthropic’s Claude AI in operation to capture Maduro.” Reuters. February 5, 2026.
  • Scharre, P. (2018). Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War. W. W. Norton & Company.
  • The Wall Street Journal. “Pentagon’s Use of Claude in Maduro Capture Raises Questions About AI Safety.” The Wall Street Journal. February 3, 2026.
  • Yuan, K., et al. (2023). “Geopolitical Competition in Artificial Intelligence: A Framework for Analysis.” International Security, 47(4), 1-32.
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Soberanía, derecho y puta fatiga moral: República Dominicana, la presión internacional, y Haití

republica dominicana, haiti, migracion, inmigracion, soberania, C. Constantin Poindexter Salcedo

Existe una fatiga pura nuestra, cívica, fiscal, institucional y emocional. YA no cabe en el lenguaje diplomático cordial lo que no tiene madre. Durante años, foros internacionales y organizaciones transnacionales han insistido en una narrativa cómoda (para ellos), que la República Dominicana debe absorber, administrar y “resolver” las consecuencias y dilemas del colapso TOTAL estatal haitiano y a la vez ordenar la frontera y SIN repatriar a quienes están en condición irregular. Ese tamaño disparate merece condena automática. Ese encuadre no solo es injusto, es metodológicamente mierda. Con frecuencia se nos habla como si fuésemos un apéndice obligado de la crisis ajena, y se nos exige desde sus despachos cómodos en países ricos y distantes, lo que no se exige con igual rigor a Estados grandes, ricos y geopolíticamente poderosos. Una y otra vez la presión viene, “que internalicemos costos sociales y presupuestarios” cuando de verdad pertenecen a una emergencia regional. Esto, para cualquier nación que no sea nosotros, sería inaceptable y rotundamente rechazado. Para un país pequeño, que además comparte una frontera terrestre activa con un estado fallido, es una fórmula de desgaste permanente. ¿Somos “nación” o estamos de adorno? Maldito bulto de sal nos ven.

La irritación nacional (y ya la tenemos) no debe confundirse con hostilidad hacia seres humanos. Una cosa es reconocer la dignidad intrínseca de toda persona, otra muy distinta sugerir que la República Dominicana carece de derecho a decidir quién ingresa, bajo qué reglas permanece y en qué condiciones se regulariza o se repatria. El discurso que pretende dictarnos qué “tenemos” que hacer con “los haitianos” , como si el Estado dominicano fuese una simple parada de guaguas sin ni una pizca de soberanía, ¡es mierda! Tamaño erosión del principio básico de igualdad soberana es. La soberanía no es una consigna. Es un elemento constitutivo del Estado nuestro expresamente protegido por la Constitución (Constitución de la República Dominicana, art. 3).

Habiendo dicho eso, la declaración el viernes del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MIREX) debe leerse como lo que es, una defensa jurídica y política de la potestad estatal de gobernar la migración, cosa que hacemos SIN renunciar al deber de respetar derechos humanos. El comunicado afirma con bastante claridad que el fenómeno migratorio debe analizarse regionalmente porque la crisis política, de seguridad y humanitaria en Haití ha generado una presión “sostenida y excepcional” sobre la República Dominicana. Por décadas el Estado dominicano ha asumido una carga desproporcionada (MIREX, 7 de febrero de 2026). Tan desproporcionada es que si usted entra un hospital del oeste y encuentra una paturienta dominicana, LEIDSA le prohíbe de sus establecimientos de por vida. Esa afirmación no es una excusa. Es el contexto causal. Ignorar el contexto es convertir la evaluación de derechos en un ejercicio abstracto que termina penalizando a NOSOTROS, un estado que sí funciona.

El MIREX reivindica que regular ingreso, permanencia y salida es un atributo esencial de soberanía, pero subraya que no se ejerce de modo discrecional, sino conforme a la Constitución, la legislación nacional y estándares internacionales de derechos humanos (MIREX, 7 de febrero de 2026). Este es un punto de bastante envergadura, . . . la soberanía no es carta blanca. Es competencia legítima dentro de “límites”. En el derecho interamericano, esa tensión se resuelve con un estándar exigente. El Estado puede controlar su política migratoria, pero debe hacerlo con garantías mínimas (i.e., debido proceso, prohibición de expulsiones colectivas, trato digno) y, cuando corresponda, respeto al principio de no devolución.

Obvio, el pasaje más controvertido del comunicado (el rechazo a aplicar el principio de no devolución “de manera general a todo migrante en condición migratoria irregular”) es, conceptualmente, una objeción a la generalización indiscriminada, no una negación de obligaciones internacionales (MIREX, 7 de febrero de 2026). En el derecho internacional de refugiados, la no devolución se formula de manera clásica en el artículo 33 de la Convención de 1951, que prohíbe devolver a una persona refugiada a territorios donde su vida o libertad peligren por motivos protegidos (Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados, 1951, art. 33). En el sistema interamericano, el artículo 22 de la Convención Americana también contiene salvaguardas relevantes: prohíbe la expulsión colectiva de extranjeros y prohíbe expulsar o devolver cuando la vida o libertad esté en riesgo en términos protegidos (Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, art. 22.8–22.9). Dicho de forma directa: el principio opera con umbrales y supuestos, i.e., riesgo real, categorías protegidas, y procedimientos, NO equivale, jurídicamente, a un “derecho universal” de entrada o permanencia para toda persona en situación irregular. De ahí que el debate serio no sea “soberanía v. derechos”, sino cómo se estructura una política de control migratorio que sea eficaz y, a la vez, compatible con los estándares que la propia CIDH ha sistematizado para personas migrantes (CIDH, 2019).

¿Ven? La defensa del MIREX es coherente. NINGUN FORO ni organización de estados nos puede obligar a sustituir el estado colapsado de Haití en la provisión de servicios y protección a su población. Este idea, en términos de política pública, apunta a un límite material: salud, educación, seguridad, presupuesto (MIREX, 7 de febrero de 2026). La insistencia dominicana en una respuesta internacional “efectiva, solidaria y corresponsable” a Haití no es retórica. Es NO sólo es la única arquitectura sostenible per también la justa (MIREX, 7 de febrero de 2026).

En esa misma línea se ubican las quince medidas anunciadas por el presidente Luis Abinader. Son, en conjunto, un paquete de capacidad estatal: más control territorial, más enforcement, más sanción a redes de tráfico y facilitadores internos, y una estrategia de reducción de incentivos económicos a la contratación irregular. La Presidencia plantea, entre otros puntos, (i) reorganización y ampliación de supervisión de brigadas fronterizas, (ii) refuerzo con 1,500 soldados adicionales, (iii) aceleración del muro fronterizo con 13 km adicionales, (iv) reforma legal para endurecer sanciones a funcionarios, traficantes y también a propietarios que alquilen a personas en estatus irregular, (v) incorporación de 750 agentes migratorios y (vi) oficinas de control migratorio en todas las provincias, además de (x) un Observatorio Ciudadano para supervisión y correctivos, y (xi) un protocolo en hospitales que exige documentación y coloca agentes migratorios para asegurar repatriación posterior a la atención cuando corresponda (Presidencia de la República Dominicana, 6 de abril de 2025). Este diseño reconoce un hecho operativo: la migración irregular no se gestiona solo en la línea fronteriza; se gestiona en el interior, donde se fijan residencia, trabajo, acceso a servicios y redes de protección informal.

¿Funcionarán? Tienen altas probabilidades de producir impacto si se cumplen tres condiciones: consistencia, trazabilidad y legitimidad. Oferto un chin más para claridad. Consistencia: que la aplicación no sea episódica, sino sostenida. Trazabilidad: que cada medida genere datos auditables (detenciones, repatriaciones, sanciones, reincidencia, costos, indicadores hospitalarios). Legitimidad: que el enforcement venga acompañado de reglas claras, supervisión y garantías mínimas, porque la legitimidad reduce fricción y, a largo plazo, mejora cumplimiento.

Suele decir que las opiniones son como cul*, todo el mundo tiene. Por ende, aquí sin que me las hayan pedido les doy las mías. Dos mejoras concretas, compatibles con el espíritu del paquete y útiles para blindarlo ante crítica jurídica:

Un protocolo robusto de “screening” y derivación en operativos y centros de procesamiento: identificación temprana de perfiles especialmente protegidos (niñez no acompañada, víctimas de trata, solicitantes de asilo, mujeres gestantes con complicaciones, personas con riesgo individualizado), con rutas de derivación y documentación estandarizada. Esto no desarma la repatriación; la hace jurídicamente más sólida, alineada con la prohibición de expulsiones colectivas y con el principio de no devolución cuando aplique (Convención Americana, art. 22; CIDH, 2019).

Un régimen de cumplimiento económico verificable para empleadores y cadenas de subcontratación: inspecciones con enfoque sectorial (construcción, agro, turismo), sanciones escalonadas por reincidencia y, crucialmente, mecanismos de verificación laboral simples y digitalizables para no crear un mercado negro de “papeles”. El propio paquete presidencial apunta a endurecer el costo del incumplimiento y a impulsar “dominicanización del empleo” mediante ajustes salariales (Presidencia, 6 de abril de 2025). La mejora aquí es convertir el objetivo político en un sistema operativo medible, que reduzca la demanda estructural de mano de obra irregular.

Mi punto aquí no es técnico. Se trata de dignidad soberana, cosa que ya estamos hartos de defender. La República Dominicana puede (y debe) escuchar, dialogar y cooperar de buena fe con el sistema interamericano. El MIREX ha ya reafirmado disposición al intercambio técnico y transparente. Sostiene y siempre ha sostenido que derechos humanos e interés nacional no son objetivos contrapuestos (MIREX, 7 de febrero de 2026). Pero cooperación no significa obediencia política a lecturas externas que ignoran capacidad fiscal, seguridad interna y realidad regional. La comunidad internacional debe dejar de tratar a la República Dominicana como válvula de escape de la tragedia haitiana. Nosotros no somos responsables por la mierda que se ha creado el propio haitiano. Los habladores en vez de decir qué “debemos” hacer, deben comenzar a tratar a Haití como lo que es: una responsabilidad colectiva hemisférica.

Sin nostalgia belicista les diré (bueno, tal vez con un chin de ácido en la boca porque no hay cibaeño con memoria corta), . . . ¡la historia pesa! La memoria nacional dominicana no nace ayer. Hay antecedentes históricos de incursiones y ocupación en el siglo XIX (como el periodo de unificación/ocupación haitiana de 1822 a 1844 y la expedición de 1805) que forman parte del archivo emocional de nosotros. Moldean nuestra sensibilidad sobre soberanía y control territorial (Academia Dominicana de la Historia, 2022). Tener memoria larga no es una licencia para vulnerar derechos, no. No estoy defendiendo atropellos. PERO sí es un recordatorio de por qué el dominicano, cuando escucha desde afuera, “Coño, brega con su problema (en la frontera)”, se pone de inmediato a la defensiva.

Pues, . . . basta. Basta de sermones selectivos. Basta de exigirnos lo que no se exige a otros. Basta de convertir cada repatriación en una maldita condena automática sin contexto ni corresponsabilidad. La República Dominicana tiene el derecho y la obligación de ordenar la política migratoria con la ley en la mano, con estándares de derechos humanos y con prioridad innegociable al bienestar de nosotros (Constitución dominicana, art. 3; Presidencia, 6 de abril de 2025; MIREX, 7 de febrero de 2026). Sobre el tema haitiano, es hora de decirlo sin rodeos. La última palabra sobre lo que se hace aquí a nuestro lado que esta Quisqueya bella la tiene el pueblo dominicano, no un coro internacional que pretende transferirnos una crisis por la que no tenemos culpa ninguna.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación U.S. DoD/DoS BFFOC, Dipl. Diplomacia Global, Dipl. Derechos Humanos por USIDHR

Bibliografía

  • Academia Dominicana de la Historia. (2022). La expedición haitiana de Dessalines a Santo Domingo en 1805. Revista Clío.
  • Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH). (2019). Principios interamericanos sobre los derechos humanos de todas las personas migrantes, refugiadas, apátridas y víctimas de la trata de personas. Organización de los Estados Americanos.
  • Constitución de la República Dominicana. (2016). Artículo 3: Inviolabilidad de la soberanía y principio de no intervención.
  • Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (Pacto de San José). (1969). Artículo 22: Derecho de circulación y de residencia.
  • Convención sobre el Estatuto de los Refugiados. (1951). Artículo 33: Prohibición de expulsión y de devolución (“refoulement”).
  • Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MIREX). (7 de febrero de 2026). Respuesta del Gobierno dominicano al comunicado de la CIDH del 6 de febrero de 2026.
  • Presidencia de la República Dominicana. (6 de abril de 2025). Presidente Abinader anuncia 15 medidas para enfrentar la migración ilegal y garantizar la soberanía nacional ante la crisis haitiana.
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When “AI-Enabled Counterintelligence” Means Everything and Therefore Proves Little

artificial intelligence, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, deception, C. Constantin Poindexter, I.C., CIA, NSA

Artificial intelligence is unquestionably altering intelligence practice, especially in collection triage, identity resolution, and D&D (“denial and deception”) at scale. The same broadness that makes “AI and counterintelligence” a timely topic also makes it easy for scholarship to drift from disciplined inference into plausible generalizations. Henry Prunckun’s article AI and the Reconfiguration of the Counterintelligence Battlefield, argues that authoritarian regimes integrate AI into counterintelligence more aggressively than democracies, generating widening disparities in surveillance capacity, strength of deception operations, and detection. That thesis is appealing, but the problem is that, as presented, it relies on conceptual stretching, not ‘real good’ operationalization, and OSINT constrained attribution, which together make the conclusion stronger than the evidence can reliably support.

Conceptual slippage: counterintelligence becomes a synonym for regime security

The article offers an expansive definition of counterintelligence, including hostile intelligence operations by FIS, non-state actors, and internal threats. That definitional move risks conflating classic counterintelligence functions, such as detecting foreign intelligence services, running double agents, and protecting sensitive programs, with broad domestic security tasks, such as repression of dissent, censorship, and generalized surveillance. In the case studies, that risk becomes reality. China’s Skynet and Sharp Eyes are treated as counterintelligence infrastructure, yet the true purpose of these systems is “public security” and political control ( meaning “suppression”) through population-scale monitoring and data fusion. This is not counterespionage in the narrow sense (Peterson, 2021; He, 2021). Using such architectures as direct evidence of “counterintelligence capability” is contestable unless the article could demonstrate a specific, evidenced pathway from mass surveillance to demonstrable counterespionage outcomes. A good example might be the identification of foreign case officers, agent spotting, surveillance detection route patterning, or disruption of recruitment pipelines.

This matters because conceptual stretching lets the analysis “win” by broadening the dependent variable. If counterintelligence includes nearly all internal security functions, then authoritarian states will almost always appear “ahead,” because their legal structures permit scale and coercion across the entire society. A tighter approach would separate “state security surveillance capacity” from “counterespionage effectiveness,” then test where and how the two overlap.

Unmeasured dependent variables: adoption is not capability, and capability is not effectiveness

The piece repeatedly asserts an “uneven transformation” and “increasing disparities” between authoritarian and democratic systems. The paper does not clearly operationalize what “capability” means. Is it speed of deployment, volume of data, integration across agencies, analytic accuracy, disruption rates, or successful attribution of hostile services? Those are DISTINCT variables. Without an operational definition and observable indicators, the comparative claim becomes rhetorical rather than analytic.

Fortunately, the literature on predictive analytics is instructive. Government and academic reviews emphasize that predictive systems can help triage and allocate resources, but performance and fairness depend heavily on data quality, feedback loops, and governance (National Institute of Justice, 2014; U.S. Department of Justice, 2024). In real deployments, predictive policing tools have faced serious critiques for low accuracy and bias amplification, precisely because historical data encode institutional and sampling distortions (Shapiro, 2017; Alikhademi et al., 2021). The counterintelligence analogy is direct. If authoritarian systems ingest broader data and act on weaker thresholds, they may increase the velocity of suspicion generation without reliably increasing detection precision. So, “more AI” generates more alerts, more potentially nefarious interventions, and more error, rather than more validated counterintelligence successes. Unless the article can distinguish surveillance scale from validated performance outcomes, it confuses activity with effectiveness.

Causal inference is asserted, not identified

The article frequently implies causation, that AI enables preemptive counterintelligence, improves early warning, and accelerates counterespionage timelines. Yet in this piece, the causal chain is not established with process tracing evidence. Much of the language signals inference by plausibility, using formulations such as “reportedly,” “believed,” “suggests,” and “consistent with.” That can be appropriate in exploratory work, but lacks strong causal conclusions about “advantage” or “disparity” without a rigorous evidentiary standard.

A methodologically disciplined approach would specify competing hypotheses and explanations. They would demonstrate why AI is THE differentiator, rather than alternative drivers like expanded authorities, intensified human surveillance, party control over institutions, enhanced cyber hygiene, or increased resourcing. Robert Yin’s framework for case study research emphasizes analytic generalization and the need to consider rival explanations, not merely accumulate confirmatory examples (Yin, 2014). Not following the framework begins to look like one of those cognitive biases that we are taught to avoid. The article’s current structure tends to accumulate plausible examples of authoritarian digital control and then attribute the change in counterintelligence conditions to AI itself, when the same outcomes could often be produced through conventional surveillance and coercion supplemented by basic automation.

Case selection: the design invites selection on the dependent variable

The four cases, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are justified partly by strategic AI application, active counterintelligence engagement, and OSINT accessibility. That selection logic is understandable, but it has consequences. It tilts the sample toward regimes that are shining examples of coercive security states. It excludes “negative” or less confirming cases that might constrain the inference. Social science methodologists have repeatedly warned us that selecting only cases where the outcome is expected will often bias comparative claims, especially when the study then reasons as if the cases represent a broader population (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). If Prunkun’s aim is build theory, he may want to say so explicitly and limit generalization claims. If the aim is an authoritarian versus democratic comparison, it needs either systematic comparative indicators or at least one or more democratic cases chosen by objective criteria.

This flaw is not just academic. The paper makes claims about democratic constraints, Five Eyes governance, and interagency “silos,” yet provides no parallel case evidence at the same granularity as the authoritarian ones. There is an asymmetric evidentiary burden. Authoritarian capability is described through many examples. Democratic capability is summarized through general governance constraints, . . . a classic setup for overstating comparative divergence.

OSINT dependence: acknowledged limitations, but high confidence attributions persist

The paper responsibly acknowledges OSINT limitations, including bias, misinformation, attribution gaps, and inference under uncertainty. Then the narrative proceeds to attribute specific AI-enabled activities to specific organs such as the MSS, FSB, GRU, MOIS, and the RGB, even while admitting overlapping roles and covert postures. This is a substantive vulnerability. The hardest analytic problem in intelligence scholarship is not describing a tool set, but attributing operational use to a particular unit with defensible confidence.

The OSINT literature is explicit that open sources can be powerful but are shaped by discoverability, platform biases, selective visibility, and analytic framing, all of which can distort both collection and interpretation (McDermott, 2021; Yadav et al., 2023). Triangulation helps, but triangulation among sources that ultimately derive from similar technical telemetry pipelines or shared reporting ecosystems can create an illusion of confirmation. The article would be stronger if it adopted a consistent evidentiary lexicon like “confirmed,” “assessed,” “plausible,” “speculative,” and then used that teminology to discipline claims about which agency did what, and with what AI component.

“Cognitive security” is promising, but under-specified as a threat model

The piece explains “cognitive security” as safeguarding the analytic process from distortion, synthetic overload, and eroded trust. That is a valid conceptual move, and it aligns with growing institutional concern about deepfakes and generative deception (particularly impersonation), synthetic identities, and social engineering at scale (RAND, 2022; CDSE, 2025; ENISA, 2025). The weakness is that the paper’s cognitive security discussion remains programmatic rather than operational. It describes effects, such as evidence stream distortion and analyst overload, but it does not specify the attack surfaces, such as data poisoning, provenance forgery, adversarial inputs to classifiers, synthetic HUMINT reporting, or deepfake-enabled pretexting. Without a more explicit threat model, cognitive security risks functioning as an exciting label rather than an analytic framework capable of generating testable hypotheses and practical mitigations.

Overstatement risk in cross-national characterizations

Some country characterizations are brittle. The claim that Russia does not use AI for extensive domestic surveillance, contrasted with China, is vulnerable because Russia’s internal security ecosystem has long invested in monitoring and control, even if its architecture differs from China’s camera-centric methods. When a paper makes categorical claims that can be challenged by counterexamples, it hands critics a free punch and distracts from the stronger parts of the argument. Good comparative work often relies on “relative to” claims rather than absolutes, unless the evidence is overwhelming.

My take? The main contribution is conceptual, but its conclusions outrun its design

The excerpt reads strongest as a conceptual intervention arguing that AI changes the conditions of counterintelligence, especially by enabling synthetic deception and stressing analytic trust. Where it becomes substantively flawed is where it implies comparative empirical conclusions about authoritarian “advantage” and widening capability disparities without operational definitions, without balanced case selection, and with OSINT-constrained attribution that cannot consistently sustain unit-level claims. The remedy is not to abandon the thesis. It is to narrow the dependent variable, define measurable indicators, discipline inference and attribution, and align claims to what the evidence and design can actually support. Absent those corrections, the argument risks becoming unfalsifiable. Authoritarian states appear superior because counterintelligence is defined broadly enough to include most internal security, adoption is treated as capability, and capability is treated as effectiveness. Prunckun’s point here may well be true. I HIIIIGHLY respect this author and his expertise, however addresssing these flaws would go a long way to proving his points.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

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