Author: Constantín Poindexter

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La Fianza y la “Inflación Social”

fianza, fianzas, caución, cauciones, seguros, corredor de seguros, asegurador, aseguradora;

Las fianzas judiciales tradicionalmente se han percibido como instrumentos con penalidades fijas, que limitan explícitamente la responsabilidad de la afianzadora al monto nominal de la fianza. Esta interpretación ha proporcionado durante mucho tiempo un marco claro tanto para las afianzadoras, como para los afianzados y los obligantes (beneficiarios). Sin embargo, interpretaciones judiciales recientes han introducido complicaciones a esta visión, desafiando los límites convencionales de la responsabilidad de la afianzadora y señalando un posible cambio en el panorama jurídico. Sin lugar a dudas, estamos percibiendo ‘inflación social’ en el ámbito de las fianzas judiciales. Por más que a quienes trabajamos en este sector nos gustaría creer que nuestro nicho especial es inmune a esos factores sociales que afectan a los productos de responsabilidad civil, tal como el aumento del litigio, interpretaciones más amplias de la responsabilidad, indemnizaciones desproporcionadas por parte de los jurados y doctrinas jurídicas en evolución, pensar así es un error. El sector de fianzas ya no puede esconderse tras el argumento del “estrictamente limitado a la penalidad aquí estipulada”, frente a abogados litigantes agresivos, definiciones expandidas de negligencia, financiamiento de litigios por terceros y percepciones públicas sobre las ricas compañías de seguros que “nunca pagan”.

La Interpretación Tradicional de la Responsabilidad de la Afianzadora

Las fianzas judiciales han funcionado como garantías mediante las cuales la afianzadora asegura al beneficiario el cumplimiento de las obligaciones del afianzado, con su responsabilidad estrictamente limitada al monto penal establecido en la fianza. Este principio ha garantizado que, independientemente de las circunstancias o particularidades del caso legal, la exposición financiera de la afianzadora no exceda el monto fijado previamente. Este marco ha permitido a las afianzadoras evaluar con precisión su exposición al riesgo y establecer primas adecuadas, fomentando un entorno de fianzas judiciales estable y predecible.

Nuevas Interpretaciones Judiciales: Más Allá del Monto Penal

Decisiones judiciales recientes han comenzado a cuestionar este paradigma de límite fijo, particularmente en escenarios que involucran alegaciones de mala fe o conductas dolosas por parte de la afianzadora. En estos casos, los tribunales han explorado la posibilidad de imponer responsabilidades que excedan la penalidad original, especialmente cuando las acciones (o inacciones) de la afianzadora han agravado las pérdidas del beneficiario.

Casos (de EEUU) que Ilustran la Expansión de la Responsabilidad de la Afianzadora

Karton v. Ari Design & Construction, Inc.

En este caso de California, el tribunal sostuvo que una afianzadora puede ser responsable por honorarios legales y costos que superen el monto penal de la fianza judicial. El tribunal razonó que, cuando los honorarios de abogado son adjudicados como costos estatutarios, estos también pueden ser exigidos a la afianzadora más allá del monto de la fianza. Esta decisión destaca la posibilidad de que las afianzadoras enfrenten responsabilidades superiores a su exposición anticipada, particularmente en relación con los gastos legales derivados de controversias.

Dodge v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland

La Corte Suprema de Arizona abordó la cuestión de si una afianzadora podría ser responsable por daños extracontractuales que excedan el monto de la fianza debido a una supuesta mala fe. El tribunal concluyó que, conforme a los estatutos de seguros de Arizona, una afianzadora puede ser responsable por dichos daños, alineando sus obligaciones más estrechamente con las de las pólizas de seguros tradicionales en lugar de las obligaciones típicas de una afianzadora. Este caso resalta la disposición del poder judicial a imponer responsabilidades más amplias a las afianzadoras, especialmente cuando su conducta se considera como contribuyente a las pérdidas del beneficiario.

Implicaciones para la Industria de Fianzas/Cauciones

Esta evolución en la interpretación judicial requiere una reevaluación de las estrategias de suscripción y gestión de riesgos por parte de las afianzadoras. Ahora deben considerar la posibilidad de responsabilidades que excedan el monto penal de la fianza en aquellas jurisdicciones que reconocen reclamaciones extracontractuales por mala fe o que alinean las obligaciones de la afianzadora con las de los seguros tradicionales.

Medidas Proactivas para las Afianzadoras

Es apropiado realizar evaluaciones exhaustivas de los afianzados, con especial atención a la mitigación de los riesgos excesivos asociados con incumplimientos y posibles reclamaciones por mala fe. Incluso en aquellas clases de negocio que generalmente requieren respaldo de garantías colaterales (como fianzas de apelación o supersedeas, fianzas por órdenes de restricción temporales de alto monto, fianzas de medidas cautelares, etc.), será importante considerar tanto la condición financiera del afianzado como la imposición de requisitos colaterales que excedan la penalidad de la fianza. Las compañías de fianzas deben asegurarse de que los acuerdos de indemnización contemplen explícitamente escenarios de responsabilidad que superen el monto de la fianza, ofreciendo así una vía clara de recuperación para la afianzadora. También es imprescindible mantener líneas abiertas de comunicación con los beneficiarios y afianzados, desde la suscripción, para comprender claramente el caso, la jurisdicción y la jurisprudencia sobre pérdida de fianza, y para abordar oportunamente cualquier situación que pudiera escalar hacia litigios contra la afianzadora. Es fundamental monitorear y analizar regularmente las decisiones judiciales y los cambios legislativos que puedan afectar la responsabilidad de las afianzadoras.

Aunque históricamente las fianzas judiciales han sido instrumentos de responsabilidad limitada, los desarrollos legales recientes subrayan la importancia de que las afianzadoras se mantengan alerta y sean adaptables. Al abordar proactivamente estos desafíos emergentes, las afianzadoras pueden seguir cumpliendo su papel fundamental en los procesos judiciales, equilibrando los intereses de todas las partes involucradas.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, CPCU, JD, MA, ASLI, ARe, AFSB

Surety One, Inc.

Janus Assurance Re

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The Evaluación Anual de la ODNI, Qué Falta

seguridad national, espionage, contraespionage, contrainteligencia, c. constantin poindexter

El Informe del DNI: ¿Qué Falta?

No debería sorprender, dado el clima político polarizado actual, que ciertas amenazas a la seguridad nacional de los Estados Unidos hayan sido omitidas, otras exageradas y algunas incluidas sin recibir un análisis más profundo. Irónicamente (o tal vez no tanto), las omisiones y la falta de una atención más exhaustiva recaen precisamente sobre aquellas amenazas que se ven agravadas por las políticas de la Administración actual. La versión no clasificada del informe del DNI no contiene sorpresas, sin embargo, hay peligros que claramente no reciben la atención que merecen. Seré breve.

La utilización de la inteligencia artificial como arma contra la población estadounidense representa una amenaza existencial para la nación, ante la cual no estamos adecuadamente preparados. El informe identifica las capacidades de China en materia de vigilancia y desinformación mediante IA, pero subestima los peligros que implica la desinformación generada por IA y las operaciones psicológicas dirigidas contra las elecciones, la cohesión civil y la confianza en las instituciones. Los medios sintéticos (deepfakes), producidos a gran escala, no se abordan adecuadamente y representan una amenaza muy real. Entidades extranjeras hostiles, expertas en la creación de estos contenidos falsos, podrían fabricar incidentes geopolíticos importantes o incriminar falsamente a líderes estadounidenses. Este es un escenario de “crisis en el mundo real”. Además, en nuestra prisa por desarrollar nuestra propia capacidad de IA, los modelos entrenados con datos estadounidenses podrían ser usados en nuestra contra en contextos de guerra, negociación o manipulación económica. El DNI no ofrece una discusión significativa sobre cómo los adversarios podrían utilizar modelos lingüísticos avanzados (LLMs) y sistemas de IA multimodal para socavar la toma de decisiones en todos los niveles de nuestras comunidades, desde votantes individuales y personal de primera respuesta hasta altos responsables políticos.

Existe un peligro considerable de colapso de la infraestructura nacional estadounidense debido a la parálisis política y el sabotaje. El DNI identifica amenazas cibernéticas a la infraestructura (por ejemplo, el agua, el sistema sanitario), sin embargo, el informe subestima la vulnerabilidad sistémica de la infraestructura estadounidense ante amenazas no digitales, como sistemas críticos envejecidos y descuidados (puentes, redes eléctricas, sistemas de agua), y el sabotaje interno por actores motivados ideológicamente. Vienen a la mente de inmediato facciones supremacistas blancas y extremistas como Timothy McVeigh. La parálisis política y la corrupción que impiden los esfuerzos de modernización o resiliencia son el último clavo en el ataúd proverbial. La pérdida de experiencia en seguridad nacional como resultado de despidos masivos y la marginación de individuos con décadas de conocimientos y experiencia profesional, por razones partidistas, constituye una amenaza muy real. El informe no considera de manera significativa cómo la polarización y la falta de voluntad de nuestro poder legislativo para cooperar hacen que Estados Unidos sea cada vez más incapaz de proteger o restaurar su infraestructura crítica después de un ataque o desastre natural. No piense ni por un momento que los servicios de inteligencia extranjeros de China, Rusia, Irán y Corea del Norte no están percibiendo estas vulnerabilidades que pueden explotar.

La omisión de temas como espionaje, subversión y otras operaciones encubiertas contra Estados Unidos y sus intereses mediante inversión extranjera e influencia corporativa es inexcusable. No hay justificación para omitir la identificación y el análisis de cómo el “gran capital” ha afectado la seguridad nacional en todos los niveles, algo evidente incluso para el ciudadano común. Si bien el informe aborda en detalle el espionaje cibernético y el robo tecnológico por parte de China, ¿por qué se omiten la propiedad extranjera y la influencia en sectores estratégicos estadounidenses, como la agricultura, la industria farmacéutica, bienes raíces cerca de instalaciones militares sensibles y startups de IA? El uso de empresas fantasma y arreglos de encubrimiento para insertar agentes y representantes en sectores sensibles y círculos de política pública representa una amenaza seria. La adquisición estratégica de empresas estadounidenses en dificultades después del COVID por entidades vinculadas a servicios de inteligencia extranjeros es un mecanismo para la subversión, el espionaje y el sabotaje. Una mirada rápida a nuestra propia historia desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial revela cuán efectivas e insidiosas son estas tácticas, quizás más peligrosas que los ciberataques, ya que brindan a nuestros adversarios acceso profundo, negación plausible y beneficios estratégicos que les servirán durante décadas. La fragmentación del financiamiento y la “actitud de elefante en una cristalería” al cancelarlo, junto con la supervisión interinstitucional rota, son extremadamente problemáticas.

Hágalo mejor.

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The DNI Report: What is Missing?

seguridad national, espionage, contraespionage, contrainteligencia, c. constantin poindexter

It should come as no surprise in the current polarized political climate that certain threats to U.S. national security are omitted, some overly emphasized and others included but not give a more thorough review. Ironically (or perhaps not so ironically) the omissions and lack of more comprehensive address of certain threat are those very ones that are exacerbated by current Administration policies. The current DNI [unclassified version] contains no surprises, however there are some perils that decidedly lack the attention that they deserve. I’ll be brief.

The weaponization of artificial intelligence against the U.S. population poses and existential threat to the nation that we are not appropriately prepared for. The assessment identifies China’s AI capabilities in surveillance and disinformation, but underestimates the dangers posed by AI-generated disinformation and psychological operations targeting U.S. elections, civil cohesion, and trust in institutions. Synthetic media (deepfakes) at scale are unaddressed and present a very real menace. FIEs that excel in producing these fakes could fabricate major geopolitical incidents and/or falsely incriminate U.S. leaders. This is a “real-world crisis” scenario. Further, in our rush to load up our own AI capability, models trained on U.S. data pose an exposure to having them turned back against us in warfare, negotiation, or economic manipulation contexts. The DNI offers no significant discussion of how adversaries might use advanced LLMs and multi-modal AI to undermine decision-making at every level of our communities, from individual voters and first responders to senior policymakers.

There is a significant danger of the collapse of U.S. domestic infrastructure due to political paralysis and sabotage. The DNI identifies cyber threats to infrastructure (e.g., water, healthcare) however the report understates the systemic vulnerability of U.S. infrastructure to non-digital threats such as aged and neglected critical systems (e.g., bridges, power grids, water systems), and insider sabotage by ideologically motivated actors. White supremacist factionists and extremists like Timothy McVeigh come immediately to mind. Political paralysis and corruption that prevent modernization or resiliency efforts are the final ugly nail in the proverbial coffin. The loss of national security expertise as a result of wholesale firings/layoffs and the sidelining of individuals with decades of tradecraft and professional expertise based on party adherence are a very real threat. The assessment fails to meaningfully consider how polarization and our legislature’s unwillingness to work together are making the U.S. increasingly incapable of protecting or restoring its critical infrastructure after an attack or natural disaster. Don’t think for a moment that Chinese, Russian, Iranian and North Korean FIEs are failing to perceive these vulnerabilities that they can exploit.

Espionage, subversion and other nefarious covert operations against the U.S. and its interests via foreign investment and big-corporate influence are absent. There is really no excuse to omit identification and discussion of how “big money” has affected national security at every level, as even for a layperson is occurring in plain view. China’s cyber espionage and technology theft are addressed in depth, but why are foreign ownership of and influence in U.S. strategic sectors, including agriculture, pharmaceuticals, real estate near sensitive military sites and AI startups left alone? The use of shell corporations and fronting arrangements to embed operatives and proxies within sensitive sectors and policy circles is a serious threat as well. Strategic acquisition of distressed U.S. companies post-COVID by entities linked to FIEs are a mechanism and vehicles for subversion, espionage and sabotage. A brief look at our own history since the end of WWII reveals how these methods are effective and insidious, perhaps presenting a greater danger than cyber-attacks because they provide our adversaries to deep access, deniability and strategic gain that will serve them well for decades. Fragmenting and ‘bull in a china shop’ cancellation of funding paired with broken inter-agency oversight are extremely problematic.

Do better.

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The Peril of Pentagon Orders Russian Cyber Defense ‘Stand Down’

cyber, cyber operations, cyber threat, espionage, counterespionage, counterintelligence, russia

It if doesn’t frighten you, it should. “The Trump administration has ordered the United States to end offensive cyber operations targeting Russia, . . . (US News, Mar. 2025) Russia, or more particularly the Russian FIE poses a grave threat to U.S. national security. Threats posed by this state-actor and its state-supported proxies are grave both in terms of capability and intent. Russia has consistently demonstrated its capacity to execute sophisticated cyber operations targeting governments, corporations, critical infrastructure and individuals. The perils are multi-dimensional, including espionage, cyber warfare (or “war in the grey”), information operations, subversion, ransoming and economic disruption. Examples of Russia’s malign and nefarious cyber activity are plethora however recently the U.S. and Ukraine seem to enjoy the brunt of Putin’s ire. Here are some points to consider:

1. State-Sponsored Cyber Warfare

  • Russia’s GRU Unit 74455, a/k/a “Sandworm” conducts offensive cyber operations, often targeting critical infrastructure the U.S., its allies and shared economic interests.
  • The 2017 NotPetya attack caused over $10 billion in global damages, hitting Maersk, FedEx, and other major commercial concerns. This agent was designed for penetration of a particular type of accounting software used in Ukraine. While not specifically targeting the U.S., the global fallout of NotPetya getting into the wild is instructive. In financial terms, it was among the greatest events of “collateral damage during war” ever recorded.
  • Russian hackers have targeted Ukraine’s energy sector repeatedly. They have demonstrated a clear ability to take down critical infrastructure. Evidence of Russian FIS’s penetration of U.S. utilities, likely in search of weakness to exploit or to leave ‘back doors’ for future exploitation, has also been detected. Notably, Dragonfly 2.0, a Russian state-sponsored hacking group (also known as Energetic Bear), successfully infiltrated U.S. energy sector systems, including nuclear power plants.

2. Cyber Espionage

  • Groups like APT29 (Cozy Bear) and APT28 (Fancy Bear), linked to Russian FIE have hacked into government agencies. They have repeatedly compromised U.S. official networks. The SolarWinds penetration in 2020 is instructive.
  • Ongoing efforts to steal classified or proprietary information from defense, aerospace, and technology sectors save Russia billions in research and development. From 2020 to 2021, Russian hackers compromised multiple U.S. defense contractors that provide support to the Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Air Force, and Navy APT28 “Fuzy Bear” stole information related to weapon systems (including fighter jets and missile defense technologies, communications and surveillance systems, naval and space-based defense projects.

3. Election Interference & Disinformation

  • Russia has weaponized social media. Troll farms such as the Internet Research Agency and more rescently AI-home-cooked content spread disinformation and misinformation to masssive audiences.
  • Russian cyber actors hacked the DNC and Clinton campaign, leaking emails via WikiLeaks in efforts to subvert the U.S. political process.
  • Operation Project Lakhta was ordered directly by Vladimir Putin. This was a “hacking and disinformation campaign” to damage Clinton’s presidential campaign.
  • The Justice Department seized thirty-two internet domains used in Russian government-directed foreign malign influence campaigns (“Doppelganger”).

4. Ransomware & Financial Cybercrime

  • Russia harbors cybercriminal groups like Conti, REvil, and LockBit, which launch ransomware attacks on U.S. hospitals, businesses, and municipal corporations.
  • Many ransomware gangs operate with tacit Kremlin approval—as long as they don’t target Russian entities. For instance, REvil’s malware is designed to avoid systems using languages from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes Russia. This evidences a deliberate effort to steer clear of Russian entities.

5. Potential for Cyber Escalation

  • Russia has declared NATO and the West and its “main enemy”. The risk of cyber retaliation is real. Russia has the capability to conduct supply chain attacks, disrupt banking systems, and interfere with military communications.
  • In 2020, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors compromised the software company SolarWinds, embedding malicious code into its Orion network management software. This supply chain attack affected approximately 18,000 organizations, including multiple U.S. government agencies and private sector companies. This was a surveillance mechanism which allowed Russia to monitor internal communications and exfiltrate sensitive data from the software users.
  • In 2008 Russia deployed specialty malware (“Agent.btz“) which penetrated the U.S. Department of Defense’s classified and unclassified networks. The breach, considered one of the most severe against U.S. military computers, led to the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command to bolster cyber defenses.

Conclusion

The Russian cyber threat is persistent, evolving, and highly strategic. The West has cyber defenses and deterrence strategies in place (like sanctions and counter-hacking operations) however the current Administration’s order to terminate much of that effort cripple U.S. national security.

Quick to react to reporting of the DoD’s posturing, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) tweeted, “CISA’s mission is to defend against all cyber threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, including from Russia. There has been no change in our posture. Any reporting to the contrary is fake and undermines our national security.” Comforting however the words of a confidential source within CISA present a different picture. “A recent memo at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (Cisa) set out new priorities for the agency, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security and monitors cyber threats against US critical infrastructure. The new directive set out priorities that included China and protecting local systems. It did not mention Russia, . . . analysts at the agency were verbally informed that they were not to follow or report on Russian threats, even though this had previously been a main focus for the agency.” (Guardian, Mar. 2025)

Russia is one of our most aggressive cyber adversaries as well as being recongnized by most nations as a ‘cyber threat pariah’ (i.e., most vocally by NATO, the EU and the U.N.). Given the President’s position on Russia, it’s impossible to say that U.S. continues to harden critical infrastructure, surveil Russian FIE cyber efforts and accomplish effective countermeasures. Russia’s offensive cyber capabilities will remain a major security challenge for the foreseeable future. The question is, are we willing to handicap our efforts to meet our adversaries with robust cyber capability or simply turn our heads away.

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Pause and Reflect, . . . How do we get to fascism?

Reflect

Pause and reflect as this can happen here. The following passage from our esteemed colleague Wayne Michael Hall highlights a critical lesson. “Still, people didn’t believe it could get too bad; Germany was highly educated, and a cultural epicenter after all, home to Goeth, Schiller, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner, Rilke and Hegel, among other great minds. It wasn’t until the night of the broke glass, Kristallnacht, when Goebbles and Hitler turned their nazi stormtroopers loose to murder, plunder, imprison and destroy Jews and their property that the nazi state’s bureaucracies, occupied by the wrong people and focused in the wrong direction, allowed the beast loose and with it came ferocity and savagery on a scale rarely seen. Then, the alternatives for the oppressed, primarily Germany’s Jews, became quite limited, particularly for people with little money. Soon the only alternative became to “go with the flow” and hope for the best. Their collective wills acquiesced because they saw no other alternatives. This too, would pass, they thought. The giant nazi nation-state run by powerful bureaucracies, brought home to the Jews of Germany and to homosexuals, communist, mentally disabled people, gypsies or anyone deemed non-Aryan what the the beast turned loose could be capable of doing to humanity; as the destroyer of alternatives and a destroyer of hope and, ultimately, mankind. By the time the German people fully understood the bureaucracy’s evil ways, it was too late to do anything. All of the feasible alternatives had been closed off by the nazi bureaucracy which had seeped into every nook and cranny of society. The beast’s masters at work in the bureaucracies faced no punishment and did not take responsibility for their actions, until they lost the war. Even then, most of them did not feel the pangs of guilt for the crimes that they conducted, even those people going to the gallows at the Nuremburg Trials except for one person, . . . Albert Speer. The beast had gone mad and the result was World War II; fifty million dead, including six million Jews murdered in death camps, hundreds of concentration camps, disrupted and dislocated people all over the world, and misery and pain to innocent men, women and children. Visit Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C, sometime to get an education in what the beast is capable of doing.” (Hall, 2018)

The lesson is self-explanatory however I will leave you with these thoughts, thoughts that I perceive as prescient and instructive.

The Illusion of Immunity in Advanced Societies

Germany’s cultural and intellectual milestones were perceived as a safeguard against barbarity, yet they failed to prevent the descent into Nazism. In 2025, similarly advanced societies may assume they are immune to tyranny due to their democratic traditions, legal frameworks, or cultural sophistication. The frightening fact is that full faith in those qualities foments complacency, making it easier for authoritarian tendencies to take root. The erosion of civil liberties, normalization of hate speech, and consolidation of power under populist leaders are illustrative.

Bureaucracies as Tools of Oppression

The Nazi state weaponized its bureaucracies to enforce policies of exclusion and extermination, embedding discrimination into every level of German government and society. Politicized bureaucracies, misused A.I. and social media, or systems designed to exclude marginalized groups can and will serve as instruments of oppression. Discriminatory immigration policies, surveillance abuse, or gerrymandering to entrench power are clear examples.

The Role of Scapegoating and Polarization

The Nazis targeted Jews, LGBTQ+ individuals, Romani people, mentally handicapped and others, creating the perception of “enemies within: to consolidate power and distract from economic or political failings. Statements like “enemy of the people”, is characteristic. Political leaders may use similar tactics, scapegoating minority groups or political opponents to inflame their base and distract from systemic issues like economic inequality, inlusion, civil rights abuses or climate crises.

The Destroyer of Hope and Alternatives

The lack of viable options for Germany’s oppressed populations made resistance seem futile, forcing many to surrender or flee. Systemic disenfranchisement, disinformation, the restriction of voting rights or peaceful demonstration similarly erode hope and stifle dissent, leaving vulnerable populations without alternatives.

The Danger of Inaction and the Cost of Ignorance

Germans as a whole underestimated the threat of Nazism until it was too late. Apathy and denial allowed Hitler to consolidate power unchallenged. Right now, democracies face homogeneous risks if citizens fail to recognize or act against the encroachment of authoritarianism, misinformation and disinformation campaigns driven by unregulated social media platforms, and restrictions on civil freedoms. In the presence of silence and inaction, harmful ideologies to take root and flourish.

What should we observe? What must we see to stop authoritarianism in its tracks? Leaders who consolidate power and any cost, undermine judicial independence, attack the free press, appoint unqualified cronies to senstive judicial, defense and intelligence positions, threaten member of their own political parties with banishment should they dare to “take sides” against the “leader”. These actions echo the bureaucratic centralization and propaganda tactics used by the Nazis. Surveillance tools, artificial intelligence, and digital platforms can be weaponized to track “the enemy withing”, spread disinformation and deepen societal divisions. THESE are the tools of modern bureaucracies of mass control. Efforts to restrict voting rights, limit freedom of assembly, limiting the free press by threatining the revocation of FCC licenses, lawsuits against or flagrant harassment of newspapers, and discriminatioin against specific groups will appear to be incremental but snowball into systemic oppression. The inability to address global crises like climate change, pandemics, commerical trade controversies or geopolitical conflicts can lead to mass displacement, economic collapse, and extremism, mirroring the chaos of the interwar period that fueled the rise of the Nazis.

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Involuntary Addiction Treatment Works

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The article in the Sunday edition, “Addiction Treatment Can Work Even When It’s Not Voluntary”, provides a well-supported argument for mandatory addiction treatment. To date, the sparse peer-reviewed work conducted on compulsory treatment has been antagonistic to the idea. “Given the potential for human rights abuses within compulsory treatment settings, non-compulsory treatment modalities should be prioritized by policymakers seeking to reduce drug-related harms.” (“The Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment”, A Kamarulzaman, et al., Dec. 2015) Newer evidence shared by Satel and Sabet in their article contradicts the cited work. Further, it fails to contemplate nearly a century of history of involuntary commitments for a multitude of reasons. The theory that drug addiction is a disease and that those who suffer from addiction should not face the danger of “consequences” has unfortunately taken hold. As a community we began to accept responsibility for the negative personal choices of our fellow Americans, viewing challenges such as the drug scourge as our failure as a society rather than bad personal choices. Decriminalization of very dangerous narcotics is the most recent manifestation of this. Addiction researchers should broaden their focus to include case studies of mental health wholly unrelated to drugs. Severe mental illness, referred to before it became an insensitive and politically incorrect term (“crazy”), would be a good start. There is a corollary, an issue which forms part of our public discourse on almost a daily basis, . . . gun violence.

Before the notorious mafia murders during prohibition and post-prohibition, any adult citizen could walk into a gun store and legally purchase any type of firearm available. It was very rare to hear of a mass shooting, children murdered by their classmates or any other horrific act with a firearm outside of the criminal underworld. Passage of the NFA in 1938, the GCA in 1968, and various state gun control regimes emerged however the increase in gun violence continued to grow. The commonsense observation, immediately applicable to the compulsory treatment question, is that we used to “lock up crazy.” Simplistically, an individual walking down the street arguing with an imaginary person in the 1940s or 1950s would likely have found him or herself the guest of a psychiatric institution. Within the context of the gun violence question, the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooter Adam Lanza may have been deprived of the opportunity to commit his heinous act.

Before the 1960s cultural revolution and posterior changes in public opinion about personal responsibility for one’s behavior, involuntary commitment was prevalent. Advances in pharmaceutical science from the 1950s forward supported the theory that a “pill” was the magical bullet, further eroding the view that involuntary commitment was a necessary evil. The courts likewise offered little help to the supporters of commitment. The 1975 case of O’Connor v. Donaldson is instructive. It represented a change in the justifying criteria for commitment from a broader test to that of almost exclusively one of the dangers that an individual presents to society. Writing for Psychiatry (Edgemont Journal), Doctors Megan Testa and Sara West wrote, “Through interviews of mothers of individuals with mental illness, Copeland learned that current civil commitment criteria force relatives to watch their loved ones go through progressive stages of psychiatric decompensation before they can get them any help at all.” (“Civil Commitment in the United States”, Megan Testa, MD and Sara G. West, MD, Oct 2010, Psychiatry) The court-imposed restrictions on involuntary commitment exacerbated the problem.

The curtailment of involuntary treatments, whether it be for drug addiction or mental illness, has impaired our ability as a society to address some of the gravest challenges to our safety as well as the happiness and well-being of those addicts and mentally ill. Authors Sally Satel and Kevin Sabet’s article on mandated treatment is prescient and the involuntary commitment question merits renewed attention.

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The Challenge of Spying on China

spy, spies, espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence,carlyle poindexter, constantin poindexter

The WSJ article on Wednesday (Challenge of Spying on China) is a sad reminder of the United States Intelligence Community’s apparent failure to accomplish any broad covert or clandestine penetration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in recent history. The lack of HUMINT human intelligence sources (HUMINT) with meaningful access and placement deprives us of insight into Chinese decision making, immediate strategic threat intelligence and perhaps more importantly, gravely impairs U.S. offensive counterintelligence operations.

Moving beyond the obvious difficulties with HUMINT operations within the PRC, reminiscent of the Cold War hostile operational environments, the Intelligence Community is overdue for a paradigm shift in human asset recruitment methodology. For the better part of the last century, the United States Intelligence Community relied on a steady flow of “walk-ins”, volunteers from opposing foreign intelligence services or governments that offered their countries’ secrets. Intelligence officers enjoyed a large degree of success based on a fairly global perception that Americans were the “good guys”, representatives of the land of fairness, equality and justice, qualities that stood in stark contrast to the ruthless and despotic republics from whence they came. Unfortunately, the mystique has faded leaving outsiders to wonder if the values that we promote to the world are nothing more than a hypocritical farce. Mass diffusion of the “Big Lie” throwing fair elections into question, an attempted coup d’etat by an outgoing president, and military involvement under highly questionable intelligence assessments erode the view once held that the United States is the “shining beacon to the oppressed”.

Chinese citizens enjoy a better standard of living than at any time in China’s history. China can rightfully boast that it is a world power and its population can justifiably be proud of its progress. Personal financial success and pride in country promote loyalty. That there is no broad internal rejection of onerous mass surveillance, social credit controls and ethnic cleansing as is the case with the Uyghurs, is a testament to the PRC’s ability to deny facts, deceive its population and prevent the import of non-PRC approved “truths” about freedom and justice within China. The Chinese cultural tendency to identify with the collective rather than the individual is likewise amplified by the PRC’s massive social control machine, with opposing or antagonistic perspectives effectively blocked by the Great Firewall or simply drowned out of public discourse by the volumes of Party-approved propaganda. The PRC’s strategy has created an environment that is more resistant to traditional intelligence recruitment techniques such as economic coercion, ideology exploitation and ego-stroking. Chinese intelligence service recruiters lean on the cultural affinity of ethnically Chinese living in the United States to turn them into spies, coerce them by alluding to what might become of their families living in China or deploy the time-tested technique of guanxi to achieve intelligence asset recruitments. United States intelligence officers do not enjoy a parallel or equivalent.

FBI Director Wray stated, “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours.” The threat is grave and our twentieth-century countermeasures, techniques and tradecraft are not appropriate for what many in the Intelligence Community deem the greatest threat to United States national security. Retooling, reimagining the intelligence recruitment cycle and modernizing the way that we approach the recruitment of sources is imperative.

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Iran Cyber Operations Target Utility Infrastructure

cyber, cyber operations, espionage, counterespionage, counterintelligence, cyber defense, CISA, countermeasures, constantin poindexter

Per the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “Since at least November 22, 2023, these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors have continued to compromise default credentials in Unitronics devices. The IRGC-affiliated cyber actors left a defacement image stating, “You have been hacked, down with Israel. Every piece of equipment ‘made in Israel’ is CyberAv3ngers legal target.” The victims span multiple U.S. states. The authoring agencies urge all organizations, especially critical infrastructure organizations, to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory to mitigate the risk of compromise from these IRGC-affiliated cyber actors.” (CISA, 12/01/2023)

The penetrations were aimed at critical utilities, in the extant case of U.S. water and water waste treatment infrastructure. Per CISA, “Beginning on November 22, 2023, IRGC cyber actors accessed multiple U.S.-based WWS facilities that operate Unitronics Vision Series PLCs with an HMI likely by compromising internet-accessible devices with default passwords. The targeted PLCs displayed the defacement message, “You have been hacked, down with Israel. Every equipment ‘made in Israel’ is Cyberav3ngers legal target.” The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector (Water Sector) underpins the health, safety, economy, and security of the nation. It is vulnerable to both cyber and physical threats.” The warning is instructive. The fallout from a successful compromise of public water systems can be severe. Andrew Farr warns, “The imagination can run wild with worst-case scenarios about what a threat actor could do to a water system, but Arceneaux explains that sophisticated actors could hack a system and manipulate pumps or chemical feeds without the utility even knowing they were in the system. They could also create a water hammer that could lead to cracked pipes or release untreated wastewater back into a source water body. What if that happens [to a water system] in a medium or a big city? Maybe it’s only for a few hours, but it could go on for a few days or weeks, depending on how extensive the damage is.” (Farr, WF&M, 04/11/2022) Darktrace reports the very real consequence of a successful water system compromise. “Earlier this month, cyber-criminals broke into the systems of a water treatment facility in Florida and altered the chemical levels of the water supply.” (Matthew Wainwright, Darktrace) If potable water delivered to consumers contains dangerous contaminants or improper balances of the “good” chemicals blended to the product (fluoride, chlorine, chloramine, etc.), it can cause negative health effects. Gastrointestinal illness, nervous system damage, reproductive system damage, and chronic diseases such as cancer are very real risks associated with the same.

CISA cyber defense model of the “brute force” methodology deployed by IRGC operatives may be viewed at MITRE.

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Strategic-Level Management, Smaller is Better

constantin poindexter, carlyle poindexter, research, Operation Bayonet, covert action, covert operation

I read an interesting article in the Wall Street Journal today, a book review of “Emperor of Rome”, by Mary Beard. While the piece focused on the untimely demise of many of the caesars, there was a short but instructive comment. “Emporer of Rome is spiced with striking comparisons. The Roman Empire functioned with about 95% fewer senior personnel than the Han Dynasty that ruled at the same time in China.” (Kyle Harper, WSJ, 10/22/2023) This small anecdote reads as if it had been a surprise finding, that a small Roman leadership circle was a Black Swan and that it bends preconceived notions about the necessity of large networks of government instrumentalities to manage an empire as large as Rome’s. It is a fallacy that large enterprises require the support of large bureaucracies. Quite to the contrary. In strategic-level management, smaller is better.

Organizational dynamics and bureaucracy are Geoffrey M. Bellman’s forté. In his work, The Consultant’s Calling, “he explains why an organization is only capable of performing to a certain level of mediocrity. Organizational structure is essential to conducting business in a modern complex society. Bellman relates that organizations are: large, awkward, and unwieldy. Usually, organizations don’t work very well because they don’t fit the human creatures who work in them. Organizations as we have built them are more mechanical than ‘organical’… we have built awkward hierarchical structures with boxes and lines connecting them. We have created structures modeled after machines–mechanistic, sharply defined, and inflexible–that force their moving human parts to act like machines too. Such organizations do not work very well … even when everything is finely in tune … there are significant difficulties.” (Bellman, 2001) The author’s commentary is prescient and instructive.

There is a ‘real world’ case study that illustrates well the concept of “smaller is better”. A master’s thesis authored by Alexander B. Calahan, COUNTERING TERRORISM: THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPIC MASSACRE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT COVERT ACTION TEAMS (Calahan, 1995) provides an excellent argument. “The important aspect of operating within organizations and systems is that by its very nature, it incorporates a predetermined limitation of success. As long as the mission operates under the constraints dictated by the organization’s structure, policies, regulations and management philosophies, it will only obtain a finite predetermined level of success. Bureaucratic processes are rigid and restrict decentralized authority and the ability to work at a continued fast and fluid pace. Government agencies must live within regulations that do not allow interpretation or flexibility for unique circumstances. Bellman related that organizations are sharply defined and do not allow flexibility. Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense (1995), further demonstrates how this is magnified in government agencies: Government acts like some extraterrestrial power, not an institution that exists to serve us….It almost never deals with real-life problems in a way that reflects an understanding of the situation….Our regulatory system has become an instruction manual. It tells us and the bureaucrats exactly what to do and how to do it. Detailed rule after detailed rule addresses every eventuality, or at least every situation lawmakers and bureaucrats can think of. Is it a coincidence that almost every encounter with government is an exercise in frustration? In the decades since World War II, we have constructed a system of regulatory law that basically outlaws common sense. Modern law, in an effort to be self-executing, has shut out our humanity….The motives were logical enough: Specific legal mandates would keep government in close check and provide crisp guidelines for private citizens. But it doesn’t work. Human activity can’t be regulated without judgment by humans. Government cannot accomplish anything when multiple procedures are required for almost every decision. Process is a defensive device; the more procedures, the less government can do. Which is more important: the process or the result?” The author and his cited references are correct. Large bureaucratic organizations cannot support a dynamic operation that must think and act “on the fly”.

Calahan’s case study is an analysis of Operation Bayonet, an assassination mission in response to the massacre of Israeli Olympians and their coaches. The Mossad fielded two teams to accomplish the operation, one under strict headquarters control (“Lillehammer”) and the other (“Avner”) under none. The former was a disaster and the latter and ALMOST perfect success. The failed operation had many flaws but the most salient argument is the “micromanagement” one. Per Calahan, “However, the failure is more attributable to attempting to conduct an operation beyond the capabilities of the political bureaucracy. The officers in Lillehammer had more than adequate training and skills; however, the organization forced them to abandon proven tradecraft procedures to accomplish the assassination of Salameh under unreasonable tactical conditions. X allowed political pressure to dictate the pace of the operation beyond what he knew was reasonably necessary for success within the bureaucracy.” (Calahan, 1995)

The successful operation enjoyed an autonomy that ultimately achieved the operation’s objective. ” . . . Avner’s team was designed outside the political realm of the Mossad. Avner’s team would not institute shortcuts bowing to political influences that might jeopardize the success of the mission. Quality operations demand quality people involved and quality planning from the outset. The Mossad team members understood that they would operate in a covert capacity until the successful completion of the mission or the team was no longer able to operate intact due to injuries or deaths. They were to remain a cohesive unit. The unit learned and understood each others’ skill, abilities, and limitations, planning and operating accordingly.” (Calahan, 1995) Small, tight and capable teams with more “hands off” oversight was key.

“Walmart CEO Doug McMillon calls it “a villain.” Berkshire Hathaway vice chair Charlie Munger says its tentacles should be treated like “the cancers they so much resemble.” Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, agrees that bureaucracy is “a disease.” These leaders understand that bureaucracy saps initiative, inhibits risk taking, and crushes creativity. It’s a tax on human achievement.” (Hammel and Zanini, HBR, 2018) In the covert operation subject of Calahan’s case study, as in the private corporate sector, smaller is better. So did the Roman caesars manage the empire with a small leadership cadre by design, eschewing the idea that large bureaucracies were necessary to the state, or was their design utilitarian, i.e., keep your enemies close? Either way, the Emperor of Rome has apparently stumbled on one of the most important observations on successful management of a team, . . . a lesson for leadership when strategic planning.

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A Bit of Spit and the Game Was Up

“A New York architect was charged with murder in connection to the killings of three of the women who became known as the “Gilgo Four,” according to the Suffolk County District Attorney, in a case that baffled authorities for more than a decade in suburban Long Island. Rex Heuermann – who told his attorney he is not the killer – was taken into custody for some of the Gilgo Beach murders, an unsolved case tied to at least 10 sets of human remains discovered since 2010, authorities said. The case was broken open thanks to cell phone data, credit card bills and DNA testing, which ultimately led them to arrest Heuermann, 59, authorities said.” (CNN, 2023) We rejoice when a maleficent actor is identified and brought to justice. It is just a small piece of closure for the families of the victims of violent crime. Investigative forensics have come a long way, for which we are thankful. We are long past the time of Scotland Yard’s epiphany in 1901 that fingerprint identification was considered voodoo science. We now live in the era of DNA. “The advances in criminalistics continue, and today’s miracle will become tomorrow’s commonplace in crime scene investigation.” (Michael Kurland, 1995) Heuerman’s discard of partially eaten pizza in a place where he might claim any reasonable expectation of privacy. Without DNA, bitemarks if any were comparable ones collected at the four crime scenes may have been the strongest link, much less exacting than Heuerman’s own DNA.

The public-facing reporting reveals another powerful tool in the forensic toolbox, mobile telephone analysis. “The court document alleges cell phone and credit card billing records show numerous instances where Heuermann was in the general locations as the burner phones used to call the three victims “as well as the use of Brainard-Barnes and (Barthelemy’s) cellphones when they use used to check voicemail and make taunting phone calls after the women disappeared. The district attorney said the killer got a new burner phone before each killing.” (CNN, 2023) Burner phones have legitimate purposes, though the term “burner” alludes to something negative or nefarious. OSINT professionals, licensed investigators and competitive intelligence professionals deploy single-use mobile telephony for all sorts of good reasons however all should be aware that geo-location, the identity of both user and recipient, and the content of the communication are eminently acquirable. In the extant homicide investigation, forensics will certainly analyze geo-location data. To estimate a subject’s location, an analyst sees is simple, . . . identify the tower that the phone is connected to, and create a circle around the tower which provides a coverage area for the same. The PCC must necessarily be located somewhere inside that circle. Repeat the circle diagram with the next one to two towers to create a map of overlapping circles. The PCD is in the overlap. Not exact, but enough if surveillance or other investigative information can place the subject near. There are more perfect methods but triangulation is a time-tested method for placing specific PCD in a (generally) specific place, clearly the methodology in the Heuermann court documents that state, “. . . Heuermann was in the general locations as the burner phones used to call the three victims.” (CNN, 2023) For those aspiring PCD forensic techies, the Cellebrite product (among others) is good, although the I.C. has better ones.