INTRODUCTION<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cCuban Intelligence operations against the United States arguably represent some of the most effective collection efforts AND penetrations of the United States Intelligence Community (hereinafter \u201cI.C.\u201d). The effectiveness of Cuban foreign intelligence service (hereinafter \u201cCuban FIS\u201d) operations against the United States has consistently superseded all I.C. expectations and assessments of the capabilities of a small, thinly funded foreign intelligence service. Although
Cuban FIS possessed some rudimentary COMINT capability to listen in on transmissions from the Central Intelligence Agency to potential Cuban assets, Cuban FIS\u2019s lack of access to its own sophisticated technical collection platforms forced it to master HUMIT tradecraft in order to accomplish its ends, and indeed evidence demonstrates that it did well. History offers a plethora of evidence of both failed I.C. efforts against the Cuban FIS as well as Cuban success against I.C. efforts. In his seminal work on Cuban Intelligence \u201cCastro\u2019s Secrets: The CIA and Cuba\u2019s Intelligence Machine\u201d, Brian Latell appropriately observed, \u201cCastro was a supreme, unchallenged spymaster.\u201d (Latell, 2012) Again, Cuban FIS has practiced excellent defensive counterintelligence as well as offensive intelligence collection. The defection in 1987 of Florentino Aspillaga finally alerted the CIA to the extent of Castro\u2019s spy network. \u201cThey were in a state of shock. Nothing like this had ever happened to us before. Aspillaga was the most informed and highly decorated officer ever to defect from Cuban intelligence and his defection was a turning point in the CIA\u2019s attitude toward Cuba. Until that point, we grossly underestimated the Cubans. We never imagined that little Cuba could run an intelligence service that was world-class.\u201d (Latell, 2012) The Aspillaga counterintelligence debrief and investigation revealed how thoroughly compromised I.C. operations in Cuba were. The unmasking of Ana Mont\u00e9s, an enormously successful penetration of the DIA, provides yet further evidence of Cuba\u2019s mastery of the spy game. \u201cBig Brother\u201d style Internal security and counterintelligence mechanisms on an island nation geographically smaller than the State of Florida poses far less of a challenge than recruitment of high-level penetration of arguably the best intelligence community in the world. How did Cuban FIS accomplish this feat? The simple argument that Cuban espionage tradecraft is not sufficient to explain how it was able to turn a decorated I.C. member into a traitor. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Counterintelligence theory since the inception of the Central Intelligence Agency early in the twentieth century has posited that \u201cM.I.C.E.<\/a>\u201d is an appropriate framework for identifying potential penetration agents. More recent scholarship points to \u201cRASCLS<\/a>\u201d (Burkett, 2013) based on Robert Cialdini\u2019s principle of influence as a more appropriate model to accomplish this end. Adherents of both pseudo-philosophies agree to one degree or another that Ana Montes was an ideologically motivated penetration. This author does not concur. Other scholarly work casts some doubt on ideology as the sole motivator in the Montes case. \u201cA final conclusion to be drawn from the U.S. government\u2019s biases leads to a deeper conversation that is highlighted by the overall case of Ana Montes. Montes\u2019s defection was characterized by novelty, an ability to evade detection, and an ability to effectively live a double life, critical skills for an intelligence officer when operating against other countries, but incredibly dangerous to one\u2019s home country.\u201d (Virgili, 2020) Virigili advertent or inadvertently alludes to what may be the deeper motivation of Montes\u2019s betrayal, . . . ego. Personal ego flaws are responsible for a significant percentage of those who have committed treason. The Montes case is no exception. Cuban FIS\u2019s ability to stroke Montes\u2019s ego and develop her into one of that most effective penetrations of U.S. Intelligence in history is instructive. On this fact rests the purpose of the proposed thesis paper. Again, Virgili\u2019s work is particularly instructive. \u201cThe \u201cI\u201d in MICE stands for ideology, one of the foundational motivating factors that lead an individual to act. While in this case, it is evident that Montes held ideological differences with U.S. LAC policy, it is not clear that these differences alone would have led to her defection. The fact that Montes did not seek out Cuban intelligence officials to defect is a critical variable in assessing Montes\u2019s willingness to defect on ideology alone. <\/p>\n\n\n\n A second piece of evidence emerges during an interview with the counterintelligence (CI) agent<\/a>, that investigated her for espionage activity later in her career, stating that disagreement does not necessarily mean disloyalty. While she was engaged in defection at the time of the statement, it brings to light that her defection was the result of internal conflict between her ideological differences being influenced by something more. This leads to the conclusion that Montes\u2019s defection in unable to be explained solely to ideological differences, demonstrated by SLT and the application of MICE.\u201d (Virgili, 2020) With Virgili\u2019s identification of \u201csomething more\u201d, this author concurs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Research should re-focus on ego as the overlying motivator for Montes\u2019s betrayal rather than the accepted ideological motivator as argued generally. With due acknowledgment of ideological differences playing some role in the Montes case, psychological predisposition ensured that Cuban FIS\u2019s recruitment was effective. There is a broad consensus that the Montes betrayal can be neatly explained by ideology, supported by arguments based on the ubiquitous MICE model. \u201cThe question should aim to contribute to an existing debate \u2014 ideally one that is current in your field or in society at large. It should produce knowledge that future researchers or practitioners can build on.\u201d (McCombes, 2019) Therefore, \u201cThe topic is appropriately narrow, research being focused on a particular counterintelligence case and one of the treason- motivators identified in the MICE model. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This topic is appropriate for analytical consideration as both C.I. case studies and general psychological principals are broadly understood, with significant scholarly research on both in current circulation. The results of answering this research question may elicit reactions from the producers of other work on the subject, precisely the purpose of scholarly work. A broad portion of the authors about betrayal in the context of intelligence will disagree with this author\u2019s position, \u201cfacilitating\u201d, if not blatantly triggering \u201cscholarly conversation\u201d. Clarifying the previous and present understanding of ideology as the motivator of treason is imperative as ideology alone does not provide a satisfactory basis on which to base current and future insider threat detection, doubling and\/or neutralization efforts. Further, the matter is of absolute contemporary import. Having most recently observed the Snowden counterintelligence case, understanding the role of ego in betrayal is without a doubt, current. The following findings will likely pose a challenge to \u201cold school\u201d perceptions about the predominance of ideology with regards to the Montes case and open a broader area of inquiry into the significance of ego when considering the insider threats to our I.C. The National Insider Threat Task Force has stated, \u201cPublic and private sector organizations which monitor this issue all agree that instances of insider threats are steadily increasing, . . . \u201c (DNI, 2016), and, \u201cthe National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) reported that incidents of insider threats are steadily increasing.\u201d (CISA, 2020) These statements are instructive and speak directly to the import of a better understanding of betrayal, \u201cwhy research matters\u201d on this subject. National security and economic security depend on the answers that this and other research may reveal on the modern motivators of those that would deliver privileged material to U.S. adversaries.\u201d (Poindexter, 2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n THE “THESIS”<\/p>\n\n\n\n The explanation that Ana Montes committed espionage on behalf of the Cuban Direcci\u00f3n General de Inteligencia (DGI) has rested on Montes\u2019s desire to be consistent with her ideology. There is a consensus among counterintelligence practitioners and intelligence studies researchers that Montes justified her betrayal because of her affinity for the Cuban people and what she perceived as unjust U.S. foreign policy directed at the Cuban government and more <\/p>\n\n\n\n LITERATURE REVIEW<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Department of Justice and preliminary Defense Intelligence press releases and information releases see to have accepted Montes\u2019 explanation, laying the ground for post-mortems that framed her betrayal as wholly ideological. Per the Department of Defense, \u201cMontes claimed that her sensitivity to helped drive her decision to work \u201cwith\u201d the Cubans. Montes never suggested that she worked “for” the Cubans. In short, Montes indicated that the Cubans “were very good to me.” She was a “comrade in the struggle” against the United States policy on Cuba.\u201d (DoD, 2005<\/a>) Ironically, the same document contains statements that suggest that perhaps there is \u201cmore to the story\u201d than Montes\u2019 affinity for the Cuban people and the plight of countries ostensibly oppressed by U.S. foreign policy therefore one looks more closely at the Defense assessment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2022 \u201cMontes saw U.S. support for the Contras in Nicaragua as unjust and wrong. With statements of such clarity, proposing an alternative explanation for Montes\u2019 betrayal is a challenge. The Defense report however offers a few clues to something other than ideology. Within the very same document one finds, \u201cThe traitorous decision to betray her country was based on a combination of factors including an ingrained hostility toward U.S. policy on Latin America; an immature, self-serving personality aimed at retaliation against authority, . . . (DoD, DISCUSSION<\/p>\n\n\n\n The seed for Montes\u2019s betrayal was sewn in childhood. \u201cMontes graduated from high school with a 3.9 grade point average. But home-life proved troublesome, and a growing emotional distance was occurring between Montes and her father, Alberto. To outsiders, Alberto was a caring and well-educated father of four. But behind closed doors, he was short-tempered and bullied his children. Alberto \u2018happened to believe that he had the right to beat his kids,\u2019\u201d One observes other clear indicators of the ego-factor in Montes\u2019s general demeanor and interactions with others. \u201cShe portrayed herself as an introverted loner who did not need people to be fulfilled. She limited her social contacts to family members, individuals she met in college and graduate school, coworkers at the DoJ, or members of the condominium association in which she was active. She rarely invited colleagues to her home. At work, she The lack of any meaningful intimate relationships should have given cause for concern. Per the Defense report, \u201cShe said she sacrificed a normal life and did not want personal relationships to interfere with her espionage activities. In so doing she dated only intermittently until her early 40s.\u201d (DoD, 2005) While a quick read suggests that Montes avoided intimacy BECAUSE of her betrayal, the suggestion contradicted by the same report, \u201cMontes was considered a loner Finally, and circling back to the aforementioned definition of betrayal (in this case \u201cinfidelity\u201d to her nation, family and coworkers), an essential element of the decision to betray is the manifest absence of empathy for those injured by one\u2019s actions and the consequences of those actions. Psychologist Al-Ubaidi observes that the actor displays a, \u201cLack of empathy, respect and boundaries, . . .\u201d (Al-Ubaidi, 2017) The subject of a lack of empathy and lack of care for the CONCLUSIONS<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n REFERENCES<\/p>\n\n\n\n INTRODUCTION \u201cCuban Intelligence operations against the United States arguably represent some of the most effective collection efforts AND penetrations of the United States Intelligence Community (hereinafter \u201cI.C.\u201d). The effectiveness of Cuban foreign intelligence service (hereinafter \u201cCuban FIS\u201d) operations against the United States has consistently superseded all I.C. expectations and assessments of the capabilities of a … <\/p>\n Continue reading “Counterintelligence ~ Ana Bel\u00e9n Montes, Another Look”<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":173,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-172","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"aioseo_notices":[],"rttpg_featured_image_url":{"full":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280.jpg",1280,720,false],"landscape":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280.jpg",1280,720,false],"portraits":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280.jpg",1280,720,false],"thumbnail":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280-150x150.jpg",150,150,true],"medium":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280-300x169.jpg",300,169,true],"large":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280-1024x576.jpg",525,295,true],"1536x1536":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280.jpg",1280,720,false],"2048x2048":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280.jpg",1280,720,false],"twentyseventeen-featured-image":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280.jpg",1280,720,false],"twentyseventeen-thumbnail-avatar":["https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/09\/spy-5821903_1280-100x100.jpg",100,100,true]},"rttpg_author":{"display_name":"C. Constantin Poindexter","author_link":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/author\/constantin-poindexter\/"},"rttpg_comment":0,"rttpg_category":"Uncategorized<\/a>","rttpg_excerpt":"INTRODUCTION \u201cCuban Intelligence operations against the United States arguably represent some of the most effective collection efforts AND penetrations of the United States Intelligence Community (hereinafter \u201cI.C.\u201d). The effectiveness of Cuban foreign intelligence service (hereinafter \u201cCuban FIS\u201d) operations against the United States has consistently superseded all I.C. expectations and assessments of the capabilities of a…","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/172","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=172"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/172\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":177,"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/172\/revisions\/177"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/173"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=172"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=172"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/constantinpoindexter.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=172"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
generally, U.S. \u201cimperialistic\u201d policies towards smaller, weaker republics. The argument here is that ego was to a greater degree than ideology the motivating factor of Monte\u2019s choice to betray her country. Adherence to a pro-Cuban (or pro-third world republic) ideology is not a sufficient explanation, but rather it was Montes\u2019s own personal attributes that allowed the DGI to successfully recruit and run her as penetration. This paper will offer evidence of the true
motivation of Montes which this author feels is better explained by ego rather than ideology, or more specifically, \u201cIs ego the more accurate causative factor that explains Montes\u2019s betrayal.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cBefore review of historical, biographical and informed-opinion sources one looks directly to the perpetrator\u2019s words explaining the reasoning for her betrayal. During the sentencing phase of Montes\u2019 criminal trial she mode the following statement. \u201cAll the world is one country.’ In such a ‘world-country,’ the principle of loving one’s neighbor as much as oneself seems, to me, to be the essential guide to harmonious relations between all of our ”nation-neighborhoods.”
This principle urges tolerance and understanding for the different ways of others. It asks that we treat other nations the way we wish to be treated — with respect and compassion. It is a principle that, tragically, I believe we have never applied to Cuba. Your honor, I engaged in the activity that brought me before you because I obeyed my conscience rather than the law. I believe our government’s policy towards Cuba is cruel and unfair, profoundly unneighborly, and
I felt morally obligated to help the island defend itself from our efforts to impose our values and our political system on it. We have displayed intolerance and contempt towards Cuba for most of the last four decades. We have never respected Cuba’s right to make its own journey towards its own ideals of equality and justice. I do not understand why we must continue to dictate how the Cubans should select their leaders, who their leaders cannot be, and what laws
are appropriate in their land. Why can’t we let Cuba pursue its own internal journey, as the United States has been doing for over two centuries? My way of responding to our Cuba policy may have been morally wrong. Perhaps Cuba’s right to exist free of political and economic coercion did not justify giving the island classified information to help it defend itself. I can only say that I did what I thought right to counter a grave injustice.\u201d (U.S.A. v. Ana Belen Montes,
1:02-cr-00131) <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Of the more authoritative historical sources of information about the Ana Montes case one looks to the post-action report produced by the Department of Defense entitled \u2018Review of the Actions Taken to Deter, Detect and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ana Belen Montes\u2019, previously referenced. The report is partially declassified and runs one hundred eighty pages. In addition to the aforementioned finding, one also observes:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u2022 Montes claimed that she was not a Communist but that she strongly sympathized with the socio-economic goals of both the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions.
\u2022 My sense of moral obligation persuaded me that this is what 1 had to do or I could not live with myself.” She said, “I was really doing something that was right.
\u2022 She also stated that she would have rejected any offer by the Cubans to pay for her services
\u2022 In her view, Cuba was victimized by U.S. repression and she concluded that she had the “moral right” to provide information to Cuba.
\u2022 Her ideological disposition fostered a negative view of U.S. foreign policy, and that fixation, coupled with her sense of moral righteousness, sealed her commitment.\u201d (DoD, 2005)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
2005) Self-serving personality is an ego flaw. Dr. Leon Seltzer opines that \u2018textbook\u2019 self-serving personalities, \u201c . . . typically don\u2019t show much concern about anyone or anything outside their (narrow) self-interest.\u201d (Seltzer, 2016) The damage assessment identifies specific losses, including the loss of life that resulted from Montes\u2019 actions, definitively showing \u201clittle concern\u201d for those that she injured.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Further, one finds in the assessment, \u201cIn sum, she indicated that she “felt morally rewarded.” (DoD, 2005) While the current positions argue that moral reward is the expected benefit of alignment with one\u2019s mores (ideology), it is equally important as compensation for one\u2019s ego. \u201cEgo needs honors in order to be validated.\u201d (Holiday, 2016) As part of Montes\u2019 plea agreement she confessed of the high esteem in which she was held by Fidel Castro and that her ego was
stroked by displays of affection and appreciation by Cuban Intelligence. \u201cAccording to Montes, the Cubans were thoughtful of her, were dedicated to their cause, and sensitive to her needs. In short, the Cubans “were very good to me.” (DoD, 2015) Psychologist Michael Price opines, \u201cPeople who are more vengeful tend to be those who are motivated by power, by authority and by the desire for status. Those personalities tend to be less forgiving, less benevolent and less focused on universal-connectedness-type values.\u201d (McKee, 2008) The Defense assessment\u2019s report that Montes\u2019 actions that were, \u201caimed at retaliation against authority\u201d, fit neatly within the bounds of this observation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Defense assessment also reported, \u201cThe traitorous decision to betray her country was based on a combination of factors including an ingrained hostility toward U.S. policy on Latin America; an immature, self-serving personality aimed at retaliation against authority; and a misguided sense of morality.\u201d (DoD, 2005) Morality is a foundational psychological concept. Without diving too deeply into Freudian, neo-Freudian, Jungian or other arcane phenomenology, \u201cif morality owes it authority not to rationality, but to the happiness that it promises us in social context.\u201d (Wong, 2015), then one immediately perceives the very selfish, self-centered and therefore \u201cego\u201d driven explanation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A second source of literature that offers a glimpse into Montes is the work by J.A. Sheppard. The author states, \u201cDIA\u2019s senior analyst for Cuban matters, Ana Belen Montes, gave classified information to Cuban officials because she believed that country was not being treated fairly.\u201d (Sheppard, 2019) The argument is based on the generally accepted explanation that Montes was an ideological spy. Restating that ideology was Montes\u2019 sole motivator in entirely unhelpful however Sheppard\u2019s illustration of causation leaves much room for further investigation. \u201cUsing MICE as a device for explaining why a person would disclose classified information is both simple and satisfying. It does risk, however, mistaking the ascription of a cause to an effect. The error is, for instance, like an association that a turkey makes between a farmer and food. Whenever the turkey sees the farmer, food follows. Since that happens every day, the turkey creates a connection between the farmer and the food. Then, one day in late November, the farmer appears but the turkey becomes the food.7 The turkey\u2019s mistake is one of failing to differentiate between covariance, i.e., how much two random variables vary together, and the necessary connection between a cause and its effect. Roughly the same can be said of assessing behavior related to espionage.\u201d (Sheppard, 2019) If one supposes that Montes was initially identified as a potential Cuban Intelligence asset based on outward displays of a particular ideological lean, based on Sheppard\u2019s covariation principal one CANNOT assume that successful recruitment and running of Montes as a penetration was due to her handler merely being a Cuban and a representative of the Cuban people or prototype of oppressed Latin American countrymen, as the motivation for her ongoing betrayal. The literate offers no more content
that specifically addresses the Montes case.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
One turns then to the literature emitting from participants in the investigation of the Montes case. \u201cShe spied out of conviction that Fidel Castro was both the savior of the Cuban people and champion of oppressed masses across the world, particularly in Latin America.\u201d (Carmichael, 2007) These word by the counterintelligence operative responsible for the five-year hunt that culminated in the identification of Montes as a penetration of the Defense Intelligence Agency, suggest a clear case of an ideological spy yet other observations may suggest something more. \u201cDuring the four years before her arrest, Montes was afflicted with anxiety and sleeplessness, and was regularly treated with psychological counseling and prescription medication.\u201d (Carmichael, 2007) The question thus is why? Was the mind suffering and the body cry out, or was the treatment appropriate for much deeper, long-term issues associated with an ego issue. \u201cHigher levels of ego-resiliency are correlated to lower levels of depression, anxiety, and stress.\u201d (Kubo, et al., 2021) If one presupposes an ego-flaw that motivated Montes, then the anxiety, sleeplessness and need for pharmaceutical intervention fits nicely with an argument that ideology may not be the only or even the predominant factor in Montes\u2019 willingness to betray. There is a gap here which even the main player in the counterintelligence case fails to address.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Among meaningful commentary about the Montes case, one finds content published by the National Office for Intelligence Reconciliation. In a piece on insider threats, the Montes case is directly referenced and unique among the literature, includes a comment about ego. \u201cIn the case of ideological spies (as well as ethnic and religious spies, although they are not the subject of this discussion) the reason they present such a challenge is that their motivation is more deeply rooted, being an expression of their beliefs, their world view, and their personal perception of who they are (or at least would like to think they are), what they stand for, and their place in the world; that is to say, their ego.\u201d (Irvin, 2015) The final sentence is prescient, as is a cited self-justification of the betrayer. Michael Shermer states, \u201c. . . the facts of the world are filtered by our brains through the colored lenses of worldview, paradigms, theories, hypotheses, conjectures, hunches, biases, and prejudices we have accumulated through living. We then sort through the facts and select those that confirm what we already believe and ignore or rationalize away those that contradict our beliefs.\u201d (Shermer, 2011) One can readily observe how Montes\u2019 sort of selective rationalization or better stated, selective moral compass worked for her ego, speaking directly to her superior opinion of herself and her mission of
betrayal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Further refinement of Montes\u2019s motivation with allusion to something other than ideology, is referenced in Michael Smith\u2019s work \u2018The Anatomy of a Spy\u2019. \u201cWhen Ana was nineteen, her mother divorced him. A secret CIA psychological assessment of Ana Montes subsequently concluded that her father\u2019s behavior, \u201cmade her intolerant of power differentials, led her to identify with the less powerful, and solidified her desire to retaliate against authoritarian
figures.\u201d (Smith, 2019) The simplistic response to this statement would be, \u201cOh, so that is why she became an ideologue.\u201d, likening her decision to betray her country, her family and coworkers to adopting a stray three-legged dog. That assumption is inappropriate. This brief excerpt about Montes\u2019 childhood immediately directs one\u2019s attention to a psychological flaw, not ideology.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A brief inclusion of literature that offers some general context and precedence with regard to the motivation of those that may commit espionage is appropriate. All intelligence studies practitioners that have produced work on human assets, recruitment, etc., (HUMINT) are aware of the traditional M.I.C.E. model, and more recently the model suggested by Randy Burkett (RASCLS) which he based on Cialdini\u2019s principals of influence. For the purposes of understanding
why researchers and investigators readily identify Montes as an ideological spy, MICE offers the explanation. Per Sheppard, MICE doesn\u2019t offer a fully satisfactory answer. The literature authored by William Virigili offers a further suggestion that ideology is not the only answer to the Montes betrayal question. \u201cThe \u201cI\u201d in MICE stands for ideology, one of the foundational motivating factors that lead an individual to act. While in this case, it is evident that Montes held ideological differences with U.S. LAC policy, it is not clear that these differences alone would have led to her defection. The fact that Montes did not seek out Cuban intelligence officials to defect is a critical variable in assessing Montes\u2019s willingness to defect on ideology alone. While she was engaged in defection at the time of the statement, it brings to light that her defection was the result of internal conflict between her ideological differences being influenced by something more. This leads to the conclusion that Montes\u2019s defection in unable to be explained solely by a predisposed to ideological differences, demonstrated by SLT, and the application of MICE.\u201d (Virgili, 2020) The \u201cinfluenced my something more\u201d is the focus of this author\u2019s research.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
American Spies, by Michael J. Sulick offers some interesting biographical information about Montes, some of which is echoed by Smith. Referring to Montes and her siblings Sulick states, \u201cJust as American spies ranging from Benedict Arnold to Robert Hanssen suffered because of the flaws of their fathers, Ana Montes and her siblings were reportedly bullied by their temperamental father to the point that their mother divorced him.\u201d (Sulick, 2013) Despite this glaring clue, Sulick places the Montes betrayal squarely within the ideological-spy box.\u201d
(Poindexter, 2022)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
RESEARCH STRATEGY<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cHistoriographic methodology is appropriately defined as the collection and analysis of archived material and written historical accounts of the subject matter. This researcher\u2019s method will be historiographic, evaluation naturally accomplished by clearly understanding the nature of the findings of others, followed by the presentation of a countering arguments that dispel the tendency to simply \u201caccept\u201d ideology as the only or the predominant motivator for Montes\u2019s betrayal. The framework is modern time focused however twenty years have lapsed since the unraveling of the Montes story, ample time for scholarly contribution and declassification (or a reading of the unclassified versions) of primary government-authored material to deploy a historiographic framework. The framework is broad but lends itself well to cultural, social and like phenomena. The objective of Cuban FIS was to effectively penetrate the United States Intelligence Community in order to access privileged information helpful to the Cuban cause
and valuable for barter with other foreign powers such as Cuba\u2019s financial sponsor, Russia.\u201d (Poindexter, 2022) Again, all of the source materials lend themselves well to a style of
historiographic work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The difficulty with research on the causes of human betrayal within the Intelligence Community centers not on reading and clearly understanding the opinions of investigators, academic researchers and scholarly writers. Digesting post-action reports issued by government agencies is a simple task, as is reading and understanding the nature of the opinions offered by what one might consider \u201cinformed persons\u201d. The difficulty lies in the dual need to consume and analyze psychological\/psychiatric science sector theorems and apply them to the intelligence conundrum under stuff. This sort of cross-disciplinary expertise is odd and uncommon. So uncommon that a researcher is hard-pressed to find any significant volume of authoritative work applying ego flaws to the question of betrayal. Because of the dearth of work on betrayal vis-\u00e0-vis the ego flaw question within intelligence studies, an investigator is obligated to seek
similarities or adjacencies, cases of betrayal that lie outside of the intelligence sector. but Fortunate for the researcher, albeit unfortunate for those that suffer its consequences, more than ample work has been accomplished on the causes of betrayal its most ubiquitous form, . . . infidelity. While not a perfect fit, one finds that particular human frailty reported in its first emanation in the Garden of Eden, in written work for hundreds of years. From the mid-1800s
forward, the causes of betrayal have been \u201cfront and center\u201d in psychiatrists\u2019 and psychologists\u2019 work with a human subject. Of the literature reviewed in preparation for this paper, psychiatric professionals that have addressed betrayal within the context of infidelity appear. The conscience choice to engage in activities that have incredibly damaging consequences to others without due regard to those consequences is a \u201ctextbook\u201d description of infidelity. It is also an
exact description of Montes\u2019s choice to betray her country, her family and her coworkers. There is therefore context for the fusion of current understandings about betrayal OUTSIDE of the intelligence question to betrayal WITHIN. The following observations are by no means comprehensive. Offering a definitive argument in support of ego being the overlying, determining factor in the Montes case would require many hundreds of pages of work. A complete defense of the ego-thesis simply is not possible within the time, length and resource constraints of this brief paper therefore what follows are a few of the salient observations and their corresponding arguments. To that end, . . .<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Montes explained when undergoing psychological tests. She expounded to her caseworker that her father \u201cwas the king of the castle and demanded complete and total obedience. Speaking to the caseworker, Montes\u2019 \u201csister said child abuse began at five years of age and their father had a violent temper. Ana\u2019s mother feared taking on her mercurial husband, but as the verbal and physical abuse persisted, she divorced him and gained custody of their children. Montes CIA profile stated: \u201cAna was 15 when her parents separated, but the damage had been done. Montes\u2019 childhood made her intolerant of power differentials, ledher to identify with the less powerful, and solidified her desire to retaliate against authoritarian figures. Her \u201carrested psychological development\u201d and the abuse she suffered at the hands of a temperamental man she associated with the U.S. military \u201cincreased her vulnerability to recruitment by a foreign intelligence service\u2026.\u201dMontes\u2019 sister commented that even in childhood, \u201cShe wasn\u2019t one that wanted to share things or talk about things.\u201d (Sims, 2015)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Montes was the product of a proverbial \u201cbroken home, a child of divorce that was subjected to intra-familiar violence and intolerance until her mother finally extricated Montes from a dysfunctional family which deeply affecting her development. With regards to ego states and their consequences, \u201cWhen authoritarian regimes behave, they can so as critical\/controlling parents or as nurturing, and the population are either compliant or rebellious. When they
rebel, they are not then mature enough to be adult once they are freed from the controlling parent.\u201d (Bali, 2019) Here we see a manifestation of an ego flaw, likely the direct result of Montes\u2019s father\u2019s behavior towards her. Montes\u2019s rebellion against authority was directed at her employer, her country as it was the only party exercising \u201cauthority\u201d over a large portion of her personal and professional life. Montes\u2019s sister, a federal law enforcement employee concurred. \u201cHer sister believes Montes ultimately committed unauthorized disclosure to obtain power over other people, in order for her to feel powerful. Rather than seeking power.\u201d (Sims, 2015) Further, Psychologist Tracy Trautner opines of ego-damaged children that they, \u201c . . . are poor judges of character and will rebel against authority figures when they are older.\u201d (Trautner, 2017) Rebelliousness is NOT a product of ideological affinity nor affiliation. Damaged ego is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
seldom left her desk, avoided office get-togethers, and cultivated a reputation for being aloof.\u201d (DoD, 2005) In addition to Sims\u2019s report that, \u201cShe wasn\u2019t one that wanted to share things or talk about things.\u201d (Sims, 2015), she offers Montes\u2019s own words, \u201cThey [Cubans] were emotionally supportive. They understood my loneliness.\u201d (Sims, 2015<\/a>) Clearly, Montes\u2019s Cuban case officer understood her flaw, stroked her ego and managed a long-term successful
penetration based on Montes\u2019s pathology. Psychologist Al-Ubaidi identifies, \u201cNeed for approval enquirers to satisfy their deficit, . . . Difficulties in intimate relationships.\u201d (Al-Ubaidi, 2017), as characteristic of the same. The descriptors are congruent with observations of Montes. One might argue that a person may not be naturally extroverted, that Montes\u2019s \u201caloofness\u201d was not necessarily an indicator of an underlying problem, however when considered in the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d, i.e., the other observed manifestations of an ego flaw, one can conclude that her demeanor was a matter of concern.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
who, at times, was emotional and unyielding, . . . exhibited a rigid posture which manifested a superiority complex. One coworker described her as a different kind of person who kept to herself. Unbeknownst to her, she was given the nickname, “la otra,” which in Spanish means, “the other” or “the outsider.” (DoD, 2015) Further, the Defense report drew comparison with other counterintelligence cases. \u201cMontes did share some personal characteristics with Ames
and Hanssen: poor interpersonal skills, a sense of intellectual superiority, and a dour demeanor.\u201d (DoD, 2015) The picture becomes clearer as one assimilates more of the observations reported by Defense and others. Montes\u2019s standoffishness was a manifestation of her underlying, unresolved ego issue. Montes\u2019s sister in fact explained Montes\u2019s avoidance of an intimate relationship. \u201cHer sister believes, . . . in order for her to feel powerful. Rather than
seeking power, Montes may have become emotionally attached to her Cuban handlers to fulfill a feeling of security that she did not have as a child.\u201d (Sims, 2015) Here again we observer a damaged child. Psychologist William Watson describes this behavior as a manifestation of an attachment disorder. \u201cDifficulty showing genuine care and affection: The child might act inappropriately affectionate with strangers while displaying little or no affection toward his or
her parents.\u201d (Watson, 2013) In the context of the Montes case, Watson\u2019s statement accurately describes Montes\u2019s inability to maintain a normal intimate relationship (affection to the appropriate party) and inappropriately affectionate towards her Cuban sponsors (affection for the inappropriate party). Al-Ubaidi identifies, \u201cDifficulties in intimate relationships, . . . insecure and lack of trust in others, no clear boundaries, . . . \u201c (Al-Ubaidi, 2017) One perceives here yet
more evidence of Montes\u2019s pathology that led her down the path of betrayal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
negative ramifications on others as a result of one\u2019s actions is an anti-social pathology and is indicative of an ego problem. \u201cDelinquent behavior\u201d (Watson, 2013) is observed among those that lack a normal empathetic function, an activity that Montes herself readily admitted to. \u201cAt the sentencing hearing she made a defiantly unrepentant statement condemning US policy towards Cuba. The judge responded that she had betrayed her family and her country and told her \u201cIf you cannot love your country, you should at least do it no harm.\u201d (PERSEREC, 2004) The
statement was a confession. Lack of empathetic response is, at its foundation is a narcissistic disorder that may be blamed on damaged ego. \u201cNarcissistic personality disorder (NPD) is associated with an assortment of characteristics that undermine interpersonal functioning. A lack of empathy is often cited as the primary distinguishing feature of NPD.\u201d (Baskin-Sommers, 2014) \u201cThe narcissist’s True Self is introverted and dysfunctional. In healthy people, Ego
functions are generated from the inside, from the Ego. In narcissists, the Ego is dormant, comatose.\u201d (Vaknin, 2018) Once again, one observes the oversized roll that an ego flaw plays in the ability to empathize. Once again, one may appropriately lay the root cause of Montes\u2019s betrayal on ego. Per Irvin, \u201c. . . clandestine life wears thin, the insider spy tends to experience regret, if not remorse, over the decision.\u201d (Irvin, 2015) Montes expressed no such reservation at
sentencing, nor did her behavior evidence any empathy whatsoever for those parties prejudiced by her actions. Her nickname as the \u201cIce Queen\u201d, is well-deserved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With due consideration to \u201cideology\u201d as the common explanation for the Montes penetration, \u201cEven in the case of the ideological spy, rarely is it ever simply a matter of ideology. Like the organizations we voluntarily join or the media sources we choose to view, ideology is not the driver, but rather the vehicle through which we express our own self-concept and confirm our established world view.\u201d (Irvin, 2015) This statement is instructive. Montes may well have
justified her betrayal after the fact by her desire to \u201ceven the scale for the downtrodden\u201d. She stated so clearly. \u201cIn her private correspondence, she refuses to apologize. Spying was justified, she says, because the United States \u201chas done some things that are terribly cruel and unfair\u201d to the Cuban government. \u201cI owe allegiance to principles and not to any one country or government or person,\u201d Montes writes in one letter to a teenage nephew. \u201cI don\u2019t owe allegiance to the US or to Cuba or to Obama or to the Castro brothers or even to God.\u201d (Popkin, 2013) Such manifest disrespect for her oath, to her family or ostensibly to anything at all speaks to the dire consequences of allowing an individual with serious character flaws access to the nation\u2019s most precious secrets. The preceding few samples extracted from the Montes counterintelligence case should create serious questions about the wisdom of laying the cause of her betrayal at the feet of \u201cideology\u201d. Within this brief commentary here is ample evidence to suggest the need for further investigation of the ego-flaw motivator.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Al-Ubaidi, Dr. Basem A., \u201cCost of Growing Up in a Dysfunctional Family\u201d, Journal of Clinical Medicine, vol. 3, iss. 3, subm. 17th October, 2016, peer review acceptance for pub. 29th July, 2017
Bali, Maha, \u201cReflecting on Ego States in Life, Classroom and Politics\u201d, Reflecting Allowed Social Research, 22nd October, 2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Baskin-Sommers, Dr. Arielle, \u201cEmpathy in Narcissistic Personality Disorder: From Clinical and Empirical Perspectives\u201d, Harvard Medical School, PMC vol. 5, iss. 3 (pgs. 323-333), April, 2015<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Camp, Noelle, and Williams, Adam David, \u201cA New Approach to Insider Threat Mitigation: Lessons Learned from Counterintelligence Theory\u201d, United States: N. p. 2020<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, \u201cInsider Threat Mitigation Guide\u201d, CISA.gov 2020<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, \u201cReview of the Actions Taken to Deter, Detect and Investigate the Espionage Activities of Ana Belen Montes\u201d, Dept. of Defense (Redacted) Report 05-INTEL-18, 16th June, 2005
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Federal Bureau of Investigation, \u201cAna Montes: Cuban Spy\u201d, FBI.gov History 2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Herbig, Katherine L., \u201cChanges in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007\u201d, Northrop Grumman Technical Services, Technical Report 08-05, March 2008 PERSEREC UNCLASSIFIED<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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McCombes, Shona, \u201cDeveloping Strong Research Questions | Criteria & Examples\u201d, Scribbr, 1th April, 2019
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Watson, Dr. William J., \u201cBehavioral Consequences of Child Abuse\u201d, College of Family Physicians of Canada, St. Michael\u2019s Hospital, vol. 59, iss. 8, August, 2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Sims, Karen Elizabeth, Senior Security Specialist, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Chief Security Officer \u201cUnauthorized disclosure: can behavioral indicators help predict who will commit unauthorized disclosure of classified national security information?\u201d, Naval Post Graduate School [unclassified] June 2015<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Smith, Michael, \u201cThe Anatomy of a Spy: A History of Espionage and Betrayal\u201d, Arcade Publishing, New York, New York 2019<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Virgili, William. “The Study of Motivation for Defection Within the Intelligence Community: Hindering the Government’s Ability to Prevent and Detect Defection” (2020). Master of Arts (MA), Thesis, Political Science\/Geography, Old Dominion University<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"