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The Collapse of CIA Clandestine Communications: The Hidden “X” Factor

COVCOM, espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence, spy, C. Constantin Poindexter, CIA, NSA

For those that haven’t picked up a copy of Tim Weiner’s new book, The Mission (a great read), the author briefly writes about an unidentified “X Factor”, that together with loose tradecraft and the betrayal of Jerry Chun Shing Lee, explain the breach of an Agency clandestine communications platform (COVCOM) used to receive production from intelligence assets. The X Factor is no longer (at least in part) as secret. Between 2010 and 2012 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suffered one of the most devastating counterintelligence failures of the post–Cold War era. Dozens of agency assets operating in China and elsewhere were rolled up, captured and/or killed, and multiple communication networks nullified. The official explanations that later emerged pointed to three contributing factors: that the COVCOM platform itself was insufficiently secure; that former officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee betrayed key operational information to Chinese intelligence; and an unknown “X-factor” that the CIA believed must have played a role. Analysts have since argued that this third factor was neither a single human source nor a cryptographic failure, but rather a systemic and architectural vulnerability The discoverability of CIA communication websites through pattern matching, fingerprinting, and open-source enumeration.

The known facts support this interpretation. Following the collapse, U.S. intelligence undertook a joint CIA-FBI inquiry to determine why an ostensibly hardened system had failed so catastrophically. The COVCOM platform, an encrypted web-based communication system that relied on innocuous-looking websites as cutouts between field assets and handlers, had been in use globally for the better part of a decade. Its purpose was to provide secure asynchronous communication without the need for physical meetings. By 2010, Chinese counterintelligence had begun identifying CIA agents and rolling up networks with alarming precision (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019). Lee’s espionage, which began around this time, appears to have enabled part of this exposure. He was found in possession of notebooks containing detailed operational notes, true names, and meeting locations for agents. His recruitment by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) represented an enormous breach (Security Boulevard, 2018). Lee’s betrayal alone did not explain the speed, geographic reach, or technical precision of the counterintelligence response. The COVCOM system in China was considered more robust than versions deployed elsewhere, and yet it collapsed far more completely, suggesting that an additional vector was in play (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

That missing vector has increasingly come into focus due to subsequent forensic research. In 2022, Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto released a public technical statement analyzing a defunct CIA covert communications network, reconstructing its infrastructure from archival data (Citizen Lab, 2022). The researchers identified at least 885 separate websites that had served as cutouts in the system, many masquerading as ordinary blogs or news portals. These domains were hosted across multiple countries and written in more than twenty-seven languages, demonstrating the global scale of the network (Overt Defense, 2022). Most importantly, the study revealed that the sites shared recurring technical fingerprints: identical JavaScript, Flash, and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) code snippets, sequential IP address allocations, and domain registrations under apparently fictitious U.S. shell companies. These patterns were visible not only to intelligence professionals but to any moderately skilled analyst using open-source tools such as Google search operators or historical DNS datasets.

The Citizen Lab researchers demonstrated that once a single website in the network became known, either through insider compromise or accidental exposure, the rest could be discovered through automated pattern matching. For example, the shared scripts and templates created a unique digital “signature” that could be queried across the web. Similarly, because many sites were hosted within contiguous IP address blocks, an adversary could perform network scans to find adjacent servers. In one striking observation, Citizen Lab noted that a “motivated amateur sleuth” could likely have mapped the entire network from a single known site using only public data sources (Citizen Lab, 2022, p. 3). In other words, once one covert node was compromised, the architecture itself facilitated the discovery of the rest—a catastrophic violation of compartmentation, the cardinal rule of clandestine operations. This structural discoverability provides a compelling explanation for the “X-factor.” If Chinese or Iranian counterintelligence services were able to recognize one of these front sites—perhaps through Lee’s betrayal or through network monitoring—they could easily expand their search to enumerate the rest. Once identified, those sites could be monitored for traffic patterns, IP logs, or metadata, revealing the physical locations or operational rhythms of field agents. The result would be precisely the kind of rapid and geographically broad collapse observed between 2010 and 2012.

Several attributes make this explanation plausible to high confidence standard. It accounts for the disproportionate collapse relative to the technical strength of the platform. A simple encryption or authentication flaw would have yielded isolated compromises, not systemic exposure. It explains the extraordinary speed of network destruction. Insider betrayal might expose a limited number of assets, but large-scale enumeration allows adversaries to map entire networks in days or weeks. It also aligns with reports that CIA stations were initially unaware of how deeply the system had been penetrated; because the exposure derived from web-level pattern analysis rather than cryptographic decryption, it left few immediate forensic traces (Risen, 2018).

The architecture’s discoverability illustrates a subtle but fundamental shift in dynamics in the digital era, especially for counterintelligence. During the Cold War, clandestine communications were localized and analog, i.e., dead drops, shortwave bursts, or one-time pads, etc., that required significant human action/interaction to intercept. By contrast, digital covert systems even when encrypted, exist within the globally indexed infrastructure of the Internet. Any reuse of code, hosting, or metadata creates a fingerprint that can be detected through open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques. The “X-factor” was pretty clearly less an unknown human leak than a manifestation of the new technological environment. The Agency had built a secret system inside a public network and underestimated the degree to which its digital seams could be analyzed by adversarial FIS.

The forensic model resolves apparent contradictions in early assessments. CIA officials believed the COVCOM used in China was “more robust” than those in other theaters, implying stronger encryption, better authentication and other tradecraft goodies (CIA Inspector General, 2017). Nonetheless, it collapsed thoroughly. The pattern-matching explanation shows why robustness in cryptography could coexist with fragility in topology. The system’s security depended not only on code strength but also on architectural compartmentation. The Agency’s reuse of templates, hosting blocks, and design elements was weak tradecraft. It undermined that compartmentation and created a single attack surface.

It is important to recognize that the web-discoverability hypothesis complements rather than replaces the other two causes. Lee’s betrayal and intrinsic platform weaknesses likely provided the initial penetration points that allowed adversaries to begin to dig. The enumeration process then magnified those breaches exponentially. The CIA has not publicly confirmed this reconstruction, understandably. Nonetheless, independent open-source evidence strongly supports the inference that the network’s design flaws were decisive.

The lessons extend beyond one agency or episode. The COVCOM failure demonstrates how operational hygiene in digital clandestine systems is as critical as cryptographic soundness and insider threats. A covert communication platform can fail not because its cipher is broken, but because its metadata is out in the wild. This insight has profound implications for modern intelligence and of course, counterintelligence work. As state and non-state actors deploy increasingly networked clandestine capabilities, the old principle of “need to know” must be re-engineered into “need to connect.” Going forward, it would be foolish not to design com platforms in a way that every covert node is architecturally unique. Different code bases, hosting, and design fingerprints are imperative to avoid global correlation. The COVCOM collapse shows the lethal cost of violating that principle.

So, the CIA’s network failures in China were not caused solely by human treachery or inadequate encryption but by an invisible architectural flaw. The covert web infrastructure could be mapped once any part was exposed. This vulnerability, amplified by Lee’s betrayal and existing COVCOM weaknesses, created a perfect storm that allowed adversaries to dismantle entire espionage networks with unprecedented speed. The “X-factor” was not mystical but mathematical, an emergent property of pattern recognition within an interconnected Internet. The episode stands as a cautionary tale that in the digital age, secrecy depends not merely on keeping information encrypted but on ensuring that the very existence of the system remains undiscoverable. Sophisticated FIS such as China’s have the capacity to “de-clandestine” it, and far too quickly.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Central Intelligence Agency. (2021). Inspector General’s review of clandestine communication failures (declassified summary). Langley, VA.

Citizen Lab. (2022). Statement on the fatal flaws found in a defunct CIA covert communications system. University of Toronto. https://citizenlab.ca/2022/09/statement-on-the-fatal-flaws-found-in-a-defunct-cia-covert-communications-system/

Overt Defense. (2022, October 5). Poorly designed CIA websites likely got spies killed. https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/10/05/poorly-designed-cia-websites-likely-got-spies-killed/

Risen, J. (2018, May 21). How China used a hacked CIA communications system to hunt down U.S. spies. The New York Times.

Security Boulevard. (2018, June 6). The espionage of former CIA case officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee for China.

U.S. Department of Justice. (2019). Former CIA officer sentenced for conspiring to commit espionage. Press release, April 19, 2019.

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New York SIM Farm, Nation-State Attribution?

intelligence, counterintelligence, spy, espionage, counterespionage, subversion, sabotage, C. Constantin Poindexter;

The discovery of an extensive SIM-box infrastructure in New York City represents a profound counterintelligence concern, not only because of the physical scale of the operation but also because of its timing and location. To appreciate the significance of this event, it is necessary to place it within a broader historical and operational context. Telecommunications networks have long been exploited by both state and non-state actors for covert communication, financial crime, and disruptive activity. The integration of criminal infrastructure with national security objectives has become an increasingly visible feature of modern gray-zone conflict, particularly since the end of the Cold War when adversaries began to weaponize civilian technologies in pursuit of deniable influence and disruption.

The use of “SIM farms,” or large-scale collections of SIM cards and servers designed to mimic ordinary cellular activity, is not new. Organized crime syndicates have leveraged them for spam, smishing, and financial fraud. North Korean operatives, for instance, have been linked to telephony-based fraud networks generating illicit revenue through scams and premium call-routing schemes. Russian-speaking cybercriminal groups have deployed SIM-boxes to mask identity and coordinate across borders while shielding themselves from law enforcement scrutiny. Iran’s cyber units, sometimes acting through cutouts, have also integrated telecommunications manipulation into campaigns targeting U.S. and allied interests. In each of these cases, the common thread is deniability, i.e., the ability to use civilian infrastructure for state-directed purposes while maintaining the outward appearance of ordinary criminality. Could this operation have been ENTIRELY non-aligned national or transnational criminal activity? Yes. “Thirty-five miles” from the U.N. would not be my choice of placement if the U.N. and the persons attending U.N. activities were my intended targets. Given the density of base station coverage in NYC, I would have opted for a post closer to both U.N. facilities and where attendees lay their heads. For the purpose of this piece, I’ll pretend that the operation was state-sponsored AND I’ll go with the premise that the discovered location was not an additional, perhaps secondary station in a chain. Of course, that might be exactly what adversarial FIS would want us to believe, i.e., “deniability” as I stated before.

Against this backdrop, the September 2025 discovery by the Secret Service of more than three hundred SIM servers and roughly one hundred thousand SIM cards clustered within a thirty-five-mile radius of the United Nations headquarters carries heightened significance. The seizure occurred during the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, a moment when global leaders converge in New York for high-level diplomacy (United States Secret Service, 2025). Official statements emphasized that the network could have enabled mass voice and text traffic, both for anonymized communications between foreign actors and potentially for the disruption of local telecommunications infrastructure (CNN, 2025; Associated Press, 2025).

The scale of this infrastructure and its deliberate placement near the United Nations point to a strategic rather than merely criminal purpose. Analysts cited by PBS noted that a SIM farm of this size could flood telecommunications systems, causing cascading outages (PBS, 2025). While some technical experts caution that U.S. carriers have robust mitigation tools that could blunt such an impact, even localized or temporary disruptions during a global diplomatic gathering would have significant psychological and operational consequences (Commsrisk, 2025). The purpose may not have been to permanently collapse networks but rather to create contingency leverage: a latent capacity to distract, delay, or obscure other operations should a geopolitical crisis erupt during the summit.

The Secret Service has publicly confirmed that communications occurred between “nation-state threat actors and individuals known to federal law enforcement,” yet no official attribution has been made (U.S. Secret Service, 2025). For counterintelligence professionals, the patterns of tradecraft and the geopolitical context allow for reasoned analytic judgments. The operation fits squarely within the framework of hybrid tactics employed by Russia. Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to blend criminal infrastructure with state-directed activity. It has relied on criminal intermediaries to support disinformation campaigns, cyber operations, and telephony-based harassment. The combination of scale, timing, and proximity to the United Nations strongly suggests a Russian operational signature. This discovery mirrors previous instances in which Russia has leveraged technically noisy, deniable assets to signal capability and project disruption potential at politically symbolic moments.

Iran also emerges as a credible suspect. Tehran has a well-documented history of asymmetric operations designed to sow disruption in Western capitals. Its intelligence services have previously partnered with non-state intermediaries to extend operational reach while maintaining plausible deniability. A SIM-box farm designed to threaten disruption of cellular networks during the United Nations General Assembly would be consistent with Iran’s asymmetric doctrine. However, Iran’s pattern of activity has traditionally emphasized cyber intrusions, targeted influence operations, and physical proxy activity, rather than large-scale telecommunications disruption.

The DPRK must also be considered. Pyongyang has long relied on illicit telecommunications infrastructures for revenue generation and covert activity. SIM farms have been documented as part of North Korea’s financial crime toolkit. Yet in this case, the strategic signaling implied by targeting the United Nations makes North Korea a less likely culprit, given its usual focus on revenue production rather than international diplomatic disruption.

The PRC possesses the capability to construct such infrastructure, but the risk-reward calculus makes Beijing an improbable sponsor. China’s intelligence services favor long-term, quiet, persistent access operations, usually in the cyber and human collection domains. Deploying a conspicuous SIM-box network during the United Nations General Assembly would carry a high probability of exposure and diplomatic fallout, outcomes that run counter to China’s operational culture of avoiding overt disruption at politically sensitive junctures.

All things considered, I feel that the evidence points more persuasively toward Russian FIS as the primary sponsor, Iran as a new second. Russia’s historical reliance on hybrid criminal-state operations, its willingness to employ disruptive signaling tactics, and its long record of targeting politically symbolic events align with the discovery in New York. Iran shares some of these characteristics but lacks the established track record of telephony-based disruption at this scale. North Korea and China are less consistent with the observed tradecraft and geopolitical logic.

The discovery of the New York SIM farm underscores two enduring counterintelligence lessons. Adversarial FISs increasingly exploit civilian infrastructure, particularly in telecommunications, to build deniable operational capacity. The integration of criminal and state networks is no longer exceptional but rather a normalized feature of nation-state competition. From a defensive/countermeasures perspective, this event highlights the need for closer alignment between federal law enforcement, telecommunications providers, and allied intelligence partners. To our enemies, the attraction of SIM farms lies not only in their covert utility but also in their symbolic power, i.e., the ability to show that civilian networks can be weaponized against the United States at moments of significant diplomatic importance.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Associated Press. (2025, September 27). U.S. Secret Service dismantles imminent telecommunications threat in New York. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/unga-threat-telecom-service-sim-93734f76578bc9ca22d93a8e91fd9c76

CNN. (2025, September 27). Secret Service investigates massive network near UN. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/27/us/nyc-network-secret-service-investigation

Commsrisk. (2025, September 24). U.S. Secret Service finds 300 SIM boxes in New York. Commsrisk. https://commsrisk.com/us-secret-service-finds-300-simboxes-in-new-york

PBS. (2025, September 24). How SIM farms like the one found near the UN could collapse telecom networks. PBS NewsHour. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-sim-farms-like-the-one-found-near-the-un-could-collapse-telecom-networks

United States Secret Service. (2025, September 27). U.S. Secret Service dismantles imminent telecommunications threat in New York. United States Secret Service. https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2025/09/us-secret-service-dismantles-imminent-telecommunications-threat-new-york

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Conduct Not Becoming: Alleged U.S.-Linked Interference in Greenland

intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, spy, spies, subversion operations, c. constantin poindexter

In August 2025, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the chargé d’affaires of the United States Embassy in Copenhagen after revelations by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) that several Americans linked to the U.S. Presidential Administration had engaged in covert political activities in Greenland. According to the reporting, these individuals compiled lists of Greenlanders categorized as “pro-U.S.” or “anti-Trump,” cultivated ties with local elites, and promoted narratives designed to widen divisions between Nuuk and Copenhagen (PBS NewsHour 2025; Associated Press 2025). The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) emphasized that Greenland remains a primary target for foreign interference operations, echoing earlier warnings that external actors could exploit or fabricate political disagreements within the Kingdom of Denmark (Al Jazeera 2025). These revelations, coupled with Denmark’s unusually direct diplomatic response, illustrate the characteristics of a malign influence or subversive operation and highlight the potential damage such activities can inflict on U.S. national security, particularly by undermining liaison trust with Denmark, arguably one of Washington’s most important intelligence partners.

Characteristics of a Malign Influence Operation

Malign influence operations are typically defined by certain recurring attributes: plausible deniability, use of cut-outs or intermediaries, audience mapping and segmentation, amplification of divisive narratives, and efforts aimed at shaping decision-making environments rather than openly persuading through argument. The Greenland episode, as described by DR and reported internationally, bears all of these hallmarks.

Plausible deniability was central to the actor’s positioning. Officials stressed that the government does not direct or control the actions of private citizens, even though the actors were reportedly politically connected to the Administration (PBS NewsHour 2025). Such disavowals allow states to shield themselves from direct accountability while benefiting from the effects of covert activity.

The use of cut-outs and informal networks appears evident. The alleged operatives were not formal embassy staff operating under Chief of Mission authority but instead American nationals cultivating relationships with Greenlandic political and business figures. This indirect approach mirrors tradecraft seen in both Cold War–era and contemporary influence campaigns, allowing sponsors to maintain distance while pursuing strategic objectives (Associated Press 2025).

The activity involved audience segmentation, as evidenced by the preparation of lists distinguishing sympathetic Greenlanders from opponents. Such mapping is a well-established precursor to micro-targeted persuasion and coalition-building (Rudbeck 2020).

The operation sought to exploit existing grievances. Greenland has a long history of tension regarding its relationship with Copenhagen, particularly concerning autonomy and resource management. PET has publicly warned that adversaries attempt to “promote or amplify particular viewpoints” in Greenland to exacerbate these tensions (Al Jazeera 2025). By pressing sovereignty-oriented narratives, the actors aligned with known fault lines.

The activities pursued a strategic effect on governance: nudging Greenland’s politics toward greater separation from Denmark or, at minimum, intensifying friction between Copenhagen and Nuuk. This fits the definition of a malign influence campaign, which aims not merely to influence public opinion but to shift the constitutional or strategic environment of the target polity (Fleshman et al. 2020).

Greenland’s Strategic Importance

Understanding why Denmark reacted so firmly requires recognition of Greenland’s immense strategic value. The island hosts Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), the northernmost U.S. military installation. Pituffik is critical to ballistic missile early warning, missile defense, and space surveillance missions, particularly through the 12th Space Warning Squadron, which tracks ballistic launches and supports U.S. Space Force operations (U.S. Space Force 2024). Pituffik’s radar and space-tracking systems are a vital component of NATO deterrence, as they enable early detection of potential Russian or other adversary launches.

Beyond Pituffik, Greenland’s geography makes it indispensable to North Atlantic security. The island sits astride the Greenland–Iceland–U.K. (GIUK) gap, a maritime chokepoint central to monitoring Russian submarine traffic from the Barents Sea into the North Atlantic. As the Arctic becomes increasingly contested due to climate change and resource competition, Greenland’s location at the intersection of North America and Europe magnifies its strategic importance.

Equally significant is Denmark’s intelligence capability. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) and PET are widely regarded as among the most capable small-state services, particularly in signals intelligence, counterintelligence, cyber and Arctic domain awareness. FE’s Intelligence Risk Assessment 2024 explicitly identifies Greenland as a frontline in great-power competition (Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2024). As such, Denmark is one of Washington’s most important intelligence liaisons, and trust in this relationship is crucial to U.S. and NATO security.

Damage to U.S. National Security

From a U.S. perspective, even if the federal government neither authorized nor directed the actions of the Americans involved, the perception of interference inflicts real costs. Four national security risks stand out.

Such activities risk eroding liaison trust. Intelligence sharing relies on reciprocity and respect for sovereignty. If Denmark perceives that the United States tolerates or encourages efforts to manipulate the Kingdom’s internal affairs, Danish services may hesitate to share sensitive information or to cooperate fully in Arctic monitoring. Trust, once diminished, is difficult to rebuild (Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2024).

Malign influence in Greenland undermines coordinated Arctic policy. Pituffik’s continued operation depends on alignment among Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Washington. Any perception that the U.S. is fueling secessionist sentiment in Greenland complicates base access negotiations, environmental approvals, and trilateral defense arrangements. Diplomatic friction could translate into delays or restrictions that weaken early warning and space-tracking capabilities (Associated Press 2025).

Such revelations hand adversaries narrative ammunition. Russia and China have long sought to depict the United States as hypocritical in its advocacy for sovereignty and democratic norms. A Danish finding that U.S.-linked actors engaged in subversive activity in Greenland would provide propaganda fodder for Moscow and Beijing, undermining U.S. credibility in NATO and in multilateral Arctic governance forums (Al Jazeera 2025).

These operations jeopardize operational continuity at Pituffik. Strategic deterrence depends on uninterrupted coverage of missile warning and space tracking. Political discord that affects budgets, labor relations, or local sentiment in Greenland could generate friction costs that weaken U.S. posture in the High North (U.S. Space Force 2024).

Theoretical Framing: Rudbeck and Malign Influence

Emma Rudbeck’s (2020) master’s thesis on foreign interference in Greenland provides an instructive framework. Applying Applied History and strategic narrative theory, Rudbeck argues that interference by major powers in Greenland echoes Cold War–era dynamics and threatens the concept of “Arctic Exceptionalism,” which had long portrayed the region as insulated from great-power rivalry. She concludes that Denmark must prepare for sustained interference by China, Russia, and the United States, and recommends a proactive Arctic strategy that emphasizes resilience and narrative management. Rudbeck’s insights align with the Greenland episode. The use of covert actors to segment populations and inflame tensions fits her description of “strategic narratives” designed to reshape perceptions of sovereignty and autonomy. By treating Greenland not as a neutral space but as contested political terrain, the alleged U.S.-linked operatives validated Rudbeck’s claim that interference is no longer limited to Russia or China but includes Washington itself. From Denmark’s perspective, this raises uncomfortable questions about the reliability of its closest ally.

Assessing the “Deception Operation” Frame

Denmark’s choice to summon the U.S. envoy demonstrates that it viewed the incident not as isolated private advocacy but as a coherent deception operation. The tactics of covert list-building, elite cultivation, and narrative seeding abroad reflect classic subversive tradecraft, intended to give the false impression of grassroots political momentum. PET has warned precisely about such techniques, noting that foreign influence in Greenland often seeks to “amplify particular viewpoints” to sow division (Al Jazeera 2025). This aligns with broader theoretical work on deception and influence, which emphasizes how adversaries shape decision environments by hiding their involvement (Fleshman et al. 2020).

We Need to Assure Copenhagen that “This isn’t who we are”

The Greenland case illustrates how malign influence can damage alliances even when conducted by non-official actors. Mitigating this damage will require visible U.S. steps: clear ministerial-level assurances to Copenhagen, tighter deconfliction to ensure all outreach in Greenland is coordinated through embassy channels, and symbolic trilateral initiatives with Denmark and Greenland to demonstrate respect for the Kingdom’s internal constitutional order. Absent such efforts, suspicion of U.S. duplicity may persist, weakening NATO cohesion at a time when Arctic security is increasingly central.

The alleged Administration-linked interference in Greenland demonstrates the characteristics of a malign influence operation: plausible deniability, cut-outs, audience segmentation, exploitation of grievances, and pursuit of strategic effects on governance. Greenland’s unique importance to U.S. defense posture and Denmark’s role as an elite intelligence ally magnify the stakes. By alienating Copenhagen, such operations risk degrading liaison trust, undermining trilateral defense cooperation, handing adversaries propaganda, and jeopardizing early-warning missions at Pituffik. Rudbeck’s (2020) analysis underscores that Greenland is no longer insulated from great-power rivalry, and that even allies may engage in subversive activity. For the United States, this episode should serve as a cautionary reminder that short-term political maneuvering can yield long-term strategic perils, especially when it undermines the trust of one of its most vital partners in the Arctic.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

References

Al Jazeera. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Trump Allies’ Alleged Greenland Interference.” Al Jazeera, August 28, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/28/denmark-summons-us-envoy-over-trump-allies-greenland.

Associated Press. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Alleged Trump Allies’ Interference in Greenland.” AP News, August 28, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/denmark-greenland-us-trump-6c9544314792cf1e287e21af06111c1e.

Danish Defence Intelligence Service. 2024. Intelligence Risk Assessment 2024. Copenhagen: FE. https://fe-ddis.dk/en.

Fleshman, William, Jennifer L. Larson, and Christopher Paul. 2020. “Deception and the Strategy of Influence.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.01331.

PBS NewsHour. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Claims of Interference in Greenland.” PBS NewsHour, August 28, 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/denmark-summons-u-s-envoy-over-claims-of-interference-in-greenland.

Rudbeck, Emma. 2020. How Should the Kingdom of Denmark React to the Increased Chinese, Russian, and U.S. Interference in Greenland in Its Coming Arctic Strategy? Master’s thesis, University of Southern Denmark. https://thesis.sdu.dk/download?id=2260.

U.S. Space Force. 2024. “12th Space Warning Squadron, Pituffik Space Base.” Fact Sheet, Department of the Air Force. https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/
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Artificial Intelligence and Offensive Counterintelligence in the U.S. I.C.

counterintelligence, intelligence, espionage, counterespionage, espia, spy, spies, contrainteligencia, contraespionaje, c. constantin poindexter, J2, CNI, DNI

Artificial intelligence is transforming the national security landscape by augmenting the capabilities of intelligence organizations to “identify, disrupt, and neutralize adversarial threats”. While much scholarly and policy attention has been devoted to the defensive applications of AI, i.e., cybersecurity, threat detection, and insider threat monitoring, implications for offensive counterintelligence (CI) are equally profound. Offensive counterintelligence, which involves proactive measures to manipulate, exploit, or dismantle adversarial intelligence operations, has traditionally depended on human ingenuity, deception, and long-term HUMINT. The introduction of AI into this realm promises to exponentially increase the scale, speed, and sophistication of U.S. counterintelligence campaigns. The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) will become more effective at penetration of FIS, deception operations, and neutralization of espionage activities.

One of the most significant ways AI will enhance offensive counterintelligence is through advanced pattern recognition and anomaly detection across massive data streams. The IC already ingests petabytes of information daily, from open-source intelligence (OSINT) to signals intelligence (SIGINT). Offensive counterintelligence officers have historically been hobbled by fragmentary reports and painfully dry and drawn-out analysis to identify foreign intelligence officers, their networks, and their vulnerabilities. Machine learning algorithms now enable CI analysts to identify subtle anomalies in communications metadata, financial transactions, or travel records that suggest covert operational behavior. Algorithms trained on known espionage tradecraft can detect anomalies in mobile phone usage, repeated travel to consular facilities, or encrypted message timing that would elude traditional analysis (Carter, 2020). By automating the detection of clandestine activity, AI provides offensive CI officers with early targeting leads for recruitment, deception, or disruption.

AI’s role in predictive modeling of adversary behavior is a game-changer. Traditional counterintelligence operations have required years of painstaking collection before a service could anticipate an adversary’s moves. Now, reinforcement learning and predictive analytics can generate probabilistic models of how foreign intelligence services will act under specific conditions. This capability is invaluable for offensive CI, in which anticipating an adversary’s agent recruitment attempts or technical collection strategies and techniques allows the U.S. to insert double agents, conduct controlled leaks, or channel disinformation in ways that compromise foreign intelligence effectiveness (Treverton & Miles, 2021). By simulating adversary decision-making processes and Loops, AI effectively allows the IC to wage a chess match several moves ahead, shifting initiative in favor of U.S. operators.

AI will transform deception operations, a core element of offensive counterintelligence. Deception requires constructing credible false narratives, fabricating convincing documents, and sustaining elaborate covers. Generative AI models provide new tools for producing synthetic but convincing content, i.e., emails, social media profiles, deepfake videos, etc., that can be deployed to manipulate adversarial intelligence targets. These capabilities enable more robust false-flag operations, digital honeypots, and disinformation campaigns designed to lure adversary collectors into traps or consume their resources chasing fabricated leads. Deepfake technology raises concerns about disinformation in democratic societies, however, if deployed in a tightly controlled counterintelligence context it becomes a force multiplier, providing scalable deception tools that previously demanded enormous human and material resources (Brundage et al., 2018).

AI enhances the identification and exploitation of recruitment opportunities, central to offensive CI operations. The IC has long relied on spotting, assessing, and recruiting human assets with access and placement. AI-driven analysis of social media, professional networks, and digital exhaust enables rapid identification of individuals with access, grievances, or vulnerabilities suitable for recruitment. Natural language processing (NLP) tools can detect sentiment, stress, or dissatisfaction in posts, while network analysis maps reveal connections within bureaucracies or security services (Greitens, 2019). By narrowing down large populations to high-value recruitment targets, AI augments human case officer ability to prioritize approaches and customize persuasion angles. The integration of AI with human tradecraft accelerates the traditionally slow and resource-intensive recruitment cycle.

Cyber counterintelligence represents another frontier where AI confers offensive advantages. FISs increasingly operate in cyberspace, exfiltrating sensitive data and conducting influence campaigns. AI-enabled intrusion detection, combined with offensive cyber capabilities, allows U.S. counterintelligence to not only identify intrusions but also manipulate them. AI can facilitate “active defense” strategies in which foreign intelligence hackers are fed false or misleading data, undermining their confidence in purloined data. Automated adversarial machine learning tools can also detect attempts by foreign services to poison U.S. AI training data, allowing counterintelligence operators to preemptively counter them (Henderson, 2022). AI both defends critical systems and creates new opportunities for denial and deception operations (D&D) and disruption of adversarial cyber espionage.

Further, AI also addresses one of the perennial challenges of offensive counterintelligence, scalability. Human operator and analyst resources are finite. Adversarial services often enjoy the advantage of operating from within authoritarian systems unconstrained by meaningful oversight. AI offers the IC the ability to scale counterintelligence operations across global theaters without proportional increases in manpower. Automated triage systems can flag potential espionage indicators for human review, while AI-driven simulations can test the effectiveness of proposed offensive strategies before deployment. The scalability of AI ensures that offensive CI efforts remain proactive rather than reactive, allowing the IC to contest adversarial services at a global level (Allen & Chan, 2017).

I will note here that the insertion of AI into offensive counterintelligence is not a panacea. Overreliance on algorithmic outputs without human validation can lead to “false positives”, misidentification, or ethically and legally problematic targeting. Adversaries are also rapidly adopting AI for their own counter-counterintelligence measures, raising the specter of an AI-driven arms race in deception, espionage and counterespionage disciplines. The U.S. IC must ensure that AI tools are embedded within a robust framework of human review, legal compliance, and ethical norms. Offensive CI, clearly operating in the shadows of democratic accountability, requires enhanced governance mechanisms to balance operational effectiveness with adherence to rule-of-law principles (Zegart, 2022).

The adoption of AI in offensive counterintelligence necessitates organizational adaptation. Case officers, analysts, and technical specialists must be trained not only to use AI tools but also to understand their limitations. Interdisciplinary collaboration between computer scientists, behavioral experts, and intelligence professionals will be essential for designing AI systems that are operationally relevant, a particularly challenging problem in a group of agencies accustomed to “siloing”. Investment in secure, resilient AI infrastructure is critical, as adversaries will inevitably seek to penetrate, manipulate, or sabotage U.S. counterintelligence AI systems. Just as past eras of counterintelligence revolved around protecting codes and agent networks, the new era will hinge on safeguarding the integrity of AI platforms themselves (Carter, 2020).

Artificial intelligence offers unprecedented opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of offensive counterintelligence. By improving anomaly detection, predictive modeling, deception, recruitment targeting, and cyber counterintelligence, AI serves as both a force multiplier and a strategic enabler. It allows the IC to proactively shape the intelligence battlespace, seize the initiative from adversaries, and scale operations to meet global challenges. These opportunities come with risks, ethical, operational, and strategic, however, with careful management the payoff will be monumental. Offensive counterintelligence has always been a contest of wits, deception, and foresight. In the twenty-first century, AI will become the decisive instrument that determines whether the U.S. retains the upper hand in the shadow war.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

References

Allen, G., & Chan, T. (2017). Artificial intelligence and national security. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., Toner, H., Eckersley, P., Garfinkel, B., … & Amodei, D. (2018). The malicious use of artificial intelligence: Forecasting, prevention, and mitigation. Future of Humanity Institute.

Carter, A. (2020). The future of counterintelligence in the age of artificial intelligence. Center for a New American Security.

Greitens, S. C. (2019). Dealing with demand for authoritarianism: The domestic politics of counterintelligence. International Security, 44(2), 9–47.

Henderson, T. (2022). Offensive cyber counterintelligence: Leveraging AI to deceive adversaries. Journal of Cybersecurity Studies, 8(1), 55–74.

Treverton, G. F., & Miles, R. (2021). Strategic counterintelligence: The case for offensive measures. RAND Corporation.

Zegart, A. (2022). Spies, lies, and algorithms: The history and future of American intelligence. Princeton University Press.

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The Strategic Importance of the INR: Safeguarding U.S. National Security through Diplomatically Anchored Intelligence

intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, spy, c. constantin poindexte

The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is a critical but underestimated pillar of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Established in 1947 and tracing its roots to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Research and Analysis Branch, the INR operates with a unique mandate: fusing diplomatic insight with rigorous intelligence analysis. Unique among I.C. member agencies, it exists specifically to inform U.S. foreign policy decisions. Despite its modest budget and staff (+/-300 personnel and less than one percent of the total IC budget), the INR’s record of analytic precision, geopolitical foresight, and principled speak-truth-to-power character has earned it a reputation as one of the most accurate and seasoned voices in national intelligence. Recent defunding directives from the current presidential administration threaten to undermine this vital function, risking a blind spot in diplomatic intelligence and foreign affairs policymaking.

The Unique Role of the INR in the U.S. Intelligence Community

The INR’s primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence analysis to the Secretary of State and other senior policymakers. Unlike larger IC agencies such as the CIA or NSA, the INR does not generally collect raw intelligence through clandestine operations or technical means. Instead, it synthesizes open-source material, diplomatic cables, intelligence reporting, and foreign liaison inputs to produce independent assessments grounded in a global diplomatic context (ODNI, 2023). This structural independence grants INR the ability to offer dissenting views when other agencies fall victim to inherent biases and groupthink. A prominent example is its refusal to endorse the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The INR dissented from the IC consensus, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting a nuclear program (National Intelligence Council, NIE 2002-16HC, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Oct. 2002, INR). History has vindicated the INR’s position, reinforcing the critical need for its unbiased, evidence-based approach to intelligence.

Case Studies: Intelligence and Counterintelligence Victories Attributed to INR

Iraq WMD Dissent (2002–2003)

INR’s refusal to support claims of an active Iraqi nuclear weapons program is perhaps its most famous act of analytic integrity. Despite intense interagency pressure, INR analysts resisted politicization and flagged the aluminum tubes cited by other agencies as likely intended for conventional rockets, NOT nuclear centrifuge use. This dissent was formalized in the 2002 NIE, which noted:

“The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) judges that the available evidence does not add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing an integrated and comprehensive program for a nuclear weapon.”
— NIE 2002-16HC (Oct. 2002), p. 8, Declassified.

This dissent not only preserved U.S. diplomatic credibility in the long term but also highlighted the dangers of overreliance on uncertain technical intelligence divorced from geopolitical context and reliance on sole, unreliable assets (i.e., “Curveball”, subject to a burn notice).

Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election

In the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), INR was a co-author alongside the CIA, NSA, and FBI. INR fully endorsed the judgment that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election with the intent of helping then-candidate Donald J. Trump. Unlike the NSA’s “moderate confidence,” INR expressed “high confidence” in the assessment (ODNI ICA 2017-01D, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections,” Jan. 6, 2017). The INR’s contribution was key to bolstering the legitimacy of the ICA amid partisan scrutiny.

Warning of the Potential for Genocide in Rwanda (1994)

Though often overlooked, the INR produced early assessments indicating the risk of mass violence in Rwanda before the April 1994 genocide. These assessments were among the few within the IC to link escalating interethnic tensions and the collapse of the Arusha Accords to the potential for mass atrocities. A State Department cable dated April 1, 1994, warned of “a planned campaign of violence” by Hutu extremists The INR analysist that authored the report was tragically ignored at the policy level (State Cable 094659, April 1, 1994, Declassified under FOIA).

Budgetary Threats: Undermining a Critical Node in Strategic Intelligence

The FY2025 presidential budget request proposes a 17% reduction in the INR’s operational funding cutting approximately $15 million from its analytic programs, staff training, and diplomatic intelligence integration efforts (Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, FY2025, pp. 112–114). Case in point, a report (07/21/2025) from “an official inside the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) stated that two offices have been eliminated, one focused on education, and the other responsible for intelligence sharing with foreign governments.” (Homeland Security Today) While such cuts may appear numerically small, they pose a disproportionate risk to the IC’s analytical diversity and strategic foresight. INR operates with a compact, specialized cadre of analysts who often possess region-specific language and cultural proficiency, and decades of diplomatic experience. This sort of expertise cannot be rapidly regenerated once shown the door.

INR’s function in supporting U.S. embassies with intelligence briefings and diplomatic threat assessments will be dangerously constrained. As the IC continues to emphasize cyber threats, great power competition, and non-state actors, the INR remains the only agency that fully integrates foreign policy objectives into intelligence production.

The proposed cuts also jeopardize INR’s role in managing the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU), which provides critical geospatial intelligence for conflict zones and disaster response. Budget constraints will degrade the HIU’s ability to deploy timely, unclassified intelligence products for decision-makers and humanitarian actors, especially in regions like Sudan, Haiti, and Gaza.

Summation

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research remains indispensable to informing sound U.S. foreign policy and the broader mission of the Intelligence Community. Its record of analytical excellence, principled dissent, and regional expertise often exceeds in breadth and depth other I.C. members. INR’s contribution is thus unmatched. From warning against skewed WMD claims to identifying hostile FIS influence operations, INR has proven that size does not equate to strategic punch. Its diplomatic intelligence orientation allows it to view global events through a lens of nuance often missing from those agencies focused on technical collection and limited asset HUMINT. To weaken the INR through budgetary attrition is to court strategic blindness. Especially in an era marked by global realignment, hybrid warfare, and renewed great-power rivalry, the INR’s voice must be amplified, not silenced. Any degradation of its capability represents not only a loss to the Department of State but a dangerous diminution of America’s strategic planning capacity.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2023). United States Intelligence Community Budget Overview. https://www.dni.gov

National Intelligence Council. (2002). National Intelligence Estimate 2002-16HC, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Declassified). https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2002_NIE_WMD.pdf

ODNI. (2017). ICA 2017-01D: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Declassified). https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf

Department of State. (1994). Cable 094659 from U.S. Embassy Kigali, April 1, 1994 (Declassified under FOIA).

U.S. Department of State. (2024). Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, FY2025. https://www.state.gov/reports/fy-2025-congressional-budget-justification

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A Ghost in the Machine: Chinese FIS Covert Collection Devices in Solar Inverters

espionage, spy, sabotage, subversion, intelligence, counterintelligence, counterespionage, c. constantin poindexter

National security operatives have found communication devices embedded within Chinese-manufactured solar power inverters and batteries, again raising significant concerns about the security of critical energy infrastructure. These devices, capable of bypassing established cybersecurity measures, appear to be capable of remote manipulation. Successful exploitation could lead to widespread power grid disruption. The following is my take on the technical aspects of the devices, design and data transmission methodologies, the potential locations of data collection receivers, and if their deployment aligns with known Chinese Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) models and methodology. The following is based on my review of NON-CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

The integration of renewable energy sources into U.S. power grids has been a cornerstone of our efforts to combat climate change. Central to this integration are power inverters, devices that convert direct current (DC) from solar panels and wind turbines into alternating current (AC) suitable for distribution across the power grid. We now have a really disconcerting development: the discovery of rogue communication devices within Chinese-manufactured inverters and batteries.

Device Composition and Integration

Investigations have revealed that certain Chinese-made solar inverters and batteries contain undocumented communication modules, including cellular-like mechanisms. These components are not listed in product specifications and are capable of establishing independent communication channels, effectively bypassing existing cybersecurity firewalls . The presence of such modules allows for potential remote access and control. (More about this in the counterintelligence section below.) These devices are covertly integrated into the hardware of the inverters and batteries making detection challenging during normal inspections. Their design suggests a deliberate effort to conceal them. The functionalities that can be activated remotely are also a BIG red flag. The integration of these components indicates a high level of sophistication and planning, aligning with tactics observed in state-sponsored cyber-espionage and sabotage operations.

Communication Channels

The devices appear to utilize various communication methods to transmit data, including cellular networks, perhaps local bluetooth-like transmission and potential satellite communications. The use of satellite communication modules such as the Iridium 9603 allows for global coverage and low-latency transmission. This feature would enable remote control capabilities even in areas with limited terrestrial network access .

Data Exfiltration and Command Reception

These communication modules can facilitate both the exfiltration of data from the energy platforms and the reception of remote commands. This bidirectional communication capability poses enormous risks because of the potential extraction of sensitive information and the execution of commands that could disrupt or damage energy infrastructure.

Potential Locations of Data Collection Receivers

The specific locations of collection receivers are classified, however, the nature of the communication methods suggests that data could be transmitted to centralized servers managed by entities affiliated with or under the influence of Chinese FIS. The use of satellite communications makes the identification of data endpoints complicated, as signals can be received from literally any point on the globe. The Chinese station in Cuba would be convenient, however, given China’s extensive global infrastructure and technological reach, it is plausible that transmissions could be routed through multiple international nodes before reaching a final collection point.

Alignment with Chinese Foreign Intelligence Service Models

China’s National Intelligence Law mandates that all organizations and citizens support, assist, and cooperate with state intelligence operations. This legal framework provides Chinese FIE with broad authority to compel companies to integrate surveillance and data collection mechanisms into their products. The deployment of rogue communication devices in energy infrastructure aligns with this model, facilitating intelligence gathering and potential sabotage capabilities. Chinese FIS operations employ a combination of cyber and HUMINT tactics to penetrate foreign systems. The integration of clandestine communication devices into critical infrastructure represents yet another example of these tactics, blending hardware manipulation with cyber capabilities. These tactics are consistent with the strategy of the Ministry of State Security and the People’s Liberation Army’s intelligence units that seek to enhance China’s advantages through technological means.

Implications for Global Energy Security

The discovery of these devices in solar components has grave implications for U.S. energy grid security. The potential for remote manipulation of power systems threatens not only the stability of national grids but also the safety and well-being of populations reliant on consistent energy delivery. The erosion of trust in international supply chains is also a grave peril, leading to increased protectionism and damage to global trade relationships. The integration of undocumented communication devices into Chinese-manufactured solar inverters and batteries represents a grave security concern. The technical sophistication of these components, coupled with their potential alignment with Chinese FIS objectives, underscores the need for new scrutiny and enhanced TSCM practices with regards to foreign-manufactured critical infrastructure components.

The Counterintelligence View

This is a bit technical so bear with me. There is a method to the madness. Problem 1: Inverters are generally equipped with ARM Cortex-M or Cortex-A series microcontrollers that serve as the core processing units for power conversion and monitoring. The covert components appear to use separate, low-power System-on-Chip (SoC) devices (think “MediaTek MT6261D or Espressif ESP32-S3 series”) which deploy onboard baseband processors capable of handling GSM/3G/4G/LTE communications. These SoCs are preloaded with proprietary firmware and operate outside the visibility of the host inverter firmware. These covert devices appear to use integrated RF transceivers on GSM bands, contain embedded GPS modules for geolocation, and have I2C or UART interface capability for stealth data siphoning from inverter controller. Unless there is a simple process for detecting the very small loss of power or disabling the cellular capability, the entire product must be scrapped. Jamming transmissions is not a feasible countermeasure considering the enormous geographic dispersion of a popular solar system component.

A transmission requires a collection part, a transmitter, something that functions as an antenna, and a power source. Problem 2: There is a redundant power supply path. Some units tap the inverter’s DC bus (48V nominal) deploying step-down DC-DC converters to deliver the 3.3V/5V required by the communication hardware. So, the shit-rogue device can acquire and/or broadcast even if the main inverter is powered down (assuming there is residual DC input from the solar panels or battery storage). Sophisticated design is evidenced by minimal-energy storage to allow burst transmissions, EMI shielding to reduce signatures and transient suppression to avoid triggering protective circuits. Again, there may not be any feasible technical countermeasure other than tossing the entire thing in the garbage.

Problem 3: Perhaps the most concerning feature is the presence of covert communication interfaces. The presence of miniature embedded GSM modules that can transmit over mobile networks is a clear indicator of the device’s true purpose. These can be paired with internal PCB-trace antennas which makes detection extremely difficult without picking the entire product apart and/or conducting a full-spectrum TSCM RF analysis. Some units, notably ones used in off-grid or critical infrastructure installations, contain Iridium 9603 transceivers. The Iridium Short Burst Data (SBD) service enables low-latency two-way messaging literally anywhere on Earth. BLE 4.0/5.0 (“Bluetooth”) modules are sometimes embedded to allow nearby short-range device pairing, enabling covert firmware updates or configuration changes via proximity-based access. From a counterintelligence perspective this one is the easiest to detect as it requires the presence of field operatives.

Problem 4: Collection and hijack are extremely problematic. The rogue devices are capable of silently intercepting inverter data via UART snooping of RTU traffic between the inverter controller and grid management mechanisms. RS-485 differential signal bridging architecture in these devices allows simultaneous passive read and active command injection. So, not only can they passively collect performance, grid sync, and telemetry but also insert remote commands (think “demand spikes, phase shifts, or false trip signals”) which could destabilize grid operations. Countermeasure? The garbage bin.

In truth, we are fortunate to have discovered this attempt to compromise these components. Once operational, detection would have been extremely difficult. The unclassified exhibits demonstrate very sophisticated anti-forensic features. They present obfuscated PCB silkscreening or black conformal coating as a physical deception, RF shielding within inverter chassis grounding, no identifiable MAC addresses and time-triggered sleep cycles which makes TSCM useless unless the sweep is conducted at the exact moment of a transmission. Encrypted communication via proprietary, obfuscated firmware (AES-128 in CTR) further points a finger at a sophistication attributable to state-level FIS. China’s intelligence doctrine views everything; commerce, academia, and even kids’ toys as vectors and to their advantage. Chinese “unrestricted warfare” doctrine, i.e., any mass-produced consumer or industrial good may serve as a channel for acquisition or disruption, explains the rogue components in solar inverters, another part of a larger, systematic effort to weaponize supply chains and exploit technological dependencies.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, Master in Intelligence Studies, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, CISA/NICCS OSINT Certified

References

Reuters. (2025, May 14). Rogue communication devices found in Chinese solar power inverters. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/ghost-machine-rogue-communication-devices-found-chinese-inverters-2025-05-14/

TechRadar. (2025, May 14). Chinese energy tech exports found to contain hidden comms and radio devices. Retrieved from: https://www.techradar.com/pro/security/chinese-energy-tech-exports-found-to-contain-hidden-comms-and-radio-devices

DIY Solar Forum. (2025, May 14). Rogue Chinese communication devices found in Solar inverters. Retrieved from: https://diysolarforum.com/threads/rogue-chinese-communication-devices-found-in-solar-inverters.104871/page-4

Wikipedia. (2025, April). National Intelligence Law of the People’s Republic of China. Retrieved from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Intelligence_Law_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China

Jamestown Foundation. (2024, March). Foreign Intelligence Hackers and Their Place in the PRC Intelligence Community. Retrieved from: https://jamestown.org/program/foreign-intelligence-hackers-and-their-place-in-the-prc-intelligence-community/

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The DeepSeek Threat: A Counterintelligence and National Security Concern

deepseek, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, export control, spy

Artificial intelligence (AI) is emerging as a transformative force in global economic, technological and military domains. Among the newest threats in the domain of adversarial AI is “DeepSeek,” a China-based generative AI platform. According to the bipartisan House Select Committee on the CCP, DeepSeek poses a serious national security risk to the United States, and I pose a grave counterintelligence one as well. I agree with the Committee’s four primary findings regarding DeepSeek and have included here some corroborating evidence and light analysis of the platform’s broader counterintelligence implications.

I. Data Funnel to the PRC through Military-Linked Infrastructure

DeepSeek funnels Americans’ data to the PRC through backend infrastructure connected to a U.S.-sanctioned Chinese military company. This is consistent with open-source cybersecurity and export control reporting. DeepSeek is affiliated with Beijing DeepSeek Technology Co., which maintains close technical cooperation with state-controlled firms like Tsinghua Tongfang Co., a subsidiary of China Electronics Corporation (CEC), a company sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Defense for its affiliation with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). U.S. officials have long warned that Chinese firms (even ostensibly private ones) are legally required under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law to support state intelligence activities. Thus, even passive collection of user queries and metadata from American users can be directly routed to China’s military-civil fused architecture. Cloud traffic analysis tools confirm that some of DeepSeek’s endpoints resolve to IP addresses controlled by Alibaba Cloud and Huawei Cloud, two platforms repeatedly identified for surveillance and data harvesting risks.

II. Covert Propaganda Alignment with CCP Objectives

DeepSeek’s second threat involves covert manipulation of search and response results to align with CCP propaganda. Chinese 2021 ‘Regulations on Recommendation Algorithms’ mandates that AI systems uphold “core socialist values.” Content analysis of DeepSeek’s outputs reveals alignment with these mandates. For instance, when queried about events such as the Tiananmen Square massacre or Uyghur internment camps, DeepSeek either deflects, omits content, or offers CCP-aligned narratives. This contrasts with U.S.-based LLMs that provide factual accounts supported by open-source citations. This form of algorithmic censorship mirrors practices deployed by Baidu and Sogou and serves as a soft power tool for narrative control.

III. Theft of U.S. AI Models through Distillation Techniques

The Committee finds that DeepSeek likely used model distillation to unlawfully replicate U.S. LLMs, a postulate supported by emerging AI security analyses. Distillation, a process whereby a smaller model is trained to mimic a larger one, is legal when trained on open data but when done using unauthorized API access or scraping against licensed outputs, it constitutes intellectual property theft. Reports from AI security firm Mithril Analytics suggest that DeepSeek’s model shows pattern duplication, formatting, and semantic behavior strikingly similar to OpenAI’s GPT-3.5 and Anthropic’s Claude-1.6 This aligns with China’s broader strategy of intellectual property misappropriation, which the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has labeled a “national policy.”

IV. Use of Prohibited NVIDIA Chips in Defiance of U.S. Export Controls

The fourth finding, that DeepSeek operates on advanced U.S.-made chips which circumvent export restrictions, reflects a broader problem of enforcement challenges in U.S. semiconductor control policy. According to internal supply chain tracking data and reporting from The Information and Reuters, DeepSeek appears to operate on thousands of NVIDIA A100 and H100 GPUs. These high-performance chips were restricted for export to China under the Biden Administration’s 2022 CHIPS Act enforcement measures. Nevertheless, Chinese AI companies have procured these processors through shell companies and resellers in Singapore, Hong Kong, and the UAE. The massive computing power needed to train and operate a GPT-scale model would be nearly impossible without these restricted components, confirming that DeepSeek benefits from illicitly obtained U.S. hardware.

Counterintelligence Threat of DeepSeek

DeepSeek poses a significant and multifaceted counterintelligence threat to the United States and its allies. The platform’s capacity to collect metadata, behavioral data, and potentially personally identifiable information (PII) from Americans creates an intelligence bonanza for Chinese FIS. Unlike traditional espionage, AI systems like DeepSeek operate invisibly and at scale, accumulating user data that can be used for profiling, influence operations, and further AI training purposes that effectively turn every American interaction into an exploitable data point.

DeepSeek represents a vector for information warfare. By manipulating answers to politically sensitive questions, promoting false equivalency in authoritarian narratives, and suppressing democratic values, the platform operates as a digital emissary of the CCP’s ideological and subversive goals. Such influence is subtle, persistent, and if not countered, capable of reshaping discourse as we have observed within our own political discourse.

The use of stolen U.S. intellectual property to build DeepSeek creates long-term strategic disadvantage. This is not a new peril. Not only does IP theft compromise American innovation, but it enables a hostile foreign power to accelerate its AI capability with limited investment. The widespread use of DeepSeek in academic or research settings could further enable China to monitor cutting-edge developments in Western institutions of higher education, R&D laboratories and to conduct surveillance on American professionals for recruitment by Chinese FIS or its allied FIEs.

Further, the misuse of restricted U.S. technology in DeepSeek is a direct challenge to the U.S. export control regime. The failure to prevent such chips from reaching adversarial AI projects undermines the deterrent effect of these restrictions and signals enforcement vulnerabilities to other hostile actors. This threat is potentially multiplicative as the CCP may allow restricted technology delivery to other state and non-state threat actors.

These grave threats demand a comprehensive counterintelligence and more broadly, national security strategy, one that includes aggressive export control enforcement, increased funding for AI provenance tracking, sanctions against companies that enable illicit procurement, and public awareness campaigns warning users of the risks posed by foreign AI platforms. Data is NOT merely informational. It is strategic. DeepSeek, if left unchecked, could be the spearhead of the CCP’s broader ambition to dominate the next frontier of digital power.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence Studies, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, NICCS/CICS Certified OSINT

Footnotes

U.S. Department of Defense. “DOD Releases List of Additional ‘Communist Chinese Military Companies’ Operating in the U.S.” (2020).

National Intelligence Law of the PRC, Articles 7 and 10 (2017).

Recorded Future. “Chinese Cloud Providers and the Global Data Exfiltration Risk.” (2023).

Cyberspace Administration of China. “Provisions on the Administration of Algorithmic Recommendation for Internet Information Services.” (2021).

Freedom House. “China’s Model of Digital Authoritarianism.” (2022).

Mithril Analytics. “Behavioral Fingerprinting of LLMs: Identifying Unauthorized Model Replication.” (2024).

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. “2023 Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Rights.”

The Information. “Inside China’s Underground Chip Market.” (2024).

Reuters. “Exclusive: China’s AI Firms Bypass U.S. Chip Ban with Grey Market Imports.” (2024).

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Disinformation as “Insurgency”, an American Constitutional View

disinformation, misinformation, espionage, counterespionage, counterintelligence, spy, subversion, psyops

I read with a great deal of interest Jacob Ware’s article “To fight disinformation, treat it as an insurgency” that appeared recently in The Strategist, an Australian Strategic Policy Institute publication. I have always held my own ideas about disinformation, more specifically “inoculation” as a countermeasure and recommending instruction from a very young age much as grade schools do in the baltic states. Ware’s article tackles the subject matter as a ‘control social media’ issue. I do not disagree with the importance of media responsibility for moderation of certain types of content, Ware appropriately identifies “overlook[ing] the important role of digital consumers”, but doubles down on content control. The article suggests that social media companies, as central nodes in the information ecosystem, must be pressured into moderating content more aggressively as much as the importance of digital consumers themselves being hardened against manipulation (“inoculation” as I have written in previous scholarship”. Control, compelling in its framing, raises some not insignificant constitutional issues in the context of the United States, particularly with regard to the First Amendment’s protections of speech, association, and press.

Framing Disinformation as Insurgency: Strategic and Legal Ramifications
Ware’s analogy between insurgencies and disinformation campaigns conveys the existential threat that hostile narratives, particularly those that foreign actors pose to democratic stability. Comparing disinformation actors to terrorist insurgents invites the application of military-style containment and suppression tactics, perhaps even the “cyber-kinetic” removal of bad actors (i.e., content moderation and bans), the targeting of ideological hubs (e.g., online communities, networks, influencers, etc.), and critically, the enforcement of norms through government-backed initiatives.

In the U.S. legal context, much of this may be a non-starter. Insurgents and terrorists operate outside the protection of constitutional law, whereas digital speakers, however misinformed or malicious, are presumptively entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. The Constitution does not permit the government to silence unpopular, false or even offensive ideas unless they meet strict criteria for incitement, true threats, or defamation. This legal boundary sharply limits the government’s ability to treat digital speech as a national security threat without triggering robust judicial scrutiny, even if that information is objectively dangerous disinformation.

Section 230 and Platform Immunity: The Epicenter of the Debate
The article criticizes Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (1996), which shields internet platforms from liability for user-generated content. This statute is often viewed as the legal linchpin that enabled the growth of the modern internet, on the whole a pretty positive thing. Ware argues that these protections prevent platforms from being held accountable and serve as a digital safe haven for malign actors. From a policy standpoint, this critique doesn’t hold much merit. Critics across the political spectrum argue that Section 230 incentivizes platforms to prioritize engagement and profit over truth and social stability, however, repealing or modifying Section 230 would not directly authorize government censorship. It WOULD expose platforms to civil liability for failing to moderate. Any new federal statute that imposes content-based restrictions or penalties would need to meet all prongs of the constitutional free speech tests and modern U.S. jurisprudence. The courts have routinely ruled that platforms are private entities with their own First Amendment rights therefore even in the absence of Section 230, the government would not be able to compel social media companies to carry or remove specific content unless it satisfies narrow constitutional exceptions.

Free Speech: A Distinctly American Commitment
A central theme in the article is the frustration that American-style free speech doctrines allow dangerous ideas to circulate freely online. Ware writes from an Australian perspective. The article praises the European Union’s Digital Services Act and Australia’s eSafety initiatives as superlative regulatory models. Under those statutory regimes platforms face stiff penalties for failing to suppress harmful content. These approaches may appear pragmatic but they clearly represent a sharp divergence from U.S. legal culture.

The U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment prohibits government abridgement of speech, including offensive, deceptive, or politically inconvenient speech. In United States v. Alvarez (2012), the Supreme Court struck down a federal law criminalizing false claims about military honors, holding that even deliberate lies are constitutionally protected unless they cause specific, fixable harm. Further, in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Court established that even advocacy of illegal action is protected unless it is directed to inciting imminent lawless action AND is likely to produce such action. So, even under the noble pretext of national defense, any proposal that seeks to directly regulate speech must reconcile with this robust jurisprudence. Foreign governments might be able to implement speech controls without constitutional constraints. We cannot. The U.S. must address disinformation through less intrusive, constitutionally sound means.

Counterinsurgency in a Civilian Space: Policing Thought and Risking Overreach
Ware’s counterinsurgency metaphor extends beyond moderation into behavioral engineering, winning the “hearts and minds” of digital citizens. This vision includes public education, civilian fact-checking brigades, and a sort of civic hygiene campaign against harmful content. Although such measures may be effective as psychological operations (PSYOPs), the distinction between persuasion and indoctrination must be carefully managed in a free society.

There is legitimate concern that state-sponsored resilience campaigns could slip into propaganda or viewpoint discrimination, especially when political actors define what constitutes “disinformation.” The inconvenient truth is that the label of “misinformation” has been applied inconsistently, sometimes suppressing legitimate dissent or valid minority viewpoints. The First Amendment’s commitment to a “marketplace of ideas theory” assumes that truth ultimately prevails in open debate, not through coercive narrative management.

There is another danger. Using the tools of counterinsurgency, even rhetorically, raises alarms about militarizing civil discourse and legitimizing authoritarian measures under the guise of “national security.” In Boumediene v. Bush (2008), the Court warned against extending military logic to civilian legal systems. Applying wartime strategy to cultural or political disputes in the civilian cyber domain risks undermining the very liberal values the state claims to protect.

An Appropriate Role for Government
Despite consitutional guardrails, the federal government is not powerless. Several constitutionally sound measures remain available. These approaches avoid entangling the government in the perilous business of adjudicating truth while still defending the information ecosystem.:

Transparency Requirements – Congress can require social media companies to disclose their moderation policies, algorithmic preferences, and foreign funding sources without dictating content outcomes.

Education Initiatives – Civics education and media literacy programs are constitutionally permissible and could help inoculate the public against disinformation without coercion.

Voluntary Partnerships – The government can engage with platforms voluntarily, offering intelligence or warnings about malign foreign influence without mandating suppression.

Targeting Foreign Actors – The government can lawfully sanction, indict, or expel foreign individuals and entities engaged in coordinated disinformation campaigns under laws governing espionage, foreign lobbying, or election interference.

Ware’s comparison of disinformation to insurgency is strategically evocative, but its prescriptive implications clash with foundational American principles. The First Amendment might seem inconvenient, but it was designed to prevent precisely the kind of overreach that counterinsurgency measures invite. Democracies do not defeat authoritarianism by adopting its tools of censorship and narrative control. If the United States is to confront the threats of disinformation effectively, it must do so in a way that affirms rather than undermines what makes us distinctively American. Educating, not censoring; persuading, not suppressing; and building durable civic institutions capable of withstanding the torrent of falsehoods without succumbing to the lure of government-controlled truth are imperative. Freedom remains the best antidote to tyranny ONLY if we remain vigilant in its defense.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter,

  • Master of Arts in Intelligence
  • Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence
  • Undergraduate Certificate in Counterintelligence
  • Former I.C. Cleared Contractor
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The Peril of Pentagon Orders Russian Cyber Defense ‘Stand Down’

cyber, cyber operations, cyber threat, espionage, counterespionage, counterintelligence, russia

It if doesn’t frighten you, it should. “The Trump administration has ordered the United States to end offensive cyber operations targeting Russia, . . . (US News, Mar. 2025) Russia, or more particularly the Russian FIE poses a grave threat to U.S. national security. Threats posed by this state-actor and its state-supported proxies are grave both in terms of capability and intent. Russia has consistently demonstrated its capacity to execute sophisticated cyber operations targeting governments, corporations, critical infrastructure and individuals. The perils are multi-dimensional, including espionage, cyber warfare (or “war in the grey”), information operations, subversion, ransoming and economic disruption. Examples of Russia’s malign and nefarious cyber activity are plethora however recently the U.S. and Ukraine seem to enjoy the brunt of Putin’s ire. Here are some points to consider:

1. State-Sponsored Cyber Warfare

  • Russia’s GRU Unit 74455, a/k/a “Sandworm” conducts offensive cyber operations, often targeting critical infrastructure the U.S., its allies and shared economic interests.
  • The 2017 NotPetya attack caused over $10 billion in global damages, hitting Maersk, FedEx, and other major commercial concerns. This agent was designed for penetration of a particular type of accounting software used in Ukraine. While not specifically targeting the U.S., the global fallout of NotPetya getting into the wild is instructive. In financial terms, it was among the greatest events of “collateral damage during war” ever recorded.
  • Russian hackers have targeted Ukraine’s energy sector repeatedly. They have demonstrated a clear ability to take down critical infrastructure. Evidence of Russian FIS’s penetration of U.S. utilities, likely in search of weakness to exploit or to leave ‘back doors’ for future exploitation, has also been detected. Notably, Dragonfly 2.0, a Russian state-sponsored hacking group (also known as Energetic Bear), successfully infiltrated U.S. energy sector systems, including nuclear power plants.

2. Cyber Espionage

  • Groups like APT29 (Cozy Bear) and APT28 (Fancy Bear), linked to Russian FIE have hacked into government agencies. They have repeatedly compromised U.S. official networks. The SolarWinds penetration in 2020 is instructive.
  • Ongoing efforts to steal classified or proprietary information from defense, aerospace, and technology sectors save Russia billions in research and development. From 2020 to 2021, Russian hackers compromised multiple U.S. defense contractors that provide support to the Department of Defense (DoD), U.S. Air Force, and Navy APT28 “Fuzy Bear” stole information related to weapon systems (including fighter jets and missile defense technologies, communications and surveillance systems, naval and space-based defense projects.

3. Election Interference & Disinformation

  • Russia has weaponized social media. Troll farms such as the Internet Research Agency and more rescently AI-home-cooked content spread disinformation and misinformation to masssive audiences.
  • Russian cyber actors hacked the DNC and Clinton campaign, leaking emails via WikiLeaks in efforts to subvert the U.S. political process.
  • Operation Project Lakhta was ordered directly by Vladimir Putin. This was a “hacking and disinformation campaign” to damage Clinton’s presidential campaign.
  • The Justice Department seized thirty-two internet domains used in Russian government-directed foreign malign influence campaigns (“Doppelganger”).

4. Ransomware & Financial Cybercrime

  • Russia harbors cybercriminal groups like Conti, REvil, and LockBit, which launch ransomware attacks on U.S. hospitals, businesses, and municipal corporations.
  • Many ransomware gangs operate with tacit Kremlin approval—as long as they don’t target Russian entities. For instance, REvil’s malware is designed to avoid systems using languages from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes Russia. This evidences a deliberate effort to steer clear of Russian entities.

5. Potential for Cyber Escalation

  • Russia has declared NATO and the West and its “main enemy”. The risk of cyber retaliation is real. Russia has the capability to conduct supply chain attacks, disrupt banking systems, and interfere with military communications.
  • In 2020, Russian state-sponsored cyber actors compromised the software company SolarWinds, embedding malicious code into its Orion network management software. This supply chain attack affected approximately 18,000 organizations, including multiple U.S. government agencies and private sector companies. This was a surveillance mechanism which allowed Russia to monitor internal communications and exfiltrate sensitive data from the software users.
  • In 2008 Russia deployed specialty malware (“Agent.btz“) which penetrated the U.S. Department of Defense’s classified and unclassified networks. The breach, considered one of the most severe against U.S. military computers, led to the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command to bolster cyber defenses.

Conclusion

The Russian cyber threat is persistent, evolving, and highly strategic. The West has cyber defenses and deterrence strategies in place (like sanctions and counter-hacking operations) however the current Administration’s order to terminate much of that effort cripple U.S. national security.

Quick to react to reporting of the DoD’s posturing, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) tweeted, “CISA’s mission is to defend against all cyber threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure, including from Russia. There has been no change in our posture. Any reporting to the contrary is fake and undermines our national security.” Comforting however the words of a confidential source within CISA present a different picture. “A recent memo at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (Cisa) set out new priorities for the agency, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security and monitors cyber threats against US critical infrastructure. The new directive set out priorities that included China and protecting local systems. It did not mention Russia, . . . analysts at the agency were verbally informed that they were not to follow or report on Russian threats, even though this had previously been a main focus for the agency.” (Guardian, Mar. 2025)

Russia is one of our most aggressive cyber adversaries as well as being recongnized by most nations as a ‘cyber threat pariah’ (i.e., most vocally by NATO, the EU and the U.N.). Given the President’s position on Russia, it’s impossible to say that U.S. continues to harden critical infrastructure, surveil Russian FIE cyber efforts and accomplish effective countermeasures. Russia’s offensive cyber capabilities will remain a major security challenge for the foreseeable future. The question is, are we willing to handicap our efforts to meet our adversaries with robust cyber capability or simply turn our heads away.

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The Challenge of Spying on China

spy, spies, espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence,carlyle poindexter, constantin poindexter

The WSJ article on Wednesday (Challenge of Spying on China) is a sad reminder of the United States Intelligence Community’s apparent failure to accomplish any broad covert or clandestine penetration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in recent history. The lack of HUMINT human intelligence sources (HUMINT) with meaningful access and placement deprives us of insight into Chinese decision making, immediate strategic threat intelligence and perhaps more importantly, gravely impairs U.S. offensive counterintelligence operations.

Moving beyond the obvious difficulties with HUMINT operations within the PRC, reminiscent of the Cold War hostile operational environments, the Intelligence Community is overdue for a paradigm shift in human asset recruitment methodology. For the better part of the last century, the United States Intelligence Community relied on a steady flow of “walk-ins”, volunteers from opposing foreign intelligence services or governments that offered their countries’ secrets. Intelligence officers enjoyed a large degree of success based on a fairly global perception that Americans were the “good guys”, representatives of the land of fairness, equality and justice, qualities that stood in stark contrast to the ruthless and despotic republics from whence they came. Unfortunately, the mystique has faded leaving outsiders to wonder if the values that we promote to the world are nothing more than a hypocritical farce. Mass diffusion of the “Big Lie” throwing fair elections into question, an attempted coup d’etat by an outgoing president, and military involvement under highly questionable intelligence assessments erode the view once held that the United States is the “shining beacon to the oppressed”.

Chinese citizens enjoy a better standard of living than at any time in China’s history. China can rightfully boast that it is a world power and its population can justifiably be proud of its progress. Personal financial success and pride in country promote loyalty. That there is no broad internal rejection of onerous mass surveillance, social credit controls and ethnic cleansing as is the case with the Uyghurs, is a testament to the PRC’s ability to deny facts, deceive its population and prevent the import of non-PRC approved “truths” about freedom and justice within China. The Chinese cultural tendency to identify with the collective rather than the individual is likewise amplified by the PRC’s massive social control machine, with opposing or antagonistic perspectives effectively blocked by the Great Firewall or simply drowned out of public discourse by the volumes of Party-approved propaganda. The PRC’s strategy has created an environment that is more resistant to traditional intelligence recruitment techniques such as economic coercion, ideology exploitation and ego-stroking. Chinese intelligence service recruiters lean on the cultural affinity of ethnically Chinese living in the United States to turn them into spies, coerce them by alluding to what might become of their families living in China or deploy the time-tested technique of guanxi to achieve intelligence asset recruitments. United States intelligence officers do not enjoy a parallel or equivalent.

FBI Director Wray stated, “We’ve now reached the point where the FBI is opening a new China-related counterintelligence case about every 10 hours.” The threat is grave and our twentieth-century countermeasures, techniques and tradecraft are not appropriate for what many in the Intelligence Community deem the greatest threat to United States national security. Retooling, reimagining the intelligence recruitment cycle and modernizing the way that we approach the recruitment of sources is imperative.