Tag: OSINT

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Consorcio de Datos de la Comunidad de Inteligencia: OSINT, Equilibrando la Seguridad Nacional y las Libertades Civiles

OSINT, inteligencia, CNI, contrainteligencia, contraespionaje, espionaje, c. constantin poindexter

La Oficina del Director de Inteligencia Nacional (ODNI, por sus siglas en inglés) ha presentado planes para el Consorcio de Datos de la Comunidad de Inteligencia (ICDC, por sus siglas en inglés), una plataforma centralizada diseñada para agilizar la adquisición de información comercialmente disponible (CAI) por parte de la Comunidad de Inteligencia. Esta iniciativa busca mejorar la accesibilidad y eficiencia de los datos en toda la Comunidad. No obstante, el ICDC ha generado un debate de corte tradicional, similar al que rodea la FISA, respecto a sus implicaciones para los derechos de privacidad de los ciudadanos estadounidenses y el posible deterioro de las protecciones constitucionales.

Comprendiendo la Iniciativa ICDC

El ICDC representa un esfuerzo coordinado por parte de la comunidad de inteligencia estadounidense para modernizar y centralizar la adquisición de CAI. Según los documentos oficiales de licitación, el ICDC se concibe como un “mercado para consultar e interactuar con los archivos de los proveedores”, con énfasis en un objetivo arquitectónico de “cero copias”, lo que significa que los datos se consultarán directamente en los sistemas de los proveedores en lugar de copiarse a servidores gubernamentales. Este enfoque pretende reducir la duplicación de datos y mejorar la eficiencia operativa. La plataforma está diseñada para operar completamente a nivel de computación no clasificada, permaneciendo toda su actividad en ese nivel. Ofrecerá múltiples opciones de interacción con los datos, incluyendo búsqueda a través de interfaces gráficas o web (GUI/WUI), llamadas API, acceso a datos en bloque y opciones de inicio de sesión en portales web externos. Se destaca el uso de código abierto y la adhesión a estándares de la industria como las especificaciones OpenAPI, a fin de garantizar flexibilidad y evitar la dependencia de un único proveedor.

Peligros Potenciales para Ciudadanos Inocentes

Si bien el ICDC tiene como objetivo mejorar las operaciones de inteligencia, plantea serias preocupaciones respecto a la privacidad de ciudadanos inocentes.

La amplitud de la recopilación de datos es problemática. La recolección masiva de información sobre personas completamente libres de sospecha o interés por parte de la Comunidad de Inteligencia es el proverbial elefante en la habitación. El ICDC facilita el acceso a cantidades inmensas de datos personales, incluidos registros de ubicación, información biométrica y actividades en línea, sin la necesidad de autorizaciones legales tradicionales, como las otorgadas por el Tribunal FISA. Esta recolección expansiva probablemente incluirá información sobre personas que no se encuentran bajo ninguna sospecha, constituyendo una clara violación de la privacidad.

La falta de transparencia y supervisión es casi tan preocupante como la propia actividad. La naturaleza centralizada del ICDC oculta de forma efectiva el tipo, alcance y profundidad de las actividades de adquisición de datos. Sin mecanismos de supervisión sólidos, existe un alto riesgo de uso indebido y extralimitaciones por parte de los organismos que componen la Comunidad de Inteligencia. Esto constituye, nuevamente, una posible violación de los derechos ciudadanos.

La adquisición incontrolada de CAI erosionará las protecciones establecidas por la Cuarta Enmienda. La investigación profunda de personas estadounidenses sin órdenes judiciales o aprobaciones legales desafía las protecciones que dicha enmienda otorga contra registros e incautaciones irrazonables. Las operaciones del ICDC sientan un precedente que permite eludir estas salvaguardas constitucionales.

Existe un alto potencial de abuso. La consolidación de datos personales en una plataforma centralizada incrementa el riesgo de accesos no autorizados y mal uso. En ausencia de estrictos controles de acceso y mecanismos de auditoría, aumenta significativamente la probabilidad de abuso de información sensible.

Equilibrio entre la Seguridad Nacional y las Protecciones Constitucionales

La justificación principal del ICDC es el fortalecimiento de la seguridad nacional mediante la mejora de las capacidades de inteligencia. Sus defensores argumentan que el acceso simplificado a la CAI permite una detección y respuesta más eficaz ante amenazas. No obstante, esto debe equilibrarse con los derechos fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución. La Cuarta Enmienda funciona como un control esencial del poder gubernamental, garantizando que los ciudadanos estén protegidos contra intromisiones injustificadas en su vida privada. El enfoque del ICDC hacia la adquisición de datos elude los procesos legales tradicionales y, por tanto, representa una amenaza significativa a dichas protecciones. Además, el potencial de desviación de misión genera inquietudes graves sobre las implicaciones a largo plazo para las libertades civiles. Sin límites claros y supervisión efectiva, el ICDC podría convertirse en una herramienta de vigilancia omnipresente, minando la confianza pública en las instituciones gubernamentales. El Panóptico habrá llegado.

Protección de la Privacidad

Si bien existen peligros, también hay medidas de control que pueden mitigar los riesgos asociados al ICDC. El establecimiento de marcos legales claros es un buen punto de partida. La legislación debe definir el alcance y las limitaciones de las actividades de recolección de datos, asegurando que se ajusten a las protecciones constitucionales y los derechos de privacidad. Se deben instaurar mecanismos de supervisión sólidos, similares a los que rigen bajo la FISA. Órganos de supervisión independientes deben estar facultados para monitorear las operaciones del ICDC, realizar auditorías y hacer cumplir el cumplimiento de los estándares legales y éticos. La transparencia debe ser la norma rectora. La comunidad de inteligencia debe estar obligada a emitir informes periódicos sobre las actividades de adquisición de datos, incluyendo los tipos de datos recopilados, los fines para los que se utilizan y las salvaguardas implementadas para proteger la privacidad. Dichos informes pueden y deben servir como base para entablar un diálogo con organizaciones de la sociedad civil, defensores de la privacidad y el público en general. La apertura en este aspecto fomentará un discurso más informado sobre el equilibrio entre seguridad nacional y los derechos de las personas y grupos afectados por la actividad OSINT.

El Consorcio de Datos de la Comunidad de Inteligencia representa un cambio significativo en la forma en la cual la comunidad de inteligencia estadounidense accede y utiliza la información comercialmente disponible. Si bien ofrece beneficios potenciales para la seguridad nacional, también conlleva riesgos sustanciales para la privacidad y los derechos constitucionales de los ciudadanos estadounidenses. Para garantizar que la búsqueda de seguridad no se realice a costa de las libertades civiles, es imperativo establecer marcos legales claros, supervisión rigurosa y prácticas transparentes que respeten los principios de una sociedad democrática.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA en Inteligencia, Cert. de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, JD, CISA/Cert. OSINT de NCISS, BFFOC del DoD/DoS

Referencias

  • Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2025). OSINT Contract Framework. Obtenido de ODNI Document
  • The Intercept. (22 de mayo de 2025). US Plans Data Portal to Expand Warrantless Surveillance. Obtenido de The Intercept
  • Wired. (24 de mayo de 2025). Security News This Week: The US Is Building a One-Stop Shop for Buying Your Data. Obtenido de Wired
  • Brennan Center for Justice. (s.f.). The Intelligence Community’s Policy on Commercially Available Data Falls Short. Obtenido de Brennan Center
  • U.S. Senate. (2023). Privacy Act of 1974. Obtenido de Wikipedia
  • U.S. Senate. (2023). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Obtenido de Wikipedia
  • Wired. (20 de noviembre de 2023). Secretive White House Surveillance Program Gives Cops Access to Trillions of US Phone Records. Obtenido de Wired
  • AP News. (28 de septiembre de 2023). A Key US Government Surveillance Tool Should Face New Limits, a Divided Privacy Oversight Board Says. Obtenido de AP News
  • Time. (15 de marzo de 2024). Inside the White House Program to Share America’s Secrets. Obtenido de Time
  • AP News. (10 de marzo de 2024). Book Review: ‘Means of Control’ Charts the Disturbing Rise of a Secretive US Surveillance Regime. Obtenido de AP News
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Intelligence Community Data Consortium: OSINT, Balancing National Security and Civil Liberties

OSINT, inteligencia, CNI, contrainteligencia, contraespionaje, espionaje, c. constantin poindexter

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has unveiled plans for the Intelligence Community Data Consortium (ICDC), a centralized platform designed to streamline the acquisition of commercially available information (CAI) by the Intelligence Community. This initiative aims to enhance data accessibility and efficiency across the I.C. However, the ICDC has sparked a traditional FISA-like debate regarding its implications for the privacy rights of American citizens and the potential erosion of constitutional protections.

Understanding the ICDC Initiative

The ICDC represents a concerted effort by the U.S. intelligence community to modernize and centralize the procurement of CAI. According to the official solicitation documents, the ICDC is envisioned as a “marketplace to query and interact with vendor holdings,” emphasizing a “zero-copy” architectural goal where data is queried in place on vendor systems rather than being copied to government servers. This approach is intended to reduce data duplication and enhance operational efficiency. The platform is designed to operate entirely at the unclassified computing level, with all work remaining unclassified. It will offer multiple data interaction options, including indexed GUI/WUI search, API calls, bulk data access, and external web portal login options. The use of open-source code and adherence to industry standards such as OpenAPI Specifications are highlighted here in order to ensure flexibility and prevent vendor lock-in.

Potential Dangers to Innocent Americans

While the ICDC aims to improve intelligence operations, it raises several concerns regarding the privacy of innocent Americans.

The scope of data collection is problematic. Scooping up masses of information about persons absolutely free of suspicion or interest to the I.C. is the proverbial eight-hundred-pound gorilla in the room. The ICDC facilitates access to vast amounts of personal data, including location information, biometric records and online activities, without the need for traditional legal authorizations such as those provided by the FISA Court. This expansive data collection will likely encompass information about individuals not under any suspicion, a clear privacy infringement.

A lack of transparency and oversight is second only to the activity itself. The centralized nature of the ICDC effectively obscures the nature, depth and breadth of acquisition activities. Without robust oversight mechanisms, there is a risk of misuse and overreach by I.C. member agencies. Again, this is potentially an infringement on the rights of citizens.

Uncontrolled CAI acquisition will erode Fourth Amendment protections. Deep investigation of U.S. persons without warrants or court approvals challenges the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment, a guard against unreasonable searches and seizures. The ICDC’s operations set up a precedent for circumventing these constitutional safeguards.

There is a high potential for abuse. The consolidation of personal data in a centralized platform increases the risk of unauthorized access and misuse. In the absence of stringent access controls and auditing mechanisms, there is a heightened potential for abuse of sensitive information.

Balancing National Security and Constitutional Protections

The primary justification for the ICDC is the enhancement of national security through improved intelligence capabilities. Proponents argue that streamlined access to CAI enables more effective threat detection and response. However, this must be balanced against the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment serves as a critical check on government power, ensuring that citizens are protected from unwarranted intrusions into their private lives. The ICDC’s approach to data acquisition bypasses traditional legal processes and thus poses a significant threat to these protections. Further, the potential for mission creates significant concerns about the long-term implications for civil liberties. Without clear boundaries and oversight, the ICDC could become a tool for pervasive surveillance, undermining public trust in government institutions. The Panopticon will have arrived.

Safeguarding Privacy

While perils exist, so do controls that can mitigate the risks associated with the ICDC. The establishment of clear legal frameworks is a good start. Legislation must define the scope and limitations of data collection activities, ensuring that they align with constitutional protections and privacy rights. Robust oversight mechanisms, much like FISA must be established. Independent oversight bodies must be empowered to monitor the ICDC’s operations, conduct audits, and enforce compliance with legal and ethical standards. Transparency must be the guiding rule. The intelligence community should be obligated to provide regular reports on data acquisition activities including the types of data collected, the purposes for which it is used, and the safeguards in place to protect privacy. Those reports can and should be the basis for engagement with civil society organizations, privacy advocates, and the public. Being open about this will foster a more informed discourse on the balance between national security and those individuals and groups affected by the OSINT activity.

The Intelligence Community Data Consortium represents a significant shift in how the U.S. intelligence community accesses and utilizes commercially available information. While it offers potential benefits for national security, it also poses substantial risks to the privacy and constitutional rights of American citizens. To ensure that the pursuit of security does not come at the expense of civil liberties, it is imperative to establish clear legal frameworks, robust oversight, and transparent practices that uphold the principles of a democratic society.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA Intelligence, Grad. Cert. Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT cert., DoD/DoS BFFOC

References

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (2025). OSINT Contract Framework. Retrieved from ODNI Document

The Intercept. (2025, May 22). US Plans Data Portal to Expand Warrantless Surveillance. Retrieved from The Intercept Article

Wired. (2025, May 24). Security News This Week: The US Is Building a One-Stop Shop for Buying Your Data. Retrieved from Wired Article

Brennan Center for Justice. (n.d.). The Intelligence Community’s Policy on Commercially Available Data Falls Short. Retrieved from Brennan Center Article

U.S. Senate. (2023). Privacy Act of 1974. Retrieved from Wikipedia Article

U.S. Senate. (2023). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Retrieved from Wikipedia Article

Wired. (2023, November 20). Secretive White House Surveillance Program Gives Cops Access to Trillions of US Phone Records. Retrieved from Wired Article

AP News. (2023, September 28). A Key US Government Surveillance Tool Should Face New Limits, a Divided Privacy Oversight Board Says. Retrieved from AP News Article

Time. (2024, March 15). Inside the White House Program to Share America’s Secrets. Retrieved from Time Article

AP News. (2024, March 10). Book Review: ‘Means of Control’ Charts the Disturbing Rise of a Secretive US Surveillance Regime. Retrieved from AP News Article

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What is OSINT all about?

OSINT, IMINT, constantin poindexter, carlyle poindexter, masters in intelligence studies, counterintelligence

OSINT is as ancient as written word. I suppose that there were cuniform tablets that were exchanged between Phoenician government functionaries, both public and sensitive that adversaries coveted. The Greeks were particularly good at intelligence. There is a really good book about it written by Frank Santi Russell. It’s super interesting to see what value a first-generation democracy put on information gathering. What is without question is that OSINT is valuable. Wild Bill Donovan said, “Even a regimented press will, again and again, betray their nation’s best interests to a painstaking observer.”

Like the other INTs, there are some definitions that most practitioners have settled on to describe OSINT. Information collected from the “wherever” is generally not intelligence. It is data or simply information. Intelligence is generally an analyzed and polished product that CONTAINS information. The Department of Defense defines OSINT under ¨§931 of Title Nine, “Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence that is produced from publicly available information and is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.” (50 U.S.C.) The Hassan and Hjazi publication which offered this statutory definition verbatim HOWEVER they added what I think are some really important distinctions of what composes OSINT (“components” as Dr. Saar has highlighted.), as follows, “, . . .

*Open-source data
*Open-source information
*Open-source intelligence
*Validated open-source intelligence”

These components are important not only for context and precedence, adhering to the currently accepted intelligence cycle, etc., but also to offer a framework for practitioners of other INTs to identify where to offer input, and from whence to retrieve reliable and timely data, information and/or intelligence for their own purposes.

OSINT has progressed over time, but not in its essential nature. OSINT has essentially existed since cavemen roamed the earth. Ug of the ooga booga tribe probably eavesdropped on conversation between the huti huchi tribesemen to discover where the best mastodon hunting ground was. Obviously, this oversimplifies something that is actually quite sophisticated now, . . . or is it? We now have written word and motions images á la the ubiquitous YouTube, but is observation and pondering (analysis) of those observations really an innovation? My position is that OSINT really hasn’t changed at all. The medium for presentation (or mass dissemination) of information, the sophistication of the sensors that we use to collect information, the volume of collection and the high-speed computer-driven analysis of the information have changed, NOT OSINT.

There are clear advantages to the development and deployment of a rigorous OSINT capability. First and foremost is risk. Passive OSINT presents almost no risk at to either the discovery of the inquiry and the fallout if collection is discovered. Done properly, OSINT projects are discovered by the betrayal of a practitioner. An intelligence manager must consider the likelihood of discovery and the severity of loss due to discovery. OSINT falls low on the risk index. It’s just smart business.

Another big benefit but as the same time, a serious challenge is the volume of data or information. The benefit of volume is generally an increased reliability of product. There are plenty of disinformation operations in the world’o’sphere but in a massive pool of data an enormous effort and resources are required to drown out factual information. Also, a really big pool offers the input of a broad variety of assets or sources. The diversity REALLY helps stabilize analyst’s effort to draw reliable conclusions. The negative of course is how to warehouse and process the huge, HUGE amount of data that an OSINT mission or tasking might produce. This is and will be solved by quantum computing but the OSINT discipline also benefits from the less rigorous processing that a technical INT might require. The Norton piece spoke specifically to the “volume” conundrum along with the vetting challenge. “OSINT is challenging because of its volume and because each piece of information must be verified or “vetted,” often in unique ways.” (Norton, 2011, p. 66)

Among the list of advantages, “shareability” is also important. Not only is dissemination of OSINT product helpful and perhaps imperative among members of the Intelligence Community. It can also be superlatively supportive our allies, the countries with whom we share special liaison or allied service relationships. There is little risk to “sources and methods” with regard to OSINT. The real risk of improper or over-dissemination of OSINT is tipping our hand as to what is important to us AND prejudicing the asset or source, ie., U.S. Adversary: “You are looking at “x”? Oh! You must have some strategic or tactical interest in “x”! We’d better look into shutting off that faucet and since it’s important to YOU, then we’d better figure out a countermeasure.” Russian FIS does this, . . . regularly.

There are some other positive qualities of OSINT, i.e., gives a baseline for understanding the results of more sensitive information collected clandestinely; timeliness, as open sources are often in open competition as to who can “break the story” first; a great enhancement to cultural and ethnic understanding, etc., however the three main attributes above I think are the most valuable and relevant.

I need to give a hat-tip to a crowdsourcing article. The author has offered a neat little diagram to identify it but the author’s statement, “Crowdsourced Intelligence is arguably a separate collection discipline from HUMINT or OSINT collection.” (Stottlemyre, 2015) I feel is prescient. I’m not sure that this fits neatly within the OSINT discipline, most especially if the source is a member of an adversarial government, military or FIS. There are also a lot of wildcards in here, i.e., crowd motivation, crowd identity, or whether it’s really a “crowd” or not. This one merits a deeper look.

Waters, Nick, “Google Maps Is a Better Spy Than James Bond”, Foreign Policy, September 25th, 2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/25/google-maps-is-a-better-spy-than-james-bond/#:~:text=In%20the%20words%20of%20William,interests%20to%20a%20painstaking%20observer.%E2%80%9D

Norton, Dr. R.A., “Guide to Open Source Intelligence: A Growing Window into the World”, Journal of Intelligence Studies”, vol. 18, no. 2, Winter/Spring 2011

Stottlemyre, Steven A., “HUMINT, OSINT, or Something New? Defining Crowdsourced Intelligence”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 28, iss. 3, 2015