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Strengthening Counterintelligence Training for Diplomats

Strengthening Counterintelligence Training for Diplomats, diplomacy, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, national security, C. Constantin Poindexter

The exposure of U.S. diplomats, both stateside and abroad, to recruitment, SIGINT/COMINT targeting, and the loss or compromise of portable computing devices (PCDs) is not accidental. It is a cumulative effect of structural neglect, cultural underinvestment, and the evolving threat environment. Three converging dynamics have produced this vulnerability: institutional bifurcation between diplomatic and intelligence missions; budgetary and educational neglect of counterintelligence (CI) training for non-intelligence personnel; and the rapid digital transformation of diplomatic operations without commensurate adaptation of tradecraft.

Institutional bifurcation is the result of the long-standing separation between the U.S. Foreign Service and the intelligence and security community. Diplomatic officers have historically focused on political, economic, consular, and public diplomacy missions, while security concerns were delegated to Diplomatic Security (DSS) or local host-nation security services. Counterintelligence responsibilities were largely retained within the FBI, CIA, and military intelligence organizations, creating operational silos. This division left diplomats outside the formal CI ecosystem, meaning they rarely received advanced training or actionable threat intelligence. As a result, many Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) still approach their duties as political envoys rather than as personnel operating within an adversarial intelligence battlespace.

Budgetary and educational neglect compound this problem. For decades, the Department of State has allocated limited funding for counterintelligence instruction. Beyond basic “insider threat” briefings or annual cybersecurity refreshers, diplomats often receive little exposure to advanced CI concepts or adversary recruitment methodologies. As reported by ClearanceJobs (McNeil, 2025), many diplomatic personnel deploy to high-threat assignments with minimal training in recognizing or resisting foreign intelligence approaches. The lack of sustained CI education and awareness initiatives at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) has produced an environment where diplomats are ill-equipped to recognize subtle recruitment tactics or electronic targeting.

The digitalization of diplomacy is a serious vulnerability. Over the past two decades, U.S. embassies and consulates have become highly dependent on portable computing, mobile devices, remote communications, and cloud-based data exchange. While these tools increase efficiency, they have also expanded the attack surface for adversaries. Foreign intelligence services (FIS) now target diplomats as entry points into the U.S. government’s global communications infrastructure. These adversaries exploit unsecured networks, intercept wireless signals, implant malware on devices, and even conduct theft of laptops and external drives. As technology has evolved, diplomatic tradecraft has failed to keep pace. The convenience of connectivity has outstripped the discipline of security.

This weakness is illustrated by several notable cases of espionage and digital compromise involving U.S. diplomatic personnel. The case of Steven John Lalas, a U.S. State Department communications officer stationed in Athens during the early 1990s, is instructive. Lalas provided classified diplomatic and military documents to Greek intelligence over several years before being caught and sentenced to 14 years in prison (Wikipedia, n.d.). He exploited his communications role to access classified cables and Defense Department assessments, which he illicitly removed and passed to a foreign government. Lalas’s case demonstrates that diplomats and communications officers, though not traditional intelligence operators, are prime recruitment targets because of their privileged access to sensitive material. His actions exposed structural vulnerabilities in both vetting and insider threat detection within the State Department’s overseas missions.

The Walter Kendall Myers betrayal is another. They spied for Cuba over nearly three decades. Myers, a senior State Department official and FSI instructor, used his position to obtain and share classified information with the Cuban Intelligence Directorate (Wikipedia, n.d.). The Myers case was not about hacking or physical theft but rather ideological recruitment and sustained insider espionage. Myers was approached gradually, courted ideologically, and ultimately compromised. This illustrates that diplomats whose careers often involve long foreign postings, personal networks abroad, and cultural immersion are highly susceptible to long-term cultivation by FIS recruiters. The absence of continuous CI vetting or behavioral monitoring allowed this penetration to persist for decades.

A third example identifies the theft and exploitation of portable computing devices. The FBI’s “Operation Ghost Stories,” which dismantled a Russian “illegals” network in 2010, revealed how laptops and wireless devices were central to espionage operations (FBI, n.d.). One seized laptop was used to establish covert wireless communications between Russian agents and their handlers. Similarly, numerous reported attempts have been made by foreign actors to steal or implant malware on the personal computers of Western diplomats. These incidents highlight that PCDs are not simply administrative tools but intelligence assets. When lost, stolen, or compromised, they can reveal network structures, contacts, and classified reporting, making them a modern equivalent of the “diplomatic pouch.” The War on the Rocks (2025) analysis of Russian espionage tactics confirms that FIS now combine human recruitment, cyber intrusion, and physical theft in hybrid collection campaigns against Western diplomatic targets.

The convergence of these human and technical vulnerabilities demands a fundamental modernization of CI training for diplomats. Primarily, diplomats MUST be required to receive foundational counterintelligence education. This training should move beyond theoretical awareness and immerse personnel in adversary recruitment tradecraft, SIGINT and COMINT methodologies, and recent case studies. Red-team simulations should require participants to role-play both target and recruiter to internalize how adversaries identify, approach, and manipulate their victims. A diplomat who can think like an adversary is far more likely to resist one.

Equally important, counter-recruitment instruction should emphasize behavioral recognition. Diplomats must learn to identify “soft pitch” recruitment methods, i.e., academic or journalistic overtures, social invitations, social media engagement, or mutual professional interests that can evolve into intelligence targeting. Diplomats must be taught how to perceive, disengage (politely, to preserve the possibility of a double operation), document, and report these encounters through secure channels without fear of reprisal. Continuous CI liaison support at missions abroad would reinforce these practices and ensure rapid response when suspicious approaches occur.

Secure digital and communications hygiene curriculum must be significantly expanded. Every diplomat should be trained in hardware hardening (full-disk encryption, TPM binding, BIOS passwording), media control (banning unvetted USB devices), secure networking (VPNs with endpoint authentication, regular rekeying), and immediate reporting of anomalies (device overheating, unauthorized processes, or loss). Training should include hands-on exercises where diplomats detect and mitigate simulated phishing or device compromise attempts. Embassies should maintain secure drop boxes and Faraday enclosures for potentially compromised devices until forensically examined.

Diplomats must be educated in SIGINT and COMINT awareness. This includes understanding how their electronic emissions can betray movements or discussions, recognizing signs of interception, and maintaining operational discipline in communications. Routine practices such as using shielded rooms for sensitive discussions, approved VPN use, disabling wireless and Bluetooth in secure areas, and maintaining strict clean-desk policies must become ingrained habits. Discipline transforms CI awareness from abstract instruction into practical daily behavior!

Counterintelligence training should incorporate recurring red-team exercises and after-action debriefs. Annual or semi-annual drills simulating recruitment, device loss, or cyber intrusion should be mandatory for all missions. These exercises not only test individual readiness but reveal systemic vulnerabilities such as inconsistent incident reporting or inadequate technical countermeasures. Lessons learned should feed back into State Department CI doctrine.

Structural and organizational reforms are equally important. The Department of State should embed a permanent counterintelligence officer or liaison from the FBI or CIA within every high-risk embassy. This officer would coordinate with the Regional Security Officer (RSO) and oversee local threat assessments, device inspections, and behavioral analysis. Additionally, all diplomats deploying to critical posts should achieve baseline CI certification, validated by written and practical exams similar to those required for intelligence personnel. This “best practices” certification should be renewed periodically and linked to promotion eligibility, reinforcing accountability.

Embassies should also implement periodic red-team audits, with technical and human testing designed to measure CI compliance and readiness. Device procurement and turnover policies must ensure secure supply chains, with forensic validation of new equipment and timely retirement of old hardware. The integration of artificial intelligence-based monitoring could further assist in detecting anomalies or exfiltration attempts across the diplomatic network.

The culture of self-reporting must be reformed. Diplomats often hesitate to report suspicious incidents for fear of professional repercussions. A no-fault reporting model paired with protective anonymity and positive reinforcement will encourage early detection of targeting attempts. CI professionals know that “near-miss” reporting is a critical tool. Diplomats and their staff members must internalize the same principle.

The exposure of U.S. diplomats to recruitment, signals interception, and device compromise is thus not merely a technical vulnerability. It is a clear cultural and institutional weakness. The cases of Lalas and Myers show that ideological or opportunistic recruitment remains a persistent threat, while modern espionage operations like those exposed in Operation Ghost Stories demonstrate that digital compromise is now equally dangerous. A robust counterintelligence program for diplomats must cultivate a mindset of constant adversarial awareness, blending human and technical security disciplines into the fabric of diplomacy itself. By embedding CI at every level of diplomatic training and operations, the United States can begin to close one of its most consequential vulnerabilities in the global intelligence contest AND contribute in a meaningful way to both defensive and offensive counterintelligence operations.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

FBI. (n.d.). Laptop from Operation Ghost Stories. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/history/artifacts/laptop-from-operation-ghost-stories

McNeil, S. (2025, October 9). Modernizing CI training for diplomats: New legislation aims to sharpen the shield abroad. ClearanceJobs. Retrieved from https://news.clearancejobs.com/2025/10/09/modernizing-ci-training-for-diplomats-new-legislation-aims-to-sharpen-the-shield-abroad-2/

War on the Rocks. (2025, April 8). Putin’s spies for hire: What the U.K.’s biggest espionage trial revealed about Kremlin tactics in wartime Europe. Retrieved from https://warontherocks.com/2025/04/putins-spies-for-hire-what-the-u-k-s-biggest-espionage-trial-revealed-about-kremlin-tactics-in-wartime-europe/

Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Kendall Myers. In Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kendall_Myers

Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Steven John Lalas. In Wikipedia. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steven_John_Lalas

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The Collapse of CIA Clandestine Communications: The Hidden “X” Factor

COVCOM, espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence, spy, C. Constantin Poindexter, CIA, NSA

For those that haven’t picked up a copy of Tim Weiner’s new book, The Mission (a great read), the author briefly writes about an unidentified “X Factor”, that together with loose tradecraft and the betrayal of Jerry Chun Shing Lee, explain the breach of an Agency clandestine communications platform (COVCOM) used to receive production from intelligence assets. The X Factor is no longer (at least in part) as secret. Between 2010 and 2012 the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) suffered one of the most devastating counterintelligence failures of the post–Cold War era. Dozens of agency assets operating in China and elsewhere were rolled up, captured and/or killed, and multiple communication networks nullified. The official explanations that later emerged pointed to three contributing factors: that the COVCOM platform itself was insufficiently secure; that former officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee betrayed key operational information to Chinese intelligence; and an unknown “X-factor” that the CIA believed must have played a role. Analysts have since argued that this third factor was neither a single human source nor a cryptographic failure, but rather a systemic and architectural vulnerability The discoverability of CIA communication websites through pattern matching, fingerprinting, and open-source enumeration.

The known facts support this interpretation. Following the collapse, U.S. intelligence undertook a joint CIA-FBI inquiry to determine why an ostensibly hardened system had failed so catastrophically. The COVCOM platform, an encrypted web-based communication system that relied on innocuous-looking websites as cutouts between field assets and handlers, had been in use globally for the better part of a decade. Its purpose was to provide secure asynchronous communication without the need for physical meetings. By 2010, Chinese counterintelligence had begun identifying CIA agents and rolling up networks with alarming precision (U.S. Department of Justice, 2019). Lee’s espionage, which began around this time, appears to have enabled part of this exposure. He was found in possession of notebooks containing detailed operational notes, true names, and meeting locations for agents. His recruitment by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) represented an enormous breach (Security Boulevard, 2018). Lee’s betrayal alone did not explain the speed, geographic reach, or technical precision of the counterintelligence response. The COVCOM system in China was considered more robust than versions deployed elsewhere, and yet it collapsed far more completely, suggesting that an additional vector was in play (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).

That missing vector has increasingly come into focus due to subsequent forensic research. In 2022, Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto released a public technical statement analyzing a defunct CIA covert communications network, reconstructing its infrastructure from archival data (Citizen Lab, 2022). The researchers identified at least 885 separate websites that had served as cutouts in the system, many masquerading as ordinary blogs or news portals. These domains were hosted across multiple countries and written in more than twenty-seven languages, demonstrating the global scale of the network (Overt Defense, 2022). Most importantly, the study revealed that the sites shared recurring technical fingerprints: identical JavaScript, Flash, and Common Gateway Interface (CGI) code snippets, sequential IP address allocations, and domain registrations under apparently fictitious U.S. shell companies. These patterns were visible not only to intelligence professionals but to any moderately skilled analyst using open-source tools such as Google search operators or historical DNS datasets.

The Citizen Lab researchers demonstrated that once a single website in the network became known, either through insider compromise or accidental exposure, the rest could be discovered through automated pattern matching. For example, the shared scripts and templates created a unique digital “signature” that could be queried across the web. Similarly, because many sites were hosted within contiguous IP address blocks, an adversary could perform network scans to find adjacent servers. In one striking observation, Citizen Lab noted that a “motivated amateur sleuth” could likely have mapped the entire network from a single known site using only public data sources (Citizen Lab, 2022, p. 3). In other words, once one covert node was compromised, the architecture itself facilitated the discovery of the rest—a catastrophic violation of compartmentation, the cardinal rule of clandestine operations. This structural discoverability provides a compelling explanation for the “X-factor.” If Chinese or Iranian counterintelligence services were able to recognize one of these front sites—perhaps through Lee’s betrayal or through network monitoring—they could easily expand their search to enumerate the rest. Once identified, those sites could be monitored for traffic patterns, IP logs, or metadata, revealing the physical locations or operational rhythms of field agents. The result would be precisely the kind of rapid and geographically broad collapse observed between 2010 and 2012.

Several attributes make this explanation plausible to high confidence standard. It accounts for the disproportionate collapse relative to the technical strength of the platform. A simple encryption or authentication flaw would have yielded isolated compromises, not systemic exposure. It explains the extraordinary speed of network destruction. Insider betrayal might expose a limited number of assets, but large-scale enumeration allows adversaries to map entire networks in days or weeks. It also aligns with reports that CIA stations were initially unaware of how deeply the system had been penetrated; because the exposure derived from web-level pattern analysis rather than cryptographic decryption, it left few immediate forensic traces (Risen, 2018).

The architecture’s discoverability illustrates a subtle but fundamental shift in dynamics in the digital era, especially for counterintelligence. During the Cold War, clandestine communications were localized and analog, i.e., dead drops, shortwave bursts, or one-time pads, etc., that required significant human action/interaction to intercept. By contrast, digital covert systems even when encrypted, exist within the globally indexed infrastructure of the Internet. Any reuse of code, hosting, or metadata creates a fingerprint that can be detected through open-source intelligence (OSINT) techniques. The “X-factor” was pretty clearly less an unknown human leak than a manifestation of the new technological environment. The Agency had built a secret system inside a public network and underestimated the degree to which its digital seams could be analyzed by adversarial FIS.

The forensic model resolves apparent contradictions in early assessments. CIA officials believed the COVCOM used in China was “more robust” than those in other theaters, implying stronger encryption, better authentication and other tradecraft goodies (CIA Inspector General, 2017). Nonetheless, it collapsed thoroughly. The pattern-matching explanation shows why robustness in cryptography could coexist with fragility in topology. The system’s security depended not only on code strength but also on architectural compartmentation. The Agency’s reuse of templates, hosting blocks, and design elements was weak tradecraft. It undermined that compartmentation and created a single attack surface.

It is important to recognize that the web-discoverability hypothesis complements rather than replaces the other two causes. Lee’s betrayal and intrinsic platform weaknesses likely provided the initial penetration points that allowed adversaries to begin to dig. The enumeration process then magnified those breaches exponentially. The CIA has not publicly confirmed this reconstruction, understandably. Nonetheless, independent open-source evidence strongly supports the inference that the network’s design flaws were decisive.

The lessons extend beyond one agency or episode. The COVCOM failure demonstrates how operational hygiene in digital clandestine systems is as critical as cryptographic soundness and insider threats. A covert communication platform can fail not because its cipher is broken, but because its metadata is out in the wild. This insight has profound implications for modern intelligence and of course, counterintelligence work. As state and non-state actors deploy increasingly networked clandestine capabilities, the old principle of “need to know” must be re-engineered into “need to connect.” Going forward, it would be foolish not to design com platforms in a way that every covert node is architecturally unique. Different code bases, hosting, and design fingerprints are imperative to avoid global correlation. The COVCOM collapse shows the lethal cost of violating that principle.

So, the CIA’s network failures in China were not caused solely by human treachery or inadequate encryption but by an invisible architectural flaw. The covert web infrastructure could be mapped once any part was exposed. This vulnerability, amplified by Lee’s betrayal and existing COVCOM weaknesses, created a perfect storm that allowed adversaries to dismantle entire espionage networks with unprecedented speed. The “X-factor” was not mystical but mathematical, an emergent property of pattern recognition within an interconnected Internet. The episode stands as a cautionary tale that in the digital age, secrecy depends not merely on keeping information encrypted but on ensuring that the very existence of the system remains undiscoverable. Sophisticated FIS such as China’s have the capacity to “de-clandestine” it, and far too quickly.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Central Intelligence Agency. (2021). Inspector General’s review of clandestine communication failures (declassified summary). Langley, VA.

Citizen Lab. (2022). Statement on the fatal flaws found in a defunct CIA covert communications system. University of Toronto. https://citizenlab.ca/2022/09/statement-on-the-fatal-flaws-found-in-a-defunct-cia-covert-communications-system/

Overt Defense. (2022, October 5). Poorly designed CIA websites likely got spies killed. https://www.overtdefense.com/2022/10/05/poorly-designed-cia-websites-likely-got-spies-killed/

Risen, J. (2018, May 21). How China used a hacked CIA communications system to hunt down U.S. spies. The New York Times.

Security Boulevard. (2018, June 6). The espionage of former CIA case officer Jerry Chun Shing Lee for China.

U.S. Department of Justice. (2019). Former CIA officer sentenced for conspiring to commit espionage. Press release, April 19, 2019.

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New York SIM Farm, Nation-State Attribution?

intelligence, counterintelligence, spy, espionage, counterespionage, subversion, sabotage, C. Constantin Poindexter;

The discovery of an extensive SIM-box infrastructure in New York City represents a profound counterintelligence concern, not only because of the physical scale of the operation but also because of its timing and location. To appreciate the significance of this event, it is necessary to place it within a broader historical and operational context. Telecommunications networks have long been exploited by both state and non-state actors for covert communication, financial crime, and disruptive activity. The integration of criminal infrastructure with national security objectives has become an increasingly visible feature of modern gray-zone conflict, particularly since the end of the Cold War when adversaries began to weaponize civilian technologies in pursuit of deniable influence and disruption.

The use of “SIM farms,” or large-scale collections of SIM cards and servers designed to mimic ordinary cellular activity, is not new. Organized crime syndicates have leveraged them for spam, smishing, and financial fraud. North Korean operatives, for instance, have been linked to telephony-based fraud networks generating illicit revenue through scams and premium call-routing schemes. Russian-speaking cybercriminal groups have deployed SIM-boxes to mask identity and coordinate across borders while shielding themselves from law enforcement scrutiny. Iran’s cyber units, sometimes acting through cutouts, have also integrated telecommunications manipulation into campaigns targeting U.S. and allied interests. In each of these cases, the common thread is deniability, i.e., the ability to use civilian infrastructure for state-directed purposes while maintaining the outward appearance of ordinary criminality. Could this operation have been ENTIRELY non-aligned national or transnational criminal activity? Yes. “Thirty-five miles” from the U.N. would not be my choice of placement if the U.N. and the persons attending U.N. activities were my intended targets. Given the density of base station coverage in NYC, I would have opted for a post closer to both U.N. facilities and where attendees lay their heads. For the purpose of this piece, I’ll pretend that the operation was state-sponsored AND I’ll go with the premise that the discovered location was not an additional, perhaps secondary station in a chain. Of course, that might be exactly what adversarial FIS would want us to believe, i.e., “deniability” as I stated before.

Against this backdrop, the September 2025 discovery by the Secret Service of more than three hundred SIM servers and roughly one hundred thousand SIM cards clustered within a thirty-five-mile radius of the United Nations headquarters carries heightened significance. The seizure occurred during the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, a moment when global leaders converge in New York for high-level diplomacy (United States Secret Service, 2025). Official statements emphasized that the network could have enabled mass voice and text traffic, both for anonymized communications between foreign actors and potentially for the disruption of local telecommunications infrastructure (CNN, 2025; Associated Press, 2025).

The scale of this infrastructure and its deliberate placement near the United Nations point to a strategic rather than merely criminal purpose. Analysts cited by PBS noted that a SIM farm of this size could flood telecommunications systems, causing cascading outages (PBS, 2025). While some technical experts caution that U.S. carriers have robust mitigation tools that could blunt such an impact, even localized or temporary disruptions during a global diplomatic gathering would have significant psychological and operational consequences (Commsrisk, 2025). The purpose may not have been to permanently collapse networks but rather to create contingency leverage: a latent capacity to distract, delay, or obscure other operations should a geopolitical crisis erupt during the summit.

The Secret Service has publicly confirmed that communications occurred between “nation-state threat actors and individuals known to federal law enforcement,” yet no official attribution has been made (U.S. Secret Service, 2025). For counterintelligence professionals, the patterns of tradecraft and the geopolitical context allow for reasoned analytic judgments. The operation fits squarely within the framework of hybrid tactics employed by Russia. Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to blend criminal infrastructure with state-directed activity. It has relied on criminal intermediaries to support disinformation campaigns, cyber operations, and telephony-based harassment. The combination of scale, timing, and proximity to the United Nations strongly suggests a Russian operational signature. This discovery mirrors previous instances in which Russia has leveraged technically noisy, deniable assets to signal capability and project disruption potential at politically symbolic moments.

Iran also emerges as a credible suspect. Tehran has a well-documented history of asymmetric operations designed to sow disruption in Western capitals. Its intelligence services have previously partnered with non-state intermediaries to extend operational reach while maintaining plausible deniability. A SIM-box farm designed to threaten disruption of cellular networks during the United Nations General Assembly would be consistent with Iran’s asymmetric doctrine. However, Iran’s pattern of activity has traditionally emphasized cyber intrusions, targeted influence operations, and physical proxy activity, rather than large-scale telecommunications disruption.

The DPRK must also be considered. Pyongyang has long relied on illicit telecommunications infrastructures for revenue generation and covert activity. SIM farms have been documented as part of North Korea’s financial crime toolkit. Yet in this case, the strategic signaling implied by targeting the United Nations makes North Korea a less likely culprit, given its usual focus on revenue production rather than international diplomatic disruption.

The PRC possesses the capability to construct such infrastructure, but the risk-reward calculus makes Beijing an improbable sponsor. China’s intelligence services favor long-term, quiet, persistent access operations, usually in the cyber and human collection domains. Deploying a conspicuous SIM-box network during the United Nations General Assembly would carry a high probability of exposure and diplomatic fallout, outcomes that run counter to China’s operational culture of avoiding overt disruption at politically sensitive junctures.

All things considered, I feel that the evidence points more persuasively toward Russian FIS as the primary sponsor, Iran as a new second. Russia’s historical reliance on hybrid criminal-state operations, its willingness to employ disruptive signaling tactics, and its long record of targeting politically symbolic events align with the discovery in New York. Iran shares some of these characteristics but lacks the established track record of telephony-based disruption at this scale. North Korea and China are less consistent with the observed tradecraft and geopolitical logic.

The discovery of the New York SIM farm underscores two enduring counterintelligence lessons. Adversarial FISs increasingly exploit civilian infrastructure, particularly in telecommunications, to build deniable operational capacity. The integration of criminal and state networks is no longer exceptional but rather a normalized feature of nation-state competition. From a defensive/countermeasures perspective, this event highlights the need for closer alignment between federal law enforcement, telecommunications providers, and allied intelligence partners. To our enemies, the attraction of SIM farms lies not only in their covert utility but also in their symbolic power, i.e., the ability to show that civilian networks can be weaponized against the United States at moments of significant diplomatic importance.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Associated Press. (2025, September 27). U.S. Secret Service dismantles imminent telecommunications threat in New York. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/unga-threat-telecom-service-sim-93734f76578bc9ca22d93a8e91fd9c76

CNN. (2025, September 27). Secret Service investigates massive network near UN. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2025/09/27/us/nyc-network-secret-service-investigation

Commsrisk. (2025, September 24). U.S. Secret Service finds 300 SIM boxes in New York. Commsrisk. https://commsrisk.com/us-secret-service-finds-300-simboxes-in-new-york

PBS. (2025, September 24). How SIM farms like the one found near the UN could collapse telecom networks. PBS NewsHour. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-sim-farms-like-the-one-found-near-the-un-could-collapse-telecom-networks

United States Secret Service. (2025, September 27). U.S. Secret Service dismantles imminent telecommunications threat in New York. United States Secret Service. https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2025/09/us-secret-service-dismantles-imminent-telecommunications-threat-new-york

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The Retracted Intelligence Report on TdA

The Retracted Intelligence Report on Tren de Aragua, espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence, strategic intelligence, national security, C. Constantin Poindexter;

The recent retraction of a National Security Agency (NSA) report on Venezuela and the Tren de Aragua (TdA) criminal gang highlights the tension between intelligence assessments and political narratives. The danger of politicization of intelligence work is front and center here. It’s reasonably clear here that the DNI denied release of the full intelligence product because it did not align neatly with the current Administration’s assertions about TdA and Venezuelan President Maduro’s direction, financing and control over its nefarious activities. Boris Bondarev, former diplomat of the Russian Federation reported on his experience in a Far East assignment, “One day, I was called to meet with the embassy’s number three official, a quiet, middle-aged diplomat who had joined the foreign ministry during the Soviet era. He handed me text from a cable from Moscow, which I was told to incorporate into a document we would deliver to Cambodian authorities. Noticing several typos, I told him that I would correct them. “Don’t do that!” he shot back. “We got the text straight from Moscow. They know better. Even if there are errors, it’s not up to us to correct the center.” It was emblematic of what would become a growing trend in the ministry: unquestioned deference to leaders.” (Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2022) The example is instructive of what we do NOT want to be.

The report, “Venezuela: Examining Regime Ties to Tren de Aragua,” declassified in May 2025, offers an analytic picture that contradicts claims made by U.S. political leaders that Nicolás Maduro is actively engaged in supporting, financing, and directing TdA. The NIC assessment concludes that while the gang has benefitted from a permissive environment in Venezuela, including corruption and weak institutional control, there is no credible evidence that Maduro or senior regime officials exercise command over the group. This retraction is striking because it underscores how intelligence assessments that fail to support policy preferences may be subject to extraordinary pressure, despite their analytic rigor.

The NIC report is clear in its findings. It states that TdA leaders have historically benefitted from permissive conditions in Venezuela, particularly weak prison oversight and corrupt officials. That is NO surprise to those of us who have operated in corrupt Latin American states. Yet it stresses that many TdA cells operate independently across Latin America, with limited coordination even among themselves, let alone with the Venezuelan government (NIC 2025). The report underscores that much of TDA’s growth has been facilitated by Venezuelan migration and that individuals and networks frequently use the gang’s name without direct affiliation, underscoring the decentralized and diffuse nature of the group. Crucially, the report states that there is “no indication that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro or senior government officials are directing the actions of Tren de Aragua,” contradicting claims that Maduro orchestrates the group’s activities (AP News 2025).

The report does allow that some mid- and low-level Venezuelan officials may have financial ties to TdA. Such connections are typically opportunistic, involving corruption or passive tolerance, rather than the product of a coherent state policy (NIC 2025). In this sense, regime responsibility lies less in the deliberate deployment of the gang as a proxy and more in the systemic weakness of governance that allows TdA to operate with impunity. This distinction is critical: corruption and negligence do not equate to strategic coordination or sponsorship. Yet political leaders have blurred this line by portraying TdA as a regime-directed instrument of repression and transnational crime.

Redactions in the NIC report shed further light on analytic processes. Although redactions obscure details, we can reasonably infer that they conceal the names of regime-linked individuals, sources and methods of intelligence collection, or details about TdA’s operations abroad. In intelligence practice, such redactions protect human sources, sensitive communications intercepts, and law enforcement leads. Notably, the report’s unredacted portions are explicit in their rejection of senior-level regime direction. Given classification practices, it is unlikely that redacted sections would conceal evidence directly contradicting the assessment’s core conclusion, since that would undermine the transparency and credibility of the report’s stated findings (NIC 2025).

Other credible sources reinforce the NIC’s position. Associated Press reporting on the document emphasizes that there is no evidence of Maduro’s direct involvement, while acknowledging that some regime actors might benefit from TdA’s activities (AP News 2025). Investigations by InSight Crime and The Guardian further show that certain monitors and advocacy groups have exaggerated TdA’s presence in the United States, even fabricating reports of its activity (InSight Crime 2025; The Guardian 2025). By contrast, organizations such as the Human Rights Foundation (HRF) argue that regime-linked actors used TdA in the abduction of Venezuelan dissident Ronald Ojeda in Chile in 2024. A more definitive answer to the question of Maduro’s involvement with TdA may have come from Ojeda. Unfortunately, he was liquidated by the regime. Perhaps the Chilean criminal information to the ICC will reveal more. The allegations remain under judicial investigation and do not yet amount to definitive evidence of direct command by Maduro himself (HRF 2025). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) both highlight Venezuela’s permissive environment for illicit financial flows and organized crime, but stress that corruption at lower levels is more prevalent than systematic state direction (GAO 2023; CRS 2024).

When these sources are synthesized, a consistent analytic picture emerges. Venezuela under Maduro provides an enabling environment for organized crime, but this is the result of systemic corruption, institutional incapacity, and deliberate tolerance by some officials, not top-level strategic direction. TDA operates as a decentralized criminal network whose spread is tied to transnational migration and weak law enforcement, not to state financing or command. The strongest claims, that Maduro is personally orchestrating TdA’s financing and direction, misrepresent available evidence and are not supported by credible intelligence or rigorous analysis. This distinction is not trivial: overstating threats distorts policymaking and risks politicizing intelligence.

The retraction of the NIC report under the leadership of DNI Tulsi Gabbard underscores the sensitivity of such findings. According to reporting, Gabbard ordered the recall of a classified report on Venezuela even after NSA officials confirmed that it met analytic and procedural standards (WRAL 2025). This action illustrates the pressures intelligence agencies face when their findings contradict prevailing political narratives. While intelligence must consider the risks of exposing sources and methods, recalling a report that undermines a presidential claim risks signaling politicization and undermining the credibility of the intelligence community.

It is important to concede some counterarguments. Intelligence reports are limited by available sources, and the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Covert relationships between regime actors and TdA may exist beyond the reach of collection or declassification. Allegations such as those emerging in Chile may eventually provide more conclusive evidence. However, at present, the preponderance of credible sources supports the NIC’s conclusion that Maduro is not directly directing or financing TdA. Until more conclusive evidence emerges, policymaking should be grounded in this nuanced understanding.

Ultimately, the retraction of the NIC report raises broader questions about the role of intelligence in our governance. The U.S. intelligence community’s credibility depends on its ability to provide unbiased, apolitical assessments to policymakers, even when those assessments contradict political preferences. Intelligence that is shaped by politics rather than evidence undermines both domestic and international credibility. For policymakers, basing decisions on politicized claims risks misallocation of resources, legal overreach, and diplomatic missteps. For the public, it threatens the erosion of trust in government institutions and more specifically the I.C. It is imperative that the DNI ensures that analytic judgments reflect the best available evidence, acknowledges uncertainties, and resists the politicization of intelligence regardless if she falls out of favor with the Administration. Only through integrity in production and delivery to the consumer can intelligence provide a sound foundation for policy in matters as consequential as Venezuela’s transnational criminal networks.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

AP News. 2025. “Declassified Intelligence Memo Contradicts Trump’s Claims Linking Gang to Venezuelan Government.” May 6, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/d818cc58962ba90cd2c94ca1b494d4fd
.

Congressional Research Service (CRS). 2024. Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy. CRS Report IF10230. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10230
.

GAO (Government Accountability Office). 2023. Venezuela: Illicit Financial Flows and U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Them. GAO-23-105668. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105668
.

Human Rights Foundation (HRF). 2025. “Venezuela’s Maduro Continues to Use Tren de Aragua for Transnational Repression, Kidnapping, Assassination.” April 25, 2025. https://hrf.org/latest/venezuelas-maduro-continues-to-use-tren-de-aragua-for-transnational-repression-kidnapping-assassination/
.

National Intelligence Council (NIC). 2025. Venezuela: Examining Regime Ties to Tren de Aragua. Case No. DF-2025-00379, declassified May 5, 2025.

The Guardian. 2025. “Trump Defense Official Led Think Tank that Spread Lies about Tren de Aragua.” August 13, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/13/joseph-humire-thinktank-tren-de-aragua
.

WRAL. 2025. “DNI Gabbard Recalls Classified Report on Venezuela in Highly Unusual Move.” May 2025. https://www.wral.com/story/dni-gabbard-recalls-classified-report-on-venezuela-in-highly-unusual-move/22152236/
.

Foreign Affairs. “Sources: Russia Misconduct – Boris Bondarev.” [n.d.]. “Sources: Russia Misconduct – Boris Bondarev,” Foreign Affairs. Accessed [insert access date]. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/sources-russia-misconduct-boris-bondarev

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Conduct Not Becoming: Alleged U.S.-Linked Interference in Greenland

intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, spy, spies, subversion operations, c. constantin poindexter

In August 2025, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the chargé d’affaires of the United States Embassy in Copenhagen after revelations by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) that several Americans linked to the U.S. Presidential Administration had engaged in covert political activities in Greenland. According to the reporting, these individuals compiled lists of Greenlanders categorized as “pro-U.S.” or “anti-Trump,” cultivated ties with local elites, and promoted narratives designed to widen divisions between Nuuk and Copenhagen (PBS NewsHour 2025; Associated Press 2025). The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) emphasized that Greenland remains a primary target for foreign interference operations, echoing earlier warnings that external actors could exploit or fabricate political disagreements within the Kingdom of Denmark (Al Jazeera 2025). These revelations, coupled with Denmark’s unusually direct diplomatic response, illustrate the characteristics of a malign influence or subversive operation and highlight the potential damage such activities can inflict on U.S. national security, particularly by undermining liaison trust with Denmark, arguably one of Washington’s most important intelligence partners.

Characteristics of a Malign Influence Operation

Malign influence operations are typically defined by certain recurring attributes: plausible deniability, use of cut-outs or intermediaries, audience mapping and segmentation, amplification of divisive narratives, and efforts aimed at shaping decision-making environments rather than openly persuading through argument. The Greenland episode, as described by DR and reported internationally, bears all of these hallmarks.

Plausible deniability was central to the actor’s positioning. Officials stressed that the government does not direct or control the actions of private citizens, even though the actors were reportedly politically connected to the Administration (PBS NewsHour 2025). Such disavowals allow states to shield themselves from direct accountability while benefiting from the effects of covert activity.

The use of cut-outs and informal networks appears evident. The alleged operatives were not formal embassy staff operating under Chief of Mission authority but instead American nationals cultivating relationships with Greenlandic political and business figures. This indirect approach mirrors tradecraft seen in both Cold War–era and contemporary influence campaigns, allowing sponsors to maintain distance while pursuing strategic objectives (Associated Press 2025).

The activity involved audience segmentation, as evidenced by the preparation of lists distinguishing sympathetic Greenlanders from opponents. Such mapping is a well-established precursor to micro-targeted persuasion and coalition-building (Rudbeck 2020).

The operation sought to exploit existing grievances. Greenland has a long history of tension regarding its relationship with Copenhagen, particularly concerning autonomy and resource management. PET has publicly warned that adversaries attempt to “promote or amplify particular viewpoints” in Greenland to exacerbate these tensions (Al Jazeera 2025). By pressing sovereignty-oriented narratives, the actors aligned with known fault lines.

The activities pursued a strategic effect on governance: nudging Greenland’s politics toward greater separation from Denmark or, at minimum, intensifying friction between Copenhagen and Nuuk. This fits the definition of a malign influence campaign, which aims not merely to influence public opinion but to shift the constitutional or strategic environment of the target polity (Fleshman et al. 2020).

Greenland’s Strategic Importance

Understanding why Denmark reacted so firmly requires recognition of Greenland’s immense strategic value. The island hosts Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), the northernmost U.S. military installation. Pituffik is critical to ballistic missile early warning, missile defense, and space surveillance missions, particularly through the 12th Space Warning Squadron, which tracks ballistic launches and supports U.S. Space Force operations (U.S. Space Force 2024). Pituffik’s radar and space-tracking systems are a vital component of NATO deterrence, as they enable early detection of potential Russian or other adversary launches.

Beyond Pituffik, Greenland’s geography makes it indispensable to North Atlantic security. The island sits astride the Greenland–Iceland–U.K. (GIUK) gap, a maritime chokepoint central to monitoring Russian submarine traffic from the Barents Sea into the North Atlantic. As the Arctic becomes increasingly contested due to climate change and resource competition, Greenland’s location at the intersection of North America and Europe magnifies its strategic importance.

Equally significant is Denmark’s intelligence capability. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) and PET are widely regarded as among the most capable small-state services, particularly in signals intelligence, counterintelligence, cyber and Arctic domain awareness. FE’s Intelligence Risk Assessment 2024 explicitly identifies Greenland as a frontline in great-power competition (Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2024). As such, Denmark is one of Washington’s most important intelligence liaisons, and trust in this relationship is crucial to U.S. and NATO security.

Damage to U.S. National Security

From a U.S. perspective, even if the federal government neither authorized nor directed the actions of the Americans involved, the perception of interference inflicts real costs. Four national security risks stand out.

Such activities risk eroding liaison trust. Intelligence sharing relies on reciprocity and respect for sovereignty. If Denmark perceives that the United States tolerates or encourages efforts to manipulate the Kingdom’s internal affairs, Danish services may hesitate to share sensitive information or to cooperate fully in Arctic monitoring. Trust, once diminished, is difficult to rebuild (Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2024).

Malign influence in Greenland undermines coordinated Arctic policy. Pituffik’s continued operation depends on alignment among Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Washington. Any perception that the U.S. is fueling secessionist sentiment in Greenland complicates base access negotiations, environmental approvals, and trilateral defense arrangements. Diplomatic friction could translate into delays or restrictions that weaken early warning and space-tracking capabilities (Associated Press 2025).

Such revelations hand adversaries narrative ammunition. Russia and China have long sought to depict the United States as hypocritical in its advocacy for sovereignty and democratic norms. A Danish finding that U.S.-linked actors engaged in subversive activity in Greenland would provide propaganda fodder for Moscow and Beijing, undermining U.S. credibility in NATO and in multilateral Arctic governance forums (Al Jazeera 2025).

These operations jeopardize operational continuity at Pituffik. Strategic deterrence depends on uninterrupted coverage of missile warning and space tracking. Political discord that affects budgets, labor relations, or local sentiment in Greenland could generate friction costs that weaken U.S. posture in the High North (U.S. Space Force 2024).

Theoretical Framing: Rudbeck and Malign Influence

Emma Rudbeck’s (2020) master’s thesis on foreign interference in Greenland provides an instructive framework. Applying Applied History and strategic narrative theory, Rudbeck argues that interference by major powers in Greenland echoes Cold War–era dynamics and threatens the concept of “Arctic Exceptionalism,” which had long portrayed the region as insulated from great-power rivalry. She concludes that Denmark must prepare for sustained interference by China, Russia, and the United States, and recommends a proactive Arctic strategy that emphasizes resilience and narrative management. Rudbeck’s insights align with the Greenland episode. The use of covert actors to segment populations and inflame tensions fits her description of “strategic narratives” designed to reshape perceptions of sovereignty and autonomy. By treating Greenland not as a neutral space but as contested political terrain, the alleged U.S.-linked operatives validated Rudbeck’s claim that interference is no longer limited to Russia or China but includes Washington itself. From Denmark’s perspective, this raises uncomfortable questions about the reliability of its closest ally.

Assessing the “Deception Operation” Frame

Denmark’s choice to summon the U.S. envoy demonstrates that it viewed the incident not as isolated private advocacy but as a coherent deception operation. The tactics of covert list-building, elite cultivation, and narrative seeding abroad reflect classic subversive tradecraft, intended to give the false impression of grassroots political momentum. PET has warned precisely about such techniques, noting that foreign influence in Greenland often seeks to “amplify particular viewpoints” to sow division (Al Jazeera 2025). This aligns with broader theoretical work on deception and influence, which emphasizes how adversaries shape decision environments by hiding their involvement (Fleshman et al. 2020).

We Need to Assure Copenhagen that “This isn’t who we are”

The Greenland case illustrates how malign influence can damage alliances even when conducted by non-official actors. Mitigating this damage will require visible U.S. steps: clear ministerial-level assurances to Copenhagen, tighter deconfliction to ensure all outreach in Greenland is coordinated through embassy channels, and symbolic trilateral initiatives with Denmark and Greenland to demonstrate respect for the Kingdom’s internal constitutional order. Absent such efforts, suspicion of U.S. duplicity may persist, weakening NATO cohesion at a time when Arctic security is increasingly central.

The alleged Administration-linked interference in Greenland demonstrates the characteristics of a malign influence operation: plausible deniability, cut-outs, audience segmentation, exploitation of grievances, and pursuit of strategic effects on governance. Greenland’s unique importance to U.S. defense posture and Denmark’s role as an elite intelligence ally magnify the stakes. By alienating Copenhagen, such operations risk degrading liaison trust, undermining trilateral defense cooperation, handing adversaries propaganda, and jeopardizing early-warning missions at Pituffik. Rudbeck’s (2020) analysis underscores that Greenland is no longer insulated from great-power rivalry, and that even allies may engage in subversive activity. For the United States, this episode should serve as a cautionary reminder that short-term political maneuvering can yield long-term strategic perils, especially when it undermines the trust of one of its most vital partners in the Arctic.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

References

Al Jazeera. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Trump Allies’ Alleged Greenland Interference.” Al Jazeera, August 28, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/28/denmark-summons-us-envoy-over-trump-allies-greenland.

Associated Press. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Alleged Trump Allies’ Interference in Greenland.” AP News, August 28, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/denmark-greenland-us-trump-6c9544314792cf1e287e21af06111c1e.

Danish Defence Intelligence Service. 2024. Intelligence Risk Assessment 2024. Copenhagen: FE. https://fe-ddis.dk/en.

Fleshman, William, Jennifer L. Larson, and Christopher Paul. 2020. “Deception and the Strategy of Influence.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.01331.

PBS NewsHour. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Claims of Interference in Greenland.” PBS NewsHour, August 28, 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/denmark-summons-u-s-envoy-over-claims-of-interference-in-greenland.

Rudbeck, Emma. 2020. How Should the Kingdom of Denmark React to the Increased Chinese, Russian, and U.S. Interference in Greenland in Its Coming Arctic Strategy? Master’s thesis, University of Southern Denmark. https://thesis.sdu.dk/download?id=2260.

U.S. Space Force. 2024. “12th Space Warning Squadron, Pituffik Space Base.” Fact Sheet, Department of the Air Force. https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/
.

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Artificial Intelligence and Offensive Counterintelligence in the U.S. I.C.

counterintelligence, intelligence, espionage, counterespionage, espia, spy, spies, contrainteligencia, contraespionaje, c. constantin poindexter, J2, CNI, DNI

Artificial intelligence is transforming the national security landscape by augmenting the capabilities of intelligence organizations to “identify, disrupt, and neutralize adversarial threats”. While much scholarly and policy attention has been devoted to the defensive applications of AI, i.e., cybersecurity, threat detection, and insider threat monitoring, implications for offensive counterintelligence (CI) are equally profound. Offensive counterintelligence, which involves proactive measures to manipulate, exploit, or dismantle adversarial intelligence operations, has traditionally depended on human ingenuity, deception, and long-term HUMINT. The introduction of AI into this realm promises to exponentially increase the scale, speed, and sophistication of U.S. counterintelligence campaigns. The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) will become more effective at penetration of FIS, deception operations, and neutralization of espionage activities.

One of the most significant ways AI will enhance offensive counterintelligence is through advanced pattern recognition and anomaly detection across massive data streams. The IC already ingests petabytes of information daily, from open-source intelligence (OSINT) to signals intelligence (SIGINT). Offensive counterintelligence officers have historically been hobbled by fragmentary reports and painfully dry and drawn-out analysis to identify foreign intelligence officers, their networks, and their vulnerabilities. Machine learning algorithms now enable CI analysts to identify subtle anomalies in communications metadata, financial transactions, or travel records that suggest covert operational behavior. Algorithms trained on known espionage tradecraft can detect anomalies in mobile phone usage, repeated travel to consular facilities, or encrypted message timing that would elude traditional analysis (Carter, 2020). By automating the detection of clandestine activity, AI provides offensive CI officers with early targeting leads for recruitment, deception, or disruption.

AI’s role in predictive modeling of adversary behavior is a game-changer. Traditional counterintelligence operations have required years of painstaking collection before a service could anticipate an adversary’s moves. Now, reinforcement learning and predictive analytics can generate probabilistic models of how foreign intelligence services will act under specific conditions. This capability is invaluable for offensive CI, in which anticipating an adversary’s agent recruitment attempts or technical collection strategies and techniques allows the U.S. to insert double agents, conduct controlled leaks, or channel disinformation in ways that compromise foreign intelligence effectiveness (Treverton & Miles, 2021). By simulating adversary decision-making processes and Loops, AI effectively allows the IC to wage a chess match several moves ahead, shifting initiative in favor of U.S. operators.

AI will transform deception operations, a core element of offensive counterintelligence. Deception requires constructing credible false narratives, fabricating convincing documents, and sustaining elaborate covers. Generative AI models provide new tools for producing synthetic but convincing content, i.e., emails, social media profiles, deepfake videos, etc., that can be deployed to manipulate adversarial intelligence targets. These capabilities enable more robust false-flag operations, digital honeypots, and disinformation campaigns designed to lure adversary collectors into traps or consume their resources chasing fabricated leads. Deepfake technology raises concerns about disinformation in democratic societies, however, if deployed in a tightly controlled counterintelligence context it becomes a force multiplier, providing scalable deception tools that previously demanded enormous human and material resources (Brundage et al., 2018).

AI enhances the identification and exploitation of recruitment opportunities, central to offensive CI operations. The IC has long relied on spotting, assessing, and recruiting human assets with access and placement. AI-driven analysis of social media, professional networks, and digital exhaust enables rapid identification of individuals with access, grievances, or vulnerabilities suitable for recruitment. Natural language processing (NLP) tools can detect sentiment, stress, or dissatisfaction in posts, while network analysis maps reveal connections within bureaucracies or security services (Greitens, 2019). By narrowing down large populations to high-value recruitment targets, AI augments human case officer ability to prioritize approaches and customize persuasion angles. The integration of AI with human tradecraft accelerates the traditionally slow and resource-intensive recruitment cycle.

Cyber counterintelligence represents another frontier where AI confers offensive advantages. FISs increasingly operate in cyberspace, exfiltrating sensitive data and conducting influence campaigns. AI-enabled intrusion detection, combined with offensive cyber capabilities, allows U.S. counterintelligence to not only identify intrusions but also manipulate them. AI can facilitate “active defense” strategies in which foreign intelligence hackers are fed false or misleading data, undermining their confidence in purloined data. Automated adversarial machine learning tools can also detect attempts by foreign services to poison U.S. AI training data, allowing counterintelligence operators to preemptively counter them (Henderson, 2022). AI both defends critical systems and creates new opportunities for denial and deception operations (D&D) and disruption of adversarial cyber espionage.

Further, AI also addresses one of the perennial challenges of offensive counterintelligence, scalability. Human operator and analyst resources are finite. Adversarial services often enjoy the advantage of operating from within authoritarian systems unconstrained by meaningful oversight. AI offers the IC the ability to scale counterintelligence operations across global theaters without proportional increases in manpower. Automated triage systems can flag potential espionage indicators for human review, while AI-driven simulations can test the effectiveness of proposed offensive strategies before deployment. The scalability of AI ensures that offensive CI efforts remain proactive rather than reactive, allowing the IC to contest adversarial services at a global level (Allen & Chan, 2017).

I will note here that the insertion of AI into offensive counterintelligence is not a panacea. Overreliance on algorithmic outputs without human validation can lead to “false positives”, misidentification, or ethically and legally problematic targeting. Adversaries are also rapidly adopting AI for their own counter-counterintelligence measures, raising the specter of an AI-driven arms race in deception, espionage and counterespionage disciplines. The U.S. IC must ensure that AI tools are embedded within a robust framework of human review, legal compliance, and ethical norms. Offensive CI, clearly operating in the shadows of democratic accountability, requires enhanced governance mechanisms to balance operational effectiveness with adherence to rule-of-law principles (Zegart, 2022).

The adoption of AI in offensive counterintelligence necessitates organizational adaptation. Case officers, analysts, and technical specialists must be trained not only to use AI tools but also to understand their limitations. Interdisciplinary collaboration between computer scientists, behavioral experts, and intelligence professionals will be essential for designing AI systems that are operationally relevant, a particularly challenging problem in a group of agencies accustomed to “siloing”. Investment in secure, resilient AI infrastructure is critical, as adversaries will inevitably seek to penetrate, manipulate, or sabotage U.S. counterintelligence AI systems. Just as past eras of counterintelligence revolved around protecting codes and agent networks, the new era will hinge on safeguarding the integrity of AI platforms themselves (Carter, 2020).

Artificial intelligence offers unprecedented opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of offensive counterintelligence. By improving anomaly detection, predictive modeling, deception, recruitment targeting, and cyber counterintelligence, AI serves as both a force multiplier and a strategic enabler. It allows the IC to proactively shape the intelligence battlespace, seize the initiative from adversaries, and scale operations to meet global challenges. These opportunities come with risks, ethical, operational, and strategic, however, with careful management the payoff will be monumental. Offensive counterintelligence has always been a contest of wits, deception, and foresight. In the twenty-first century, AI will become the decisive instrument that determines whether the U.S. retains the upper hand in the shadow war.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

References

Allen, G., & Chan, T. (2017). Artificial intelligence and national security. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., Toner, H., Eckersley, P., Garfinkel, B., … & Amodei, D. (2018). The malicious use of artificial intelligence: Forecasting, prevention, and mitigation. Future of Humanity Institute.

Carter, A. (2020). The future of counterintelligence in the age of artificial intelligence. Center for a New American Security.

Greitens, S. C. (2019). Dealing with demand for authoritarianism: The domestic politics of counterintelligence. International Security, 44(2), 9–47.

Henderson, T. (2022). Offensive cyber counterintelligence: Leveraging AI to deceive adversaries. Journal of Cybersecurity Studies, 8(1), 55–74.

Treverton, G. F., & Miles, R. (2021). Strategic counterintelligence: The case for offensive measures. RAND Corporation.

Zegart, A. (2022). Spies, lies, and algorithms: The history and future of American intelligence. Princeton University Press.

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Can I.C. HUMINT Operators Counter Facial Recognition Supercharged by A.I.?

HUMINT, facial recognition, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, c. constantin poindexter;

The WAPO article in May of this year (“CIA chief faces stiff test in bid to revitalize human spying”) revealed a peril that has been on my radar for a few years. Writers Warren P. Strobel and Ellen Nakashima reported that the CIA is facing ‘unprecedented operational challenges’ in conducting human intelligence (HUMINT) missions, particularly in “denied areas” such as China, Russia, and other heavily surveilled states. The central premise is that advances in artificial intelligence–powered facial recognition, combined with integrated surveillance networks are making it extremely difficult for intelligence officers and sub-handlers to operate covertly. Maybe, . . . but maybe not.

As I.C. agencies grapple with the proliferation of AI-enhanced facial recognition in denied areas, human intelligence (HUMINT) operators must seek new tradecraft to elude detection. Exploiting the inherent bias vulnerabilities and adaptive learning mechanisms within facial recognition systems, HUMINT operatives can deliberately degrade their reliability, more specifically, by flooding systems with inputs that are not identical but very similar thereby “poisoning” the recognition algorithm. Operators can broaden acceptance thresholds and reduce fidelity. Drawing a parallel with Apple’s iPhone Face ID system, whose adaptive mechanism occasionally grants access to similar-looking individuals (e.g., family members), here is how HUMINT practitioners could deliberately introduce adversarial noise to AI surveillance systems to slip through.

Algorithmic Bias in Facial Recognition

Facial recognition systems are susceptible to algorithmic bias rooted in uneven training data. For instance, the now-classic “Gender Shades” study revealed error rates up to 35 % for darker-skinned women versus < 1 % for lighter-skinned males. More broadly, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has documented that commercial face recognition systems misidentify Black and Asian faces 10 to 100 times more often than white faces. These disparities not only expose systemic flaws but also point to the system’s sensitivity to subtle variations. Adversarial machine learning research has demonstrated that imperceptible perturbations can dramatically mislead facial recognition models. These adversarial examples exploit “non-robust” features, patterns perceptible to AI but invisible to humans that induce misclassification. Studies in the domain have confirmed that even small alterations in pixel patterns can force erroneous outputs in face recognition systems.

Adaptive Learning: The iPhone Face ID Example

Apple’s Face ID serves as a real-world instance of an adaptive facial recognition mechanism. The system uses a detailed infrared depth map and neural engine adaptation to adjust to users’ appearance changes over time, i.e., aging, makeup, glasses, or facial hair. Critically, Face ID “updates its registered face data” when it detects a close match that is subsequently unlocked via passcode, effectively learning from borderline inputs. This adaptability can lead to misrecognition in practice. A widely reported case involved a ten-year-old boy unlocking his mother’s iPhone X on the first attempt, thanks to their similar features. The system adapted sufficiently that the child could consistently unlock the device in subsequent attempts even though he was neither registered nor the primary user. Apple’s own user disclosure acknowledges that Face ID is statistically more prone to false positives with twins, siblings, and children under thirteen owing to underdeveloped, similar facial features.

HUMINT Application: Poisoning Recognition Systems

HUMINT operators, aware of such adaptive vulnerabilities, could deliberately exploit them when entering denied areas monitored by AI facial recognition cameras or checkpoints. How would that work?

Creating “near duplicate” appearances: Operators could train the system by repeatedly presenting faces that are not identical but nearly identical. Sending similar-looking collaborators through passport control wearing slight variations in makeup, glasses, lighting, or facial hair is a good example. Over time, the system’s adaptive threshold would widen, accepting a broader range of inputs as belonging to the same identity.

Adversarial perturbation via “morphing”: Using adversarial machine learning techniques, operatives could create morphs (digital or printed images blending two individuals) so that the system’s recognition vector drifts toward both identities. The DHS has documented such “morphing attacks” as a real threat to face recognition systems. Not a perfect solution as adversarial C.I. might simply surveil them ALL.

Feedback loop poisoning: With systems that incorporate user feedback (e.g., unlocking after near matches), HUMINT operators might deliberately trigger false acceptances or input other authentication data after near matches, feeding the system mis-labelled data and amplifying its error tolerance. That’s the way siblings or children inadvertently taught Face ID to accept them in the previous example.

Ethical, Operational, and Technical Defense

Is the approach technically plausible or ethically defensible? Technically, the literature on adversarial attacks and adaptive biases confirms that recognition systems can be deliberately misconfigured through controlled input poisoning. Operationally, such techniques must be deployed after careful risk assessment. If a HUMINT operating group consistently “trains” a system in advance, the likelihood of detection increases, perhaps dramatically. However, in dynamic environments with rotating operators and multiple lookalikes, the system can deteriorate in reliability over time without drawing attention to a single individual. Ethically, these strategies are defensible under the doctrine of necessity and deception inherent to espionage. The goal is not harm but evasion in hostile surveillance contexts.

Limitations and Countermeasures

The approach is not foolproof. Highly calibrated systems may lock after repeated unlock failures or require emergency analysis and supervisory resets. Advanced systems may isolate per identity representations, preventing cross-contamination. Systems without adaptive learning or those that guard against morphing remain immune. Nonetheless, many real-world systems are not designed for adversarial resistance, . . . yet. Authoritarian regimes with bulk “brute” surveillance networks, less than state-of-the-art platforms and/or resource constraints may nullify robust defense against poisoning.

In the escalating arms race between AI surveillance and clandestine operations, HUMINT tradecraft must evolve. By exploiting biases and adaptive flaws in facial recognition systems (ex., through near identical inputs, morphing techniques, and feedback poisoning) operators can subtly degrade recognition fidelity. The iPhone Face ID example underscores the viability of such tactics in practice, i.e., a system designed for convenience can become a liability when its adaptability is weaponized. As surveillance proliferates, understanding and manipulating AI’s algorithmic susceptibilities will be indispensable for evasion and operational success.

Facial recognition is not the only sophisticated peril to HUMINT operations. Per Thomas Claburn’s recent report in The Register, “Researchers in Italy have developed a way to create a biometric identifier for people based on the way the human body interferes with Wi-Fi signal propagation. The scientists claim this identifier, a pattern derived from Wi-Fi Channel State Information, can re-identify a person in other locations most of the time when a Wi-Fi signal can be measured. Observers could therefore track a person as they pass through signals sent by different Wi-Fi networks – even if they’re not carrying a phone.” (Claburn, 2025) Tradecraft and countermeasures will likewise have to evolve to address this threat, but I’ll leave that subject for a future piece.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Buolamwini, J., & Gebru, T. (2018). Gender Shades: Intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender classification. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, 81, 1–15. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithmic_bias

National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2019). Face recognition vendor test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic effects (NIST Interagency/Internal Report No. 8280). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-facial_recognition_movement

Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., & Szegedy, C. (2015). Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. International Conference on Learning Representations. https://www.wired.com/story/adversarial-examples-ai-may-not-hallucinate

Vakhshiteh, A., Alparslan, F., & Farokhi, F. (2020). Adversarial attacks on deep face recognition systems. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11709

Apple Inc. (2024). About Face ID advanced technology. Apple Support. https://support.apple.com/en-us/102381

Greenberg, A. (2017, December 14). A 10-year-old unlocked his mom’s iPhone X using Face ID. Wired. https://www.wired.com/story/10-year-old-face-id-unlocks-mothers-iphone-x

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2023). Risks and mitigation strategies for morphing attacks on biometric systems. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/23_1222_st_risks_mitigation_strategies.pdf

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La pesadilla de contrainteligencia: Huawei, España y la amenaza a la cooperación transatlántica de inteligencia

La pesadilla de contrainteligencia Huawei, España y la amenaza a la cooperación transatlántica de inteligencia, inteligencia, contrainteligencia, espionage, contraespionage, c. constantin poindexter

El Gobierno de España adjudicó a Huawei Technologies un contrato por valor de 12,3 millones de euros para proveer los sistemas de almacenamiento y procesamiento de las escuchas judiciales autorizadas por jueces en investigaciones penales y de seguridad nacional. El contrato contempla la utilización de servidores de la línea OceanStor 6800 V5 de Huawei, destinados a manejar datos clasificados de extrema sensibilidad relacionados con interceptaciones de comunicaciones autorizadas judicialmente, muchas de las cuales forman parte de operaciones en curso en las que colaboran servicios de inteligencia de otros países aliados. La decisión ha causado consternación en sectores diplomáticos, legislativos y de seguridad, no sólo en los Estados Unidos, sino también en el seno de la Unión Europea y la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), dadas las implicaciones que esto tiene en materia de contrainteligencia, interoperabilidad y confianza entre socios estratégicos.

La principal preocupación se origina en el hecho incontrovertible de que Huawei mantiene una relación estructural con el Partido Comunista Chino (PCCh) y está sujeta a las leyes de inteligencia nacionales de China, en particular la Ley de Inteligencia Nacional de 2017. Esta legislación obliga a todas las entidades chinas, incluidas las privadas, a cooperar con los servicios de inteligencia del Estado cuando se les requiera. De este modo, el hecho de que Huawei tenga acceso directo o indirecto a los sistemas españoles de interceptación electrónica AUNQUE supuestamente aislados y sin conexión a redes externas, constituye una amenaza inherente para la seguridad nacional, no sólo de España, sino de todos los países que mantienen canales de cooperación bilateral o multilateral con sus servicios de inteligencia españoles. Aunque el Ministerio del Interior ha insistido en que los servidores de Huawei están blindados y físicamente desconectados de redes externas, y que cumplen con los estándares del Esquema Nacional de Seguridad (ENS), expertos internacionales han señalado que tales garantías son insuficientes cuando se trata de proveedores sujetos a legislación extranjera opaca y autoritaria.

La respuesta de los EEEUU fue inmediata y contundente. Los congresistas Rick Crawford, miembro del Comité de Inteligencia de la Cámara de Representantes, y Tom Cotton, miembro del Comité Selecto de Inteligencia del Senado, enviaron una carta a la Directora de Inteligencia Nacional (DNI) solicitando una revisión integral de los acuerdos de intercambio de inteligencia entre Washington y Madrid (CNI). En dicha carta, los legisladores advierten que la decisión del gobierno español de confiar a Huawei el manejo de escuchas judiciales constituye una “puerta trasera potencial” para que el aparato de inteligencia chino acceda a información clasificada generada en el contexto de operaciones conjuntas. La gravedad del asunto es tal que los firmantes sugieren suspender temporalmente el intercambio de inteligencia con España si no se revierte la medida. Estas preocupaciones no son infundadas ni exageradas; más bien reflejan una lógica estricta de seguridad nacional en la que la integridad de la cadena de custodia de la información es condición sine qua non para la cooperación.

Además, la reacción internacional expone una contradicción estructural en la política de seguridad digital de la Unión Europea. Mientras que Bruselas ha desaconsejado expresamente la participación de Huawei en redes 5G debido a los “riesgos sustanciales” que representa en términos de espionaje, ciberataques y dependencia tecnológica, no existe un marco normativo vinculante que prohíba su participación en otras infraestructuras críticas, como lo son los sistemas de gestión de datos de inteligencia y contrainteligencia. Esta brecha normativa fue denunciada en un análisis reciente de The Cipher Brief, donde expertos como el Dr. Dave Venable, exfuncionario de la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional (NSA), señalaron que la “caja de herramientas” de la UE frente a proveedores de alto riesgo es demasiado limitada y carente de fuerza jurídica. En consecuencia, cada Estado miembro actúa con un margen de discrecionalidad que pone en riesgo la coherencia del bloque y mina la confianza entre socios.

En este sentido, la decisión española también afecta de forma directa a la arquitectura de seguridad colectiva de la OTAN. España es un miembro activo de la Alianza Atlántica y participa regularmente en misiones y operaciones de inteligencia compartida, tanto en el marco europeo como transatlántico. Muchas de las escuchas judiciales que ahora estarán bajo la custodia tecnológica de Huawei probablemente incluyan comunicaciones de interés para operaciones conjuntas, tanto en el ámbito del contraterrorismo como del crimen organizado transnacional. Si uno de los eslabones de esta cadena adopta prácticas tecnológicas que no garantizan la inmunidad frente a actores hostiles, todo el sistema se ve comprometido. Esta vulnerabilidad estructural plantea la necesidad urgente de establecer normas comunes, con fuerza jurídica, que limiten o prohíban la contratación de proveedores tecnológicos sujetos a regímenes autoritarios y leyes de inteligencia incompatibles con los valores democráticos.

Las implicaciones no se limitan al plano técnico. Existe también un componente diplomático y estratégico. Al ignorar las advertencias previas sobre los riesgos asociados a Huawei, España corre el riesgo de erosionar su reputación como socio fiable en materia de seguridad e inteligencia. La percepción de que Madrid prioriza el precio y la conveniencia tecnológica sobre la seguridad estratégica puede tener consecuencias en términos de acceso a inteligencia sensible y participación en operaciones multilaterales. Esta posibilidad fue esbozada por altos funcionarios estadounidenses, quienes plantean que la continuidad del intercambio de inteligencia con España podría estar condicionada a la eliminación de Huawei de sus sistemas de seguridad nacional. En el contexto actual de competencia geopolítica entre Occidente y China, las decisiones tecnológicas tienen un peso estratégico equivalente al de las decisiones militares o diplomáticas.

Por su parte, el gobierno chino, a través del diario estatal Global Times, celebró la adjudicación como una muestra de independencia y racionalidad frente a la “presión hegemónica” de los Estados Unidos. Según los editoriales publicados, la decisión española prueba que Huawei es una empresa confiable y que las acusaciones en su contra carecen de fundamento técnico. Esta narrativa se alinea con la estrategia del PCCh de proyectar una imagen de inocuidad y eficiencia técnica de sus empresas, mientras oculta las estructuras de control estatal que las rigen. Desde esta perspectiva, el caso español se convierte en un caso testigo de la pugna entre dos visiones irreconciliables: una basada en la apertura, la transparencia y el Estado de derecho, y otra cimentada en el control autoritario, la opacidad y la manipulación estratégica de la tecnología con fines geopolíticos.

En resumen, el contrato adjudicado a Huawei no es un asunto meramente administrativo ni una cuestión de eficiencia tecnológica. En realidad, se trata de una grave falla de contrainteligencia con efectos potenciales sobre toda la red occidental de cooperación en seguridad. La combinación de factores legales, tecnológicos, estratégicos y diplomáticos que confluyen en esta decisión genera una tormenta perfecta que pone en jaque los principios fundamentales de confianza, integridad e interoperabilidad entre aliados. Si no se revierte la medida o se establecen controles supranacionales estrictos, se corre el riesgo de que otros países sigan el mismo camino, desdibujando la línea entre aliados seguros y entornos tecnológicos vulnerables a la penetración de adversarios estratégicos como China. En un mundo cada vez más definido por la competencia informacional, la lealtad tecnológica no puede ser tratada como un tema secundario; es, en última instancia, una cuestión de soberanía, integridad nacional y supervivencia estratégica.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, JD, Certificación OSINT CISA/NCISS, Certificación BFFOC del DoD/DoS

Referencias

Politico Europe. (2025). Spain’s Huawei contract raises US alarm over judicial wiretap security. Disponible en: https://www.politico.eu/article/spain-huawei-contract-judicial-wiretaps/

El País. (2025). España asegura a EE UU que el contrato de Interior con la china Huawei no supone ningún riesgo de seguridad. Disponible en: https://elpais.com/espana/2025-07-19/espana-asegura-a-ee-uu-que-el-contrato-de-interior-con-la-china-huwaei-no-supone-ningun-riesgo-de-seguridad.html

The Cipher Brief. (2025). Huawei, Spain and the Threat to Western Intelligence Cooperation. Disponible en: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/huawei-spain-intelligence

Global Times. (2025). Huawei’s win in Spain shows EU autonomy in face of US pressure. Disponible en: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202507/1339651.shtml

Venable, D. (2025). EU Security Frameworks and the Huawei Dilemma. The Cipher Brief Expert Commentary.

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The Strategic Importance of the INR: Safeguarding U.S. National Security through Diplomatically Anchored Intelligence

intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, spy, c. constantin poindexte

The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is a critical but underestimated pillar of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Established in 1947 and tracing its roots to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Research and Analysis Branch, the INR operates with a unique mandate: fusing diplomatic insight with rigorous intelligence analysis. Unique among I.C. member agencies, it exists specifically to inform U.S. foreign policy decisions. Despite its modest budget and staff (+/-300 personnel and less than one percent of the total IC budget), the INR’s record of analytic precision, geopolitical foresight, and principled speak-truth-to-power character has earned it a reputation as one of the most accurate and seasoned voices in national intelligence. Recent defunding directives from the current presidential administration threaten to undermine this vital function, risking a blind spot in diplomatic intelligence and foreign affairs policymaking.

The Unique Role of the INR in the U.S. Intelligence Community

The INR’s primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence analysis to the Secretary of State and other senior policymakers. Unlike larger IC agencies such as the CIA or NSA, the INR does not generally collect raw intelligence through clandestine operations or technical means. Instead, it synthesizes open-source material, diplomatic cables, intelligence reporting, and foreign liaison inputs to produce independent assessments grounded in a global diplomatic context (ODNI, 2023). This structural independence grants INR the ability to offer dissenting views when other agencies fall victim to inherent biases and groupthink. A prominent example is its refusal to endorse the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. The INR dissented from the IC consensus, concluding that there was insufficient evidence that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting a nuclear program (National Intelligence Council, NIE 2002-16HC, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Oct. 2002, INR). History has vindicated the INR’s position, reinforcing the critical need for its unbiased, evidence-based approach to intelligence.

Case Studies: Intelligence and Counterintelligence Victories Attributed to INR

Iraq WMD Dissent (2002–2003)

INR’s refusal to support claims of an active Iraqi nuclear weapons program is perhaps its most famous act of analytic integrity. Despite intense interagency pressure, INR analysts resisted politicization and flagged the aluminum tubes cited by other agencies as likely intended for conventional rockets, NOT nuclear centrifuge use. This dissent was formalized in the 2002 NIE, which noted:

“The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) judges that the available evidence does not add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing an integrated and comprehensive program for a nuclear weapon.”
— NIE 2002-16HC (Oct. 2002), p. 8, Declassified.

This dissent not only preserved U.S. diplomatic credibility in the long term but also highlighted the dangers of overreliance on uncertain technical intelligence divorced from geopolitical context and reliance on sole, unreliable assets (i.e., “Curveball”, subject to a burn notice).

Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election

In the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA), INR was a co-author alongside the CIA, NSA, and FBI. INR fully endorsed the judgment that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election with the intent of helping then-candidate Donald J. Trump. Unlike the NSA’s “moderate confidence,” INR expressed “high confidence” in the assessment (ODNI ICA 2017-01D, “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections,” Jan. 6, 2017). The INR’s contribution was key to bolstering the legitimacy of the ICA amid partisan scrutiny.

Warning of the Potential for Genocide in Rwanda (1994)

Though often overlooked, the INR produced early assessments indicating the risk of mass violence in Rwanda before the April 1994 genocide. These assessments were among the few within the IC to link escalating interethnic tensions and the collapse of the Arusha Accords to the potential for mass atrocities. A State Department cable dated April 1, 1994, warned of “a planned campaign of violence” by Hutu extremists The INR analysist that authored the report was tragically ignored at the policy level (State Cable 094659, April 1, 1994, Declassified under FOIA).

Budgetary Threats: Undermining a Critical Node in Strategic Intelligence

The FY2025 presidential budget request proposes a 17% reduction in the INR’s operational funding cutting approximately $15 million from its analytic programs, staff training, and diplomatic intelligence integration efforts (Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, FY2025, pp. 112–114). Case in point, a report (07/21/2025) from “an official inside the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) stated that two offices have been eliminated, one focused on education, and the other responsible for intelligence sharing with foreign governments.” (Homeland Security Today) While such cuts may appear numerically small, they pose a disproportionate risk to the IC’s analytical diversity and strategic foresight. INR operates with a compact, specialized cadre of analysts who often possess region-specific language and cultural proficiency, and decades of diplomatic experience. This sort of expertise cannot be rapidly regenerated once shown the door.

INR’s function in supporting U.S. embassies with intelligence briefings and diplomatic threat assessments will be dangerously constrained. As the IC continues to emphasize cyber threats, great power competition, and non-state actors, the INR remains the only agency that fully integrates foreign policy objectives into intelligence production.

The proposed cuts also jeopardize INR’s role in managing the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU), which provides critical geospatial intelligence for conflict zones and disaster response. Budget constraints will degrade the HIU’s ability to deploy timely, unclassified intelligence products for decision-makers and humanitarian actors, especially in regions like Sudan, Haiti, and Gaza.

Summation

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research remains indispensable to informing sound U.S. foreign policy and the broader mission of the Intelligence Community. Its record of analytical excellence, principled dissent, and regional expertise often exceeds in breadth and depth other I.C. members. INR’s contribution is thus unmatched. From warning against skewed WMD claims to identifying hostile FIS influence operations, INR has proven that size does not equate to strategic punch. Its diplomatic intelligence orientation allows it to view global events through a lens of nuance often missing from those agencies focused on technical collection and limited asset HUMINT. To weaken the INR through budgetary attrition is to court strategic blindness. Especially in an era marked by global realignment, hybrid warfare, and renewed great-power rivalry, the INR’s voice must be amplified, not silenced. Any degradation of its capability represents not only a loss to the Department of State but a dangerous diminution of America’s strategic planning capacity.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2023). United States Intelligence Community Budget Overview. https://www.dni.gov

National Intelligence Council. (2002). National Intelligence Estimate 2002-16HC, “Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction” (Declassified). https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Reports%20and%20Pubs/2002_NIE_WMD.pdf

ODNI. (2017). ICA 2017-01D: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections (Declassified). https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf

Department of State. (1994). Cable 094659 from U.S. Embassy Kigali, April 1, 1994 (Declassified under FOIA).

U.S. Department of State. (2024). Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, FY2025. https://www.state.gov/reports/fy-2025-congressional-budget-justification

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CIA Tradecraft Review: Did Russian FIS Interfere in the 2016 Election?

russia, russian foreign intelligence, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, subversion

The U.S. Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) of January 6, 2017, titled “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections,” has been released. As anticipated, it has caused fierce controversy, largely along partisan lines. The report concluded with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign aimed at the 2016 U.S. presidential election, with the explicit intent to damage Hillary Clinton’s chances and to help elect Donald J. Trump. Subsequent reviews, including the 2025 CIA Directorate of Analysis (DA) tradecraft report, have scrutinized certain aspects of the ICA’s internal work, there is no credible evidence that refutes the fundamental claim that Russian intelligence services interfered. A comprehensive review of official U.S. government investigations, independent reports, and declassified materials affirms the legitimacy of the ICA’s core finding.

I am basing this analysis on the publicly-facing document which contains some significant ‘black-out’ redactions. Those redactions do not invalidate the core of the assessment and there are good justifications for their exclusion.

What is ‘Blacked-Out’

Specific positions of CIA, FBI, and NSA personnel who contributed to the ICA or participated in internal I.C. debate have been extracted. These individuals were not publicly known figures like Director Brennan or DNI Clapper, and therefore their identities remain protected for operational security. The redactions include analytic line officers, mission center managers, and mid-level coordinators whose participation would be readily identifiable by job title or context. Protecting these names aligns with intelligence S.O.P., especially for personnel involved in sensitive political assessments.

A central redaction concerns the highly classified CIA serialized report that underpinned the ICA’s “aspired” judgment about Putin’s preference for Trump. The specific contents of this report remain classified. This is due to its likely origin from a uniquely sensitive HUMINT source or technical collection platform. The Tradecraft Review indicates that this report was narrowly held, and not serialized until December 2016, suggesting it contains material that would compromise collection methods or expose a clandestine asset if disclosed. Some sections reference analytic decisions to include or omit parts of intelligence reporting. Direct quotes or paraphrased summaries of raw intelligence that suggested alternative interpretations of Putin’s intent are logically excluded. These redactions reflect legitimate tradecraft deliberation but also contain operationally sensitive material not appropriate for public release, including specific source citations or field report language.

Portions discussing Brennan’s creation of a special Fusion Cell and the restricted access to intelligence materials omit codewords and program names related to special compartments. These would include the names of CIA internal groups or clearance levels, operational terms for sensitive works, and the identities of officers working within those projects. These redactions preserve the integrity of compartmented information management protocols and protect methodologies that may still be in use.

I firmly believe that complementary reporting was received from liaison FISs/FIEs. Redacted content in this context likely conceals the nationality, origin, or method of foreign partner contributions. Revealing such details would violate long-standing “third party rule” agreements and jeopardize future collaboration with allied intelligence services.

The Meat of the Matter

The declassified version of the ICA concluded that Russia’s goals were to “undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency,” and further, that “Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump” (ODNI, 2017). These findings were endorsed with “high confidence” by the CIA, FBI, and NSA (the latter assigning “moderate confidence”) to the judgment about Putin’s aspiration to help Trump. The ICA was the result of a coordinated effort by three key intelligence agencies and was supported by substantial intelligence reporting, including cyber forensics, human intelligence (HUMINT), and intercepted communications (SIGINT). It was not, as some media narratives have suggested, based solely on the controversial Steele Dossier, which was not used to support any key analytic judgments but was included only as an annex.

The Mueller Investigation and DOJ Indictments

Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation into Russian interference produced robust corroboration of the ICA’s central conclusions. The Mueller Report, released in 2019, found, “The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and systematic fashion” (Mueller Report, Vol. I, p. 1).” Two major components of this interference were outlined:

The Internet Research Agency (IRA): A Russian troll farm that used fake social media accounts to promote pro-Trump and anti-Clinton narratives, targeting U.S. voters with disinformation, racial division, and conspiracy theories.

Russian Military Intelligence (GRU) Operations: The GRU conducted cyber intrusions into the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta, stealing tens of thousands of emails and documents, which were strategically leaked via Wikileaks.

Twelve GRU officers were indicted by the Department of Justice in July 2018 for these operations (DOJ Indictment, 2018), establishing the direct role of Russian military intelligence in hacking and disseminating stolen data for political impact. The indictment’s forensic details, including the specific units and servers used, leave no room for ambiguity as to the perpetrators or their intentions.

Bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee Report

The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence conducted a multi-volume, bipartisan investigation into Russian interference, culminating in a 966-page final report in August 2020. The committee validated the ICA’s primary conclusions, “The Committee found that the ICA presents a coherent and well-constructed intelligence basis for the assessment that Putin and the Russian government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances” (SSCI, Volume 5, p. 6). The committee reported that the ICA was not politically driven, that dissenting views were aired, and that the analytic tradecraft was sound despite the rushed timeline. It also noted that the Russian government viewed a Trump presidency as favorable to Moscow’s interests, particularly due to Trump’s stated skepticism toward NATO and the transatlantic alliance.

Russian Messaging and Disinformation Strategy

Open-source analysis of Russian disinformation also supports the conclusion that Trump was the preferred candidate. The Hamilton 68 dashboard, maintained by the Alliance for Securing Democracy, tracked pro-Kremlin Twitter activity and documented a clear slant toward Trump, along with the propagation of hashtags and narratives attacking Clinton and promoting voter distrust.

Russian state media such as RT and Sputnik displayed markedly pro-Trump coverage and actively spread conspiracy theories about Clinton’s health, corruption, and the DNC emails (Brookings Institution, 2017). The timing and content of Wikileaks dumps were strategically synchronized with key moments in the election to maximize damage to Clinton, such as the release of Podesta’s emails hours after the Access Hollywood tape was revealed.

Intelligence Community Reassessment in 2025

The 2025 CIA Tradecraft Review, while critical of procedural anomalies, did not retract or invalidate the ICA’s conclusions. Instead, it affirmed that the “aspired” judgment, that Putin wanted Trump to win, was plausible and supported by credible evidence. However, it argued that the “high confidence” level should have been “moderate confidence” due to the reliance on a single highly classified report (Tradecraft Review, 2025, p. 6).

Even this critique, however, explicitly stated, “The DA Review does not dispute the quality and credibility of the highly classified CIA serialized report… The ICA authors’ interpretation of its meaning was most consistent with the raw intelligence” So, while advocating for stricter tradecraft standards and a more cautious confidence level assignment, the report reaffirmed that the core intelligence judgments remained defensible and well-founded.

No U.S. government entity, CIA, NSA, ODNI, or the Department of Justice, has issued a formal repudiation of the ICA’s 2017 findings. While internal reviews have called for greater transparency and adherence to tradecraft standards, no post hoc analysis has offered an alternative judgment asserting that Russia was neutral or preferred Clinton over Trump. In fact, public statements by senior Trump-era officials confirm the ICA’s findings. Former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, for instance, stated in 2018, “The Russians are still trying to influence our elections. The warning lights are blinking red again. It was Russia’s intent to interfere, and it was clearly to hurt Hillary Clinton and help Donald Trump” (DNI Coats, Aspen Security Forum, 2018).

In Summary

The claim that Russian FIS interfered in the 2016 U.S. presidential election is substantiated by a broad and consistent body of evidence from multiple independent, bipartisan, and interagency investigations. The ICA, the Mueller Report, the DOJ indictments, and the Senate Intelligence Committee’s findings converge to form a coherent narrative: that the Russian government engaged in an expansive campaign to damage Hillary Clinton and to bolster Trump’s candidacy. Attempts to discredit this conclusion relying on political framing or selective interpretation of later reviews do not withstand the weight of forensic, testimonial, and documentary evidence. While internal CIA reviews have rightly scrutinized tradecraft and process, they do not reverse the analytical consensus that Russia interfered, and did so in a manner aligned with Moscow’s preference for Trump.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). (2017). Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf

Mueller, R. S. (2019). Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election. https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf

Department of Justice. (2018). Indictment of Russian GRU Officers for DNC Hack. https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (2020). Report on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume 5. https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/report_volume5.pdf

CIA Directorate of Analysis. (2025). Tradecraft Review of the 2016 Intelligence Community Assessment on Russian Election Interference.

Brookings Institution. (2017). The Kremlin’s Strategy: Pro-Trump Coverage and Disinformation. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-russian-state-media-views-the-2016-election/

Coats, D. (2018). Remarks at Aspen Security Forum. https://www.c-span.org/video/?448718-1/dan-coats-says-warning-lights-blinking-red-russian-cyberattacks