I read an interesting article in the Wall Street Journal today, a book review of “Emperor of Rome”, by Mary Beard. While the piece focused on the untimely demise of many of the caesars, there was a short but instructive comment. “Emporer of Rome is spiced with striking comparisons. The Roman Empire functioned with about 95% fewer senior personnel than the Han Dynasty that ruled at the same time in China.” (Kyle Harper, WSJ, 10/22/2023) This small anecdote reads as if it had been a surprise finding, that a small Roman leadership circle was a Black Swan and that it bends preconceived notions about the necessity of large networks of government instrumentalities to manage an empire as large as Rome’s. It is a fallacy that large enterprises require the support of large bureaucracies. Quite to the contrary. In strategic-level management, smaller is better.
Organizational dynamics and bureaucracy are Geoffrey M. Bellman’s forté. In his work, The Consultant’s Calling, “he explains why an organization is only capable of performing to a certain level of mediocrity. Organizational structure is essential to conducting business in a modern complex society. Bellman relates that organizations are: large, awkward, and unwieldy. Usually, organizations don’t work very well because they don’t fit the human creatures who work in them. Organizations as we have built them are more mechanical than ‘organical’… we have built awkward hierarchical structures with boxes and lines connecting them. We have created structures modeled after machines–mechanistic, sharply defined, and inflexible–that force their moving human parts to act like machines too. Such organizations do not work very well … even when everything is finely in tune … there are significant difficulties.” (Bellman, 2001) The author’s commentary is prescient and instructive.
There is a ‘real world’ case study that illustrates well the concept of “smaller is better”. A master’s thesis authored by Alexander B. Calahan, COUNTERING TERRORISM: THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE 1972 MUNICH OLYMPIC MASSACRE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDEPENDENT COVERT ACTION TEAMS (Calahan, 1995) provides an excellent argument. “The important aspect of operating within organizations and systems is that by its very nature, it incorporates a predetermined limitation of success. As long as the mission operates under the constraints dictated by the organization’s structure, policies, regulations and management philosophies, it will only obtain a finite predetermined level of success. Bureaucratic processes are rigid and restrict decentralized authority and the ability to work at a continued fast and fluid pace. Government agencies must live within regulations that do not allow interpretation or flexibility for unique circumstances. Bellman related that organizations are sharply defined and do not allow flexibility. Philip K. Howard, The Death of Common Sense (1995), further demonstrates how this is magnified in government agencies: Government acts like some extraterrestrial power, not an institution that exists to serve us….It almost never deals with real-life problems in a way that reflects an understanding of the situation….Our regulatory system has become an instruction manual. It tells us and the bureaucrats exactly what to do and how to do it. Detailed rule after detailed rule addresses every eventuality, or at least every situation lawmakers and bureaucrats can think of. Is it a coincidence that almost every encounter with government is an exercise in frustration? In the decades since World War II, we have constructed a system of regulatory law that basically outlaws common sense. Modern law, in an effort to be self-executing, has shut out our humanity….The motives were logical enough: Specific legal mandates would keep government in close check and provide crisp guidelines for private citizens. But it doesn’t work. Human activity can’t be regulated without judgment by humans. Government cannot accomplish anything when multiple procedures are required for almost every decision. Process is a defensive device; the more procedures, the less government can do. Which is more important: the process or the result?” The author and his cited references are correct. Large bureaucratic organizations cannot support a dynamic operation that must think and act “on the fly”.
Calahan’s case study is an analysis of Operation Bayonet, an assassination mission in response to the massacre of Israeli Olympians and their coaches. The Mossad fielded two teams to accomplish the operation, one under strict headquarters control (“Lillehammer”) and the other (“Avner”) under none. The former was a disaster and the latter and ALMOST perfect success. The failed operation had many flaws but the most salient argument is the “micromanagement” one. Per Calahan, “However, the failure is more attributable to attempting to conduct an operation beyond the capabilities of the political bureaucracy. The officers in Lillehammer had more than adequate training and skills; however, the organization forced them to abandon proven tradecraft procedures to accomplish the assassination of Salameh under unreasonable tactical conditions. X allowed political pressure to dictate the pace of the operation beyond what he knew was reasonably necessary for success within the bureaucracy.” (Calahan, 1995)
The successful operation enjoyed an autonomy that ultimately achieved the operation’s objective. ” . . . Avner’s team was designed outside the political realm of the Mossad. Avner’s team would not institute shortcuts bowing to political influences that might jeopardize the success of the mission. Quality operations demand quality people involved and quality planning from the outset. The Mossad team members understood that they would operate in a covert capacity until the successful completion of the mission or the team was no longer able to operate intact due to injuries or deaths. They were to remain a cohesive unit. The unit learned and understood each others’ skill, abilities, and limitations, planning and operating accordingly.” (Calahan, 1995) Small, tight and capable teams with more “hands off” oversight was key.
“Walmart CEO Doug McMillon calls it “a villain.” Berkshire Hathaway vice chair Charlie Munger says its tentacles should be treated like “the cancers they so much resemble.” Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase, agrees that bureaucracy is “a disease.” These leaders understand that bureaucracy saps initiative, inhibits risk taking, and crushes creativity. It’s a tax on human achievement.” (Hammel and Zanini, HBR, 2018) In the covert operation subject of Calahan’s case study, as in the private corporate sector, smaller is better. So did the Roman caesars manage the empire with a small leadership cadre by design, eschewing the idea that large bureaucracies were necessary to the state, or was their design utilitarian, i.e., keep your enemies close? Either way, the Emperor of Rome has apparently stumbled on one of the most important observations on successful management of a team, . . . a lesson for leadership when strategic planning.
