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The Retracted Intelligence Report on TdA

The Retracted Intelligence Report on Tren de Aragua, espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence, strategic intelligence, national security, C. Constantin Poindexter;

The recent retraction of a National Security Agency (NSA) report on Venezuela and the Tren de Aragua (TdA) criminal gang highlights the tension between intelligence assessments and political narratives. The danger of politicization of intelligence work is front and center here. It’s reasonably clear here that the DNI denied release of the full intelligence product because it did not align neatly with the current Administration’s assertions about TdA and Venezuelan President Maduro’s direction, financing and control over its nefarious activities. Boris Bondarev, former diplomat of the Russian Federation reported on his experience in a Far East assignment, “One day, I was called to meet with the embassy’s number three official, a quiet, middle-aged diplomat who had joined the foreign ministry during the Soviet era. He handed me text from a cable from Moscow, which I was told to incorporate into a document we would deliver to Cambodian authorities. Noticing several typos, I told him that I would correct them. “Don’t do that!” he shot back. “We got the text straight from Moscow. They know better. Even if there are errors, it’s not up to us to correct the center.” It was emblematic of what would become a growing trend in the ministry: unquestioned deference to leaders.” (Foreign Affairs, Nov. 2022) The example is instructive of what we do NOT want to be.

The report, “Venezuela: Examining Regime Ties to Tren de Aragua,” declassified in May 2025, offers an analytic picture that contradicts claims made by U.S. political leaders that Nicolás Maduro is actively engaged in supporting, financing, and directing TdA. The NIC assessment concludes that while the gang has benefitted from a permissive environment in Venezuela, including corruption and weak institutional control, there is no credible evidence that Maduro or senior regime officials exercise command over the group. This retraction is striking because it underscores how intelligence assessments that fail to support policy preferences may be subject to extraordinary pressure, despite their analytic rigor.

The NIC report is clear in its findings. It states that TdA leaders have historically benefitted from permissive conditions in Venezuela, particularly weak prison oversight and corrupt officials. That is NO surprise to those of us who have operated in corrupt Latin American states. Yet it stresses that many TdA cells operate independently across Latin America, with limited coordination even among themselves, let alone with the Venezuelan government (NIC 2025). The report underscores that much of TDA’s growth has been facilitated by Venezuelan migration and that individuals and networks frequently use the gang’s name without direct affiliation, underscoring the decentralized and diffuse nature of the group. Crucially, the report states that there is “no indication that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro or senior government officials are directing the actions of Tren de Aragua,” contradicting claims that Maduro orchestrates the group’s activities (AP News 2025).

The report does allow that some mid- and low-level Venezuelan officials may have financial ties to TdA. Such connections are typically opportunistic, involving corruption or passive tolerance, rather than the product of a coherent state policy (NIC 2025). In this sense, regime responsibility lies less in the deliberate deployment of the gang as a proxy and more in the systemic weakness of governance that allows TdA to operate with impunity. This distinction is critical: corruption and negligence do not equate to strategic coordination or sponsorship. Yet political leaders have blurred this line by portraying TdA as a regime-directed instrument of repression and transnational crime.

Redactions in the NIC report shed further light on analytic processes. Although redactions obscure details, we can reasonably infer that they conceal the names of regime-linked individuals, sources and methods of intelligence collection, or details about TdA’s operations abroad. In intelligence practice, such redactions protect human sources, sensitive communications intercepts, and law enforcement leads. Notably, the report’s unredacted portions are explicit in their rejection of senior-level regime direction. Given classification practices, it is unlikely that redacted sections would conceal evidence directly contradicting the assessment’s core conclusion, since that would undermine the transparency and credibility of the report’s stated findings (NIC 2025).

Other credible sources reinforce the NIC’s position. Associated Press reporting on the document emphasizes that there is no evidence of Maduro’s direct involvement, while acknowledging that some regime actors might benefit from TdA’s activities (AP News 2025). Investigations by InSight Crime and The Guardian further show that certain monitors and advocacy groups have exaggerated TdA’s presence in the United States, even fabricating reports of its activity (InSight Crime 2025; The Guardian 2025). By contrast, organizations such as the Human Rights Foundation (HRF) argue that regime-linked actors used TdA in the abduction of Venezuelan dissident Ronald Ojeda in Chile in 2024. A more definitive answer to the question of Maduro’s involvement with TdA may have come from Ojeda. Unfortunately, he was liquidated by the regime. Perhaps the Chilean criminal information to the ICC will reveal more. The allegations remain under judicial investigation and do not yet amount to definitive evidence of direct command by Maduro himself (HRF 2025). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) both highlight Venezuela’s permissive environment for illicit financial flows and organized crime, but stress that corruption at lower levels is more prevalent than systematic state direction (GAO 2023; CRS 2024).

When these sources are synthesized, a consistent analytic picture emerges. Venezuela under Maduro provides an enabling environment for organized crime, but this is the result of systemic corruption, institutional incapacity, and deliberate tolerance by some officials, not top-level strategic direction. TDA operates as a decentralized criminal network whose spread is tied to transnational migration and weak law enforcement, not to state financing or command. The strongest claims, that Maduro is personally orchestrating TdA’s financing and direction, misrepresent available evidence and are not supported by credible intelligence or rigorous analysis. This distinction is not trivial: overstating threats distorts policymaking and risks politicizing intelligence.

The retraction of the NIC report under the leadership of DNI Tulsi Gabbard underscores the sensitivity of such findings. According to reporting, Gabbard ordered the recall of a classified report on Venezuela even after NSA officials confirmed that it met analytic and procedural standards (WRAL 2025). This action illustrates the pressures intelligence agencies face when their findings contradict prevailing political narratives. While intelligence must consider the risks of exposing sources and methods, recalling a report that undermines a presidential claim risks signaling politicization and undermining the credibility of the intelligence community.

It is important to concede some counterarguments. Intelligence reports are limited by available sources, and the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Covert relationships between regime actors and TdA may exist beyond the reach of collection or declassification. Allegations such as those emerging in Chile may eventually provide more conclusive evidence. However, at present, the preponderance of credible sources supports the NIC’s conclusion that Maduro is not directly directing or financing TdA. Until more conclusive evidence emerges, policymaking should be grounded in this nuanced understanding.

Ultimately, the retraction of the NIC report raises broader questions about the role of intelligence in our governance. The U.S. intelligence community’s credibility depends on its ability to provide unbiased, apolitical assessments to policymakers, even when those assessments contradict political preferences. Intelligence that is shaped by politics rather than evidence undermines both domestic and international credibility. For policymakers, basing decisions on politicized claims risks misallocation of resources, legal overreach, and diplomatic missteps. For the public, it threatens the erosion of trust in government institutions and more specifically the I.C. It is imperative that the DNI ensures that analytic judgments reflect the best available evidence, acknowledges uncertainties, and resists the politicization of intelligence regardless if she falls out of favor with the Administration. Only through integrity in production and delivery to the consumer can intelligence provide a sound foundation for policy in matters as consequential as Venezuela’s transnational criminal networks.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

AP News. 2025. “Declassified Intelligence Memo Contradicts Trump’s Claims Linking Gang to Venezuelan Government.” May 6, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/d818cc58962ba90cd2c94ca1b494d4fd
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Congressional Research Service (CRS). 2024. Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy. CRS Report IF10230. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10230
.

GAO (Government Accountability Office). 2023. Venezuela: Illicit Financial Flows and U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Them. GAO-23-105668. https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105668
.

Human Rights Foundation (HRF). 2025. “Venezuela’s Maduro Continues to Use Tren de Aragua for Transnational Repression, Kidnapping, Assassination.” April 25, 2025. https://hrf.org/latest/venezuelas-maduro-continues-to-use-tren-de-aragua-for-transnational-repression-kidnapping-assassination/
.

National Intelligence Council (NIC). 2025. Venezuela: Examining Regime Ties to Tren de Aragua. Case No. DF-2025-00379, declassified May 5, 2025.

The Guardian. 2025. “Trump Defense Official Led Think Tank that Spread Lies about Tren de Aragua.” August 13, 2025. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/aug/13/joseph-humire-thinktank-tren-de-aragua
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WRAL. 2025. “DNI Gabbard Recalls Classified Report on Venezuela in Highly Unusual Move.” May 2025. https://www.wral.com/story/dni-gabbard-recalls-classified-report-on-venezuela-in-highly-unusual-move/22152236/
.

Foreign Affairs. “Sources: Russia Misconduct – Boris Bondarev.” [n.d.]. “Sources: Russia Misconduct – Boris Bondarev,” Foreign Affairs. Accessed [insert access date]. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/sources-russia-misconduct-boris-bondarev

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La vigilancia del ingreso de extranjeros como eje estratégico de prevención pandémica en la República Dominicana

La Amenaza Pandemica y la República Dominicana, inteligencia, vigilancia, C. Constantin Poindexter, J2, DNI

La llegada de personas extranjeras, ya sean turistas, trabajadores temporales, migrantes o demás, constituye uno de los vectores críticos mediante los cuales nuevas enfermedades infecciosas pueden introducirse en el territorio nacional. Dado que la República Dominicana es un país de alta exposición internacional por su sector turístico, sus conexiones aéreas y marítimas, y su proximidad geográfica con Haití, los riesgos asociados a pandemias demandan que la inteligencia nacional y los mecanismos de vigilancia fronteriza se fortalezcan. ¿Cuáles serían los costos potenciales y qué mecanismos son necesarios para mitigar dicho riesgo?

La República Dominicana es uno de los destinos turísticos más visitados del Caribe. En 2022 ingresaron al país más de 8.5 millones de turistas, incluidos más de 2.5 millones provenientes de Estados Unidos y Canadá, lo que la convierte en la nación más visitada de la región caribeña (CDC 2023). Este alto flujo internacional acentúa la posibilidad de importar agentes patógenos. Durante emergencias sanitarias globales, la movilidad internacional se ha demostrado como uno de los principales factores de propagación: no solo por el movimiento de personas infectadas, sino por portadores asintomáticos que se desplazan antes de desarrollar síntomas.

Un ejemplo concreto de esta vulnerabilidad se observó al inicio de la pandemia de COVID-19 en la República Dominicana. El primer caso confirmado fue de una persona que había ingresado desde Italia, y otro de un ciudadano canadiense, turistas vacacionando en Bayahibe (Wikipedia 2023a). Este patrón evidencia que los vínculos internacionales, i.e., turismo, viajes de placer o negocios, pueden ser la puerta de entrada para pandemias respiratorias virales, patógenos nuevos o variantes emergentes. La vigilancia de las fronteras (aéreas, marítimas, terrestres) y de los puntos de entrada de personas debe comprender estrategias integrales de detección temprana, cuarentena, rastreo de contactos y normas sanitarias obligatorias.

Además de los riesgos epidemiológicos, existen vulnerabilidades estructurales que agravan el peligro de una pandemia originada por la llegada de extranjeros. El sistema de salud tiene capacidad limitada para responder a brotes súbitos de enfermedades altamente contagiosas, quiere decir, número de camas de cuidados intensivos, concentración de personal médico especializado, escasez de insumos críticos como ventiladores o equipos de protección. Segundo, la densidad poblacional en zonas urbanas como Santo Domingo y Santiago favorece la transmisión comunitaria si no se identifican rápidamente los casos importados. También, la economía informal, presente en ciudades y zonas turísticas, dificulta la implementación de cuarentenas sin causar severos impactos sociales y económicos. Los costos de una pandemia causada o agravada por el ingreso de extranjeros sin control pueden ser múltiples: aumento de casos y muertes, colapso del sistema sanitario, pérdidas económicas por cierres, interrupción del turismo, desempleo masivo, impacto en la imagen internacional del país, disminución de inversiones extranjeras y acumulación de deuda pública si se requieren medidas extraordinarias. Dado que el turismo representa aproximadamente un 11.6 % del Producto Interno Bruto dominicano y es fuente importante de divisas, cualquier afectación al flujo de visitantes puede generar daños macroeconómicos significativos (Wikipedia 2023b).

Por todo ello, es esencial que la inteligencia dominicana (el conjunto de agencias y unidades de vigilancia epidemiológica, migratoria y de seguridad nacional) incluya como prioridad la vigilancia de la entrada de extranjeros con un enfoque preventivo. Esto implicaría varios componentes concretos.

El control sanitario en puntos de entrada: implementación de protocolos obligatorios de salud en aeropuertos, puertos y pasos fronterizos terrestres, tales como monitoreo de temperatura, pruebas diagnósticas (PCR, antígenos), declaración de salud previa al vuelo y cuarentenas obligatorias cuando lo requiera la situación.

La integración de inteligencia epidemiológica y migratoria: coordinación entre autoridades migratorias, salud pública, fuerzas de seguridad y agencias de inteligencia para compartir datos de vuelos, pasajeros, historiales epidemiológicos de regiones de origen, e identificar vuelos o rutas de alto riesgo.

La vigilancia internacional de brotes: mantener monitoreo constante de las alertas sanitarias internacionales, especialmente en los países de los cuales provienen grandes flujos de turistas o migrantes. Si surge un brote nuevo en un país con fuerte conexión con República Dominicana, activar protocolos especiales.

La capacitación, infraestructura y recursos: fortalecer la capacidad de los laboratorios nacionales, mejorar el sistema de atención en salud pública, disponer de equipos y espacios para aislamiento, así como personal entrenado para respuesta rápida. Esto también incluye la mejora de los procedimientos sanitarios en hoteles, resorts y transporte, que son puntos de encuentro entre nacionales y extranjeros.

Las políticas legales y regulaciones claras: etablecer leyes y normativas que permitan imponer medidas sanitarias (vacunaciones, pruebas previas al viaje, cuarentenas), con bases legales robustas y con respeto a los derechos humanos. Además, mecanismos para sancionar incumplimientos sin afectar excesivamente los flujos legítimos de personas.

La comunicación pública transparente y la cooperación internacional: informar claramente a la ciudadanía sobre riesgos y medidas tomadas, y contar con acuerdos con otros países para coordinar protocolos, especialmente en emergencias sanitarias.

La vigilancia de extranjeros no significa adoptar políticas cerradas o xenófobas, sino gestionar la movilidad internacional de forma responsable, balanceando la apertura con la protección sanitaria. En un mundo globalizado, los países no están aislados y el cierre total no siempre es viable ni deseable por sus impactos económicos y sociales. Sin embargo, ignorar la posibilidad de ingreso de enfermedades nuevas o reemergentes a través de visitantes es jugar con fuego. Dada la importancia estratégica del turismo y la conexión internacional de la República Dominicana, los órganos de inteligencia y vigilancia fronteriza deben reconocer que la entrada de extranjeros constituye un vector de riesgo significativo en una pandemia. La prevención activa, mediante control sanitario, inteligencia epidemiológica, fortalecimiento institucional y regulaciones, puede mitigar ese riesgo. No hacerlo, nos traerá consecuencias sanitarias, sociales, económicas y reputacionales graves. Imperativo es que nuestras instituciones incluyan como prioridad la vigilancia proactiva del ingreso de no nacionales, como parte integral de la preparación y respuesta ante futuras pandemias.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter Salcedo, M.A. en Inteligencia, J.D., Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

Bibliografía

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 2023. Dominican Republic | Yellow Book. Atlanta: CDC. https://www.cdc.gov/yellow-book/hcp/americas-caribbean/dominican-republic.html.

Wikipedia. 2023a. COVID-19 Pandemic in the Dominican Republic. Last modified September 10, 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COVID-19_pandemic_in_the_Dominican_Republic.

Wikipedia. 2023b. Tourism in the Dominican Republic. Last modified August 14, 2023. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tourism_in_the_Dominican_Republic

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El precedente de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la República Dominicana sobre el “tercer envío”: análisis doctrinal y repercusiones procesales

Suprema de la República Dominicana, abogado, abodadas, bufete legal, judicial, Republica Dominicana, C. Constantin Poindexter Salcedo;

La Suprema Corte de Justicia (SCJ) de la República Dominicana, en su sentencia SCJ-SR-24-0188 de 29 de noviembre de 2024, emitida por las Salas Reunidas, marcó un hito jurisprudencial al prohibir el llamado “tercer envío” en casación. La decisión estableció que, cuando un litigio ha sido ya devuelto en dos ocasiones a instancias inferiores, la Corte debe resolver el fondo mediante un fallo directo, cerrando definitivamente el ciclo procesal. Este viraje tiene una trascendencia singular: no solo redefine los contornos del recurso de casación en el ordenamiento dominicano, sino que también introduce un correctivo frente a la dilación excesiva de los procesos.

El objetivo de este ensayo es analizar el contenido del fallo, su fundamento legal, la doctrina procesal que sienta y las implicaciones para el sistema judicial dominicano, tanto en términos de eficiencia como de garantías procesales.

Contexto normativo del recurso de casación

El recurso de casación en la República Dominicana está regulado principalmente por la Ley núm. 2-23 sobre Recurso de Casación, promulgada en febrero de 2023. Esta ley introdujo reglas más estrictas para la admisibilidad y la resolución de los recursos, buscando equilibrar dos valores en tensión: la seguridad jurídica y la tutela judicial efectiva. En este marco, el artículo 78 de la Ley 2-23 dispone expresamente que no procede un tercer reenvío. En caso de que un asunto llegue a esa instancia, la SCJ debe resolver el fondo, evitando así la perpetuación indefinida de litigios (SCJ 2024). Antes de esta disposición, la práctica judicial permitía múltiples reenvíos, lo que producía ciclos procesales de larga duración y cuestionaba la eficacia del sistema.

La decisión SCJ-SR-24-0188

La sentencia de las Salas Reunidas resuelve un asunto que había atravesado ya dos ciclos de casación y reenvío. Al conocer el caso en su tercera llegada, la Corte enfrentó la disyuntiva de continuar con la tradición de devolverlo a instancias inferiores o aplicar de manera directa la disposición del artículo 78. La SCJ optó por la segunda vía, señalando que la prohibición del tercer reenvío es categórica y que, por ende, la Corte estaba compelida a emitir un fallo de fondo. En consecuencia, anuló lo que consideró viciado en las decisiones anteriores y, en el mismo acto, dictó sentencia resolviendo el mérito del litigio. Lo relevante no es solo la decisión concreta, sino la construcción doctrinal que la acompaña. La Corte fundamentó que el fallo directo no vulnera el debido proceso siempre que las partes hayan tenido oportunidad plena de presentar pruebas y alegatos en instancias anteriores. Asimismo, indicó que el rol de las Salas Reunidas es precisamente garantizar la uniformidad y cierre definitivo de los ciclos casacionales (Suprema Corte de Justicia 2024).

Doctrina fijada por la SCJ

El fallo establece tres principios doctrinales de enorme envergadura:

Prohibición absoluta del tercer reenvío. Una vez que un caso ha sido reenviado en dos ocasiones, la SCJ tiene la obligación de resolver el fondo.

Competencia de las Salas Reunidas. El caso debe ser conocido por el pleno de las Salas Reunidas, reforzando así la idea de que la cuestión reviste trascendencia y requiere uniformidad jurisprudencial.

Fallo directo. La Corte puede dictar una sentencia que combine la anulación de lo viciado con la resolución del mérito, sin necesidad de convocar nuevas audiencias, salvo que lo considere indispensable para la garantía de derechos.

Estos elementos configuran una nueva técnica de decisión en casación, alineada con modelos procesales comparados que priorizan la economía procesal.

Implicaciones procesales y sociales

Reducción de la dilación procesal

El impacto más inmediato es la disminución de la duración de los procesos. Antes del precedente, existían litigios que podían prolongarse durante más de una década debido a múltiples reenvíos. La decisión corta de raíz esa posibilidad y obliga a la SCJ a clausurar el conflicto en un máximo de tres ciclos.

Refuerzo de la seguridad jurídica

La seguridad jurídica se ve fortalecida en la medida en que las partes tienen la certeza de que, tras un segundo reenvío, el asunto recibirá una decisión definitiva. Ello reduce la incertidumbre y desincentiva tácticas dilatorias.

Equilibrio con el debido proceso

Uno de los principales cuestionamientos a este modelo es el riesgo de que un fallo directo pueda vulnerar el derecho de defensa si las partes no hubieran tenido oportunidad plena de alegar y probar. La SCJ respondió a esta objeción argumentando que la posibilidad de defensa se agota en las instancias previas y que el fallo directo opera sobre un expediente ya consolidado (SCJ 2024).

Impacto institucional

Finalmente, la decisión contribuye a la consolidación de las Salas Reunidas como órgano de cierre definitivo. Esto refuerza su rol de garante de la uniformidad jurisprudencial y su capacidad de producir precedentes vinculantes.

Comparación con experiencias extranjeras

El modelo adoptado por la SCJ tiene paralelismos en otras jurisdicciones. En Francia, por ejemplo, la Cour de cassation también ha limitado históricamente los reenvíos múltiples, privilegiando el fallo definitivo en tercera instancia (Cadiet 2018). En América Latina, países como Colombia y Chile han experimentado reformas similares para evitar el desgaste procesal y fortalecer la seguridad jurídica (Uprimny 2015).

La adopción de este criterio en República Dominicana evidencia una tendencia regional hacia la eficiencia procesal y la uniformidad jurisprudencial.

Conclusión

La sentencia SCJ-SR-24-0188 de 29 de noviembre de 2024 constituye uno de los precedentes más significativos de la Suprema Corte de Justicia dominicana en los últimos años. Al prohibir el tercer reenvío y obligar al fallo directo, la Corte introduce un cambio estructural en la práctica casacional, alineado con los principios de economía procesal, seguridad jurídica y tutela judicial efectiva. Más allá del caso concreto, la decisión inaugura una nueva etapa en la cultura procesal dominicana, donde la prolongación indefinida de litigios deja de ser posible. Se trata, sin duda, de un paso firme hacia un sistema judicial más ágil, predecible y eficiente.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter Salcedo, M.A. en Inteligencia, J.D., Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

Referencias

Cadiet, L. (2018). La cassation en droit comparé: une étude sur la fonction de la Cour de cassation. París: Dalloz.

Suprema Corte de Justicia (SCJ). (2024). Sentencia SCJ-SR-24-0188, Salas Reunidas, 29 de noviembre de 2024. Santo Domingo, República Dominicana.

Uprimny, R. (2015). La tutela judicial efectiva y la economía procesal en América Latina. Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.

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Conduct Not Becoming: Alleged U.S.-Linked Interference in Greenland

intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, spy, spies, subversion operations, c. constantin poindexter

In August 2025, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the chargé d’affaires of the United States Embassy in Copenhagen after revelations by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) that several Americans linked to the U.S. Presidential Administration had engaged in covert political activities in Greenland. According to the reporting, these individuals compiled lists of Greenlanders categorized as “pro-U.S.” or “anti-Trump,” cultivated ties with local elites, and promoted narratives designed to widen divisions between Nuuk and Copenhagen (PBS NewsHour 2025; Associated Press 2025). The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) emphasized that Greenland remains a primary target for foreign interference operations, echoing earlier warnings that external actors could exploit or fabricate political disagreements within the Kingdom of Denmark (Al Jazeera 2025). These revelations, coupled with Denmark’s unusually direct diplomatic response, illustrate the characteristics of a malign influence or subversive operation and highlight the potential damage such activities can inflict on U.S. national security, particularly by undermining liaison trust with Denmark, arguably one of Washington’s most important intelligence partners.

Characteristics of a Malign Influence Operation

Malign influence operations are typically defined by certain recurring attributes: plausible deniability, use of cut-outs or intermediaries, audience mapping and segmentation, amplification of divisive narratives, and efforts aimed at shaping decision-making environments rather than openly persuading through argument. The Greenland episode, as described by DR and reported internationally, bears all of these hallmarks.

Plausible deniability was central to the actor’s positioning. Officials stressed that the government does not direct or control the actions of private citizens, even though the actors were reportedly politically connected to the Administration (PBS NewsHour 2025). Such disavowals allow states to shield themselves from direct accountability while benefiting from the effects of covert activity.

The use of cut-outs and informal networks appears evident. The alleged operatives were not formal embassy staff operating under Chief of Mission authority but instead American nationals cultivating relationships with Greenlandic political and business figures. This indirect approach mirrors tradecraft seen in both Cold War–era and contemporary influence campaigns, allowing sponsors to maintain distance while pursuing strategic objectives (Associated Press 2025).

The activity involved audience segmentation, as evidenced by the preparation of lists distinguishing sympathetic Greenlanders from opponents. Such mapping is a well-established precursor to micro-targeted persuasion and coalition-building (Rudbeck 2020).

The operation sought to exploit existing grievances. Greenland has a long history of tension regarding its relationship with Copenhagen, particularly concerning autonomy and resource management. PET has publicly warned that adversaries attempt to “promote or amplify particular viewpoints” in Greenland to exacerbate these tensions (Al Jazeera 2025). By pressing sovereignty-oriented narratives, the actors aligned with known fault lines.

The activities pursued a strategic effect on governance: nudging Greenland’s politics toward greater separation from Denmark or, at minimum, intensifying friction between Copenhagen and Nuuk. This fits the definition of a malign influence campaign, which aims not merely to influence public opinion but to shift the constitutional or strategic environment of the target polity (Fleshman et al. 2020).

Greenland’s Strategic Importance

Understanding why Denmark reacted so firmly requires recognition of Greenland’s immense strategic value. The island hosts Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base), the northernmost U.S. military installation. Pituffik is critical to ballistic missile early warning, missile defense, and space surveillance missions, particularly through the 12th Space Warning Squadron, which tracks ballistic launches and supports U.S. Space Force operations (U.S. Space Force 2024). Pituffik’s radar and space-tracking systems are a vital component of NATO deterrence, as they enable early detection of potential Russian or other adversary launches.

Beyond Pituffik, Greenland’s geography makes it indispensable to North Atlantic security. The island sits astride the Greenland–Iceland–U.K. (GIUK) gap, a maritime chokepoint central to monitoring Russian submarine traffic from the Barents Sea into the North Atlantic. As the Arctic becomes increasingly contested due to climate change and resource competition, Greenland’s location at the intersection of North America and Europe magnifies its strategic importance.

Equally significant is Denmark’s intelligence capability. The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) and PET are widely regarded as among the most capable small-state services, particularly in signals intelligence, counterintelligence, cyber and Arctic domain awareness. FE’s Intelligence Risk Assessment 2024 explicitly identifies Greenland as a frontline in great-power competition (Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2024). As such, Denmark is one of Washington’s most important intelligence liaisons, and trust in this relationship is crucial to U.S. and NATO security.

Damage to U.S. National Security

From a U.S. perspective, even if the federal government neither authorized nor directed the actions of the Americans involved, the perception of interference inflicts real costs. Four national security risks stand out.

Such activities risk eroding liaison trust. Intelligence sharing relies on reciprocity and respect for sovereignty. If Denmark perceives that the United States tolerates or encourages efforts to manipulate the Kingdom’s internal affairs, Danish services may hesitate to share sensitive information or to cooperate fully in Arctic monitoring. Trust, once diminished, is difficult to rebuild (Danish Defence Intelligence Service 2024).

Malign influence in Greenland undermines coordinated Arctic policy. Pituffik’s continued operation depends on alignment among Copenhagen, Nuuk, and Washington. Any perception that the U.S. is fueling secessionist sentiment in Greenland complicates base access negotiations, environmental approvals, and trilateral defense arrangements. Diplomatic friction could translate into delays or restrictions that weaken early warning and space-tracking capabilities (Associated Press 2025).

Such revelations hand adversaries narrative ammunition. Russia and China have long sought to depict the United States as hypocritical in its advocacy for sovereignty and democratic norms. A Danish finding that U.S.-linked actors engaged in subversive activity in Greenland would provide propaganda fodder for Moscow and Beijing, undermining U.S. credibility in NATO and in multilateral Arctic governance forums (Al Jazeera 2025).

These operations jeopardize operational continuity at Pituffik. Strategic deterrence depends on uninterrupted coverage of missile warning and space tracking. Political discord that affects budgets, labor relations, or local sentiment in Greenland could generate friction costs that weaken U.S. posture in the High North (U.S. Space Force 2024).

Theoretical Framing: Rudbeck and Malign Influence

Emma Rudbeck’s (2020) master’s thesis on foreign interference in Greenland provides an instructive framework. Applying Applied History and strategic narrative theory, Rudbeck argues that interference by major powers in Greenland echoes Cold War–era dynamics and threatens the concept of “Arctic Exceptionalism,” which had long portrayed the region as insulated from great-power rivalry. She concludes that Denmark must prepare for sustained interference by China, Russia, and the United States, and recommends a proactive Arctic strategy that emphasizes resilience and narrative management. Rudbeck’s insights align with the Greenland episode. The use of covert actors to segment populations and inflame tensions fits her description of “strategic narratives” designed to reshape perceptions of sovereignty and autonomy. By treating Greenland not as a neutral space but as contested political terrain, the alleged U.S.-linked operatives validated Rudbeck’s claim that interference is no longer limited to Russia or China but includes Washington itself. From Denmark’s perspective, this raises uncomfortable questions about the reliability of its closest ally.

Assessing the “Deception Operation” Frame

Denmark’s choice to summon the U.S. envoy demonstrates that it viewed the incident not as isolated private advocacy but as a coherent deception operation. The tactics of covert list-building, elite cultivation, and narrative seeding abroad reflect classic subversive tradecraft, intended to give the false impression of grassroots political momentum. PET has warned precisely about such techniques, noting that foreign influence in Greenland often seeks to “amplify particular viewpoints” to sow division (Al Jazeera 2025). This aligns with broader theoretical work on deception and influence, which emphasizes how adversaries shape decision environments by hiding their involvement (Fleshman et al. 2020).

We Need to Assure Copenhagen that “This isn’t who we are”

The Greenland case illustrates how malign influence can damage alliances even when conducted by non-official actors. Mitigating this damage will require visible U.S. steps: clear ministerial-level assurances to Copenhagen, tighter deconfliction to ensure all outreach in Greenland is coordinated through embassy channels, and symbolic trilateral initiatives with Denmark and Greenland to demonstrate respect for the Kingdom’s internal constitutional order. Absent such efforts, suspicion of U.S. duplicity may persist, weakening NATO cohesion at a time when Arctic security is increasingly central.

The alleged Administration-linked interference in Greenland demonstrates the characteristics of a malign influence operation: plausible deniability, cut-outs, audience segmentation, exploitation of grievances, and pursuit of strategic effects on governance. Greenland’s unique importance to U.S. defense posture and Denmark’s role as an elite intelligence ally magnify the stakes. By alienating Copenhagen, such operations risk degrading liaison trust, undermining trilateral defense cooperation, handing adversaries propaganda, and jeopardizing early-warning missions at Pituffik. Rudbeck’s (2020) analysis underscores that Greenland is no longer insulated from great-power rivalry, and that even allies may engage in subversive activity. For the United States, this episode should serve as a cautionary reminder that short-term political maneuvering can yield long-term strategic perils, especially when it undermines the trust of one of its most vital partners in the Arctic.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

References

Al Jazeera. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Trump Allies’ Alleged Greenland Interference.” Al Jazeera, August 28, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/28/denmark-summons-us-envoy-over-trump-allies-greenland.

Associated Press. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Alleged Trump Allies’ Interference in Greenland.” AP News, August 28, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/denmark-greenland-us-trump-6c9544314792cf1e287e21af06111c1e.

Danish Defence Intelligence Service. 2024. Intelligence Risk Assessment 2024. Copenhagen: FE. https://fe-ddis.dk/en.

Fleshman, William, Jennifer L. Larson, and Christopher Paul. 2020. “Deception and the Strategy of Influence.” arXiv preprint arXiv:2011.01331.

PBS NewsHour. 2025. “Denmark Summons US Envoy over Claims of Interference in Greenland.” PBS NewsHour, August 28, 2025. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/denmark-summons-u-s-envoy-over-claims-of-interference-in-greenland.

Rudbeck, Emma. 2020. How Should the Kingdom of Denmark React to the Increased Chinese, Russian, and U.S. Interference in Greenland in Its Coming Arctic Strategy? Master’s thesis, University of Southern Denmark. https://thesis.sdu.dk/download?id=2260.

U.S. Space Force. 2024. “12th Space Warning Squadron, Pituffik Space Base.” Fact Sheet, Department of the Air Force. https://www.spaceforce.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/
.

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Artificial Intelligence and Offensive Counterintelligence in the U.S. I.C.

counterintelligence, intelligence, espionage, counterespionage, espia, spy, spies, contrainteligencia, contraespionaje, c. constantin poindexter, J2, CNI, DNI

Artificial intelligence is transforming the national security landscape by augmenting the capabilities of intelligence organizations to “identify, disrupt, and neutralize adversarial threats”. While much scholarly and policy attention has been devoted to the defensive applications of AI, i.e., cybersecurity, threat detection, and insider threat monitoring, implications for offensive counterintelligence (CI) are equally profound. Offensive counterintelligence, which involves proactive measures to manipulate, exploit, or dismantle adversarial intelligence operations, has traditionally depended on human ingenuity, deception, and long-term HUMINT. The introduction of AI into this realm promises to exponentially increase the scale, speed, and sophistication of U.S. counterintelligence campaigns. The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) will become more effective at penetration of FIS, deception operations, and neutralization of espionage activities.

One of the most significant ways AI will enhance offensive counterintelligence is through advanced pattern recognition and anomaly detection across massive data streams. The IC already ingests petabytes of information daily, from open-source intelligence (OSINT) to signals intelligence (SIGINT). Offensive counterintelligence officers have historically been hobbled by fragmentary reports and painfully dry and drawn-out analysis to identify foreign intelligence officers, their networks, and their vulnerabilities. Machine learning algorithms now enable CI analysts to identify subtle anomalies in communications metadata, financial transactions, or travel records that suggest covert operational behavior. Algorithms trained on known espionage tradecraft can detect anomalies in mobile phone usage, repeated travel to consular facilities, or encrypted message timing that would elude traditional analysis (Carter, 2020). By automating the detection of clandestine activity, AI provides offensive CI officers with early targeting leads for recruitment, deception, or disruption.

AI’s role in predictive modeling of adversary behavior is a game-changer. Traditional counterintelligence operations have required years of painstaking collection before a service could anticipate an adversary’s moves. Now, reinforcement learning and predictive analytics can generate probabilistic models of how foreign intelligence services will act under specific conditions. This capability is invaluable for offensive CI, in which anticipating an adversary’s agent recruitment attempts or technical collection strategies and techniques allows the U.S. to insert double agents, conduct controlled leaks, or channel disinformation in ways that compromise foreign intelligence effectiveness (Treverton & Miles, 2021). By simulating adversary decision-making processes and Loops, AI effectively allows the IC to wage a chess match several moves ahead, shifting initiative in favor of U.S. operators.

AI will transform deception operations, a core element of offensive counterintelligence. Deception requires constructing credible false narratives, fabricating convincing documents, and sustaining elaborate covers. Generative AI models provide new tools for producing synthetic but convincing content, i.e., emails, social media profiles, deepfake videos, etc., that can be deployed to manipulate adversarial intelligence targets. These capabilities enable more robust false-flag operations, digital honeypots, and disinformation campaigns designed to lure adversary collectors into traps or consume their resources chasing fabricated leads. Deepfake technology raises concerns about disinformation in democratic societies, however, if deployed in a tightly controlled counterintelligence context it becomes a force multiplier, providing scalable deception tools that previously demanded enormous human and material resources (Brundage et al., 2018).

AI enhances the identification and exploitation of recruitment opportunities, central to offensive CI operations. The IC has long relied on spotting, assessing, and recruiting human assets with access and placement. AI-driven analysis of social media, professional networks, and digital exhaust enables rapid identification of individuals with access, grievances, or vulnerabilities suitable for recruitment. Natural language processing (NLP) tools can detect sentiment, stress, or dissatisfaction in posts, while network analysis maps reveal connections within bureaucracies or security services (Greitens, 2019). By narrowing down large populations to high-value recruitment targets, AI augments human case officer ability to prioritize approaches and customize persuasion angles. The integration of AI with human tradecraft accelerates the traditionally slow and resource-intensive recruitment cycle.

Cyber counterintelligence represents another frontier where AI confers offensive advantages. FISs increasingly operate in cyberspace, exfiltrating sensitive data and conducting influence campaigns. AI-enabled intrusion detection, combined with offensive cyber capabilities, allows U.S. counterintelligence to not only identify intrusions but also manipulate them. AI can facilitate “active defense” strategies in which foreign intelligence hackers are fed false or misleading data, undermining their confidence in purloined data. Automated adversarial machine learning tools can also detect attempts by foreign services to poison U.S. AI training data, allowing counterintelligence operators to preemptively counter them (Henderson, 2022). AI both defends critical systems and creates new opportunities for denial and deception operations (D&D) and disruption of adversarial cyber espionage.

Further, AI also addresses one of the perennial challenges of offensive counterintelligence, scalability. Human operator and analyst resources are finite. Adversarial services often enjoy the advantage of operating from within authoritarian systems unconstrained by meaningful oversight. AI offers the IC the ability to scale counterintelligence operations across global theaters without proportional increases in manpower. Automated triage systems can flag potential espionage indicators for human review, while AI-driven simulations can test the effectiveness of proposed offensive strategies before deployment. The scalability of AI ensures that offensive CI efforts remain proactive rather than reactive, allowing the IC to contest adversarial services at a global level (Allen & Chan, 2017).

I will note here that the insertion of AI into offensive counterintelligence is not a panacea. Overreliance on algorithmic outputs without human validation can lead to “false positives”, misidentification, or ethically and legally problematic targeting. Adversaries are also rapidly adopting AI for their own counter-counterintelligence measures, raising the specter of an AI-driven arms race in deception, espionage and counterespionage disciplines. The U.S. IC must ensure that AI tools are embedded within a robust framework of human review, legal compliance, and ethical norms. Offensive CI, clearly operating in the shadows of democratic accountability, requires enhanced governance mechanisms to balance operational effectiveness with adherence to rule-of-law principles (Zegart, 2022).

The adoption of AI in offensive counterintelligence necessitates organizational adaptation. Case officers, analysts, and technical specialists must be trained not only to use AI tools but also to understand their limitations. Interdisciplinary collaboration between computer scientists, behavioral experts, and intelligence professionals will be essential for designing AI systems that are operationally relevant, a particularly challenging problem in a group of agencies accustomed to “siloing”. Investment in secure, resilient AI infrastructure is critical, as adversaries will inevitably seek to penetrate, manipulate, or sabotage U.S. counterintelligence AI systems. Just as past eras of counterintelligence revolved around protecting codes and agent networks, the new era will hinge on safeguarding the integrity of AI platforms themselves (Carter, 2020).

Artificial intelligence offers unprecedented opportunities to enhance the effectiveness of offensive counterintelligence. By improving anomaly detection, predictive modeling, deception, recruitment targeting, and cyber counterintelligence, AI serves as both a force multiplier and a strategic enabler. It allows the IC to proactively shape the intelligence battlespace, seize the initiative from adversaries, and scale operations to meet global challenges. These opportunities come with risks, ethical, operational, and strategic, however, with careful management the payoff will be monumental. Offensive counterintelligence has always been a contest of wits, deception, and foresight. In the twenty-first century, AI will become the decisive instrument that determines whether the U.S. retains the upper hand in the shadow war.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

References

Allen, G., & Chan, T. (2017). Artificial intelligence and national security. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.

Brundage, M., Avin, S., Clark, J., Toner, H., Eckersley, P., Garfinkel, B., … & Amodei, D. (2018). The malicious use of artificial intelligence: Forecasting, prevention, and mitigation. Future of Humanity Institute.

Carter, A. (2020). The future of counterintelligence in the age of artificial intelligence. Center for a New American Security.

Greitens, S. C. (2019). Dealing with demand for authoritarianism: The domestic politics of counterintelligence. International Security, 44(2), 9–47.

Henderson, T. (2022). Offensive cyber counterintelligence: Leveraging AI to deceive adversaries. Journal of Cybersecurity Studies, 8(1), 55–74.

Treverton, G. F., & Miles, R. (2021). Strategic counterintelligence: The case for offensive measures. RAND Corporation.

Zegart, A. (2022). Spies, lies, and algorithms: The history and future of American intelligence. Princeton University Press.

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The Strategic Perils of Russian Surveillance Drones Over U.S. Weapons Routes

drone, drones, UAV, UAS, intelligence, counterintelligence, c. constantin poindexter

A counterintelligence operator is trained to view emerging threats not merely as tactical curiosities but as systemic dangers to national security. Recent OSINT reports allege that Russian drones are conducting surveillance flights over U.S. and allied weapons routes in Germany demand serious attention. These surveillance efforts represent a grave escalation in the intelligence collection activities of the Russian FIS. The threat is not hypothetical. The integration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into hybrid warfare doctrines allows Russia to gather real-time operational intelligence on NATO supply chains. This poses extreme peril to the secure movement of materiel destined for Ukraine and represents a sophisticated attempt to erode Western cohesion, exploit vulnerabilities, and set conditions for potential sabotage or kinetic strikes.

What is Publicly Reported

According to Western intelligence sources, Russian drones have been sighted in the German state of Thuringia, where weapons shipments to Ukraine transit rail yards, depots, and logistical hubs (Economic Times, 2025; Kyiv Independent, 2025). Germany’s domestic intelligence services reportedly believe that some of these drones could be Iranian in origin or launched from Russian naval platforms in the Baltic Sea (Anadolu Agency, 2025). The Kremlin has denied the allegations, dismissing them as “fake news” (Reuters, 2025). Denial, however, is a hallmark of Russian active measures. For those of us tasked with monitoring foreign intelligence service activity, the convergence of these reports with broader Russian hybrid campaigns across Europe renders the allegations credible.

Intelligence Value for Russian FIS

The intelligence value of drone surveillance over supply routes is considerable. First, the timing and frequency of convoy movements can be observed, allowing Russian planners to predict when materiel is most vulnerable to interdiction. Second, drones provide detailed imagery of infrastructure—bridges, depots, marshalling yards—that, once catalogued, become high-value targets for sabotage. Third, persistent surveillance forces NATO and U.S. forces into resource-draining defensive postures, requiring the diversion of air defense and counter-UAS assets to areas previously considered secure. Finally, the fusion of UAV surveillance with Russian electronic warfare and cyber capabilities creates an integrated battlespace picture that can guide both conventional and unconventional operations.

For a counterintelligence operator, the concern is not limited to observation. Surveillance missions are often precursors to active measures. Once an adversary establishes an accurate intelligence baseline, it can launch precision sabotage operations. In recent years, European states have documented Russian-linked arson, warehouse fires, and cyber disruptions targeting military supply chains. Drone surveillance dramatically increases the efficiency and lethality of such operations.

The Hybrid Warfare Context

Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has expanded its reliance on hybrid warfare against Europe. These activities include cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, clandestine sabotage, and assassinations, all designed to destabilize Western societies and fracture NATO solidarity. Drone surveillance over weapons routes is consistent with this doctrine. Unlike satellites or manned aircraft, drones provide deniable, low-cost, and flexible platforms for real-time reconnaissance. Their small signatures make detection difficult, especially in civilian airspace cluttered with commercial UAV activity.

From a C.I. perspective, the surveillance of logistical corridors is particularly concerning. Unlike frontline operations, which are compartmented and expected to face adversary collection, weapons transit routes through Germany are deep in NATO territory. If Russian FIS is indeed penetrating these secure rear areas with impunity, it demonstrates both capability and intent that far exceed opportunistic intelligence gathering. It reflects a deliberate campaign to compromise the West’s ability to sustain Ukraine’s defense.

Technological and Doctrinal Shifts

The modern intelligence battlespace has shifted decisively with the proliferation of drones. Russia has invested heavily in artificial intelligence-driven autonomy, swarming capabilities, and advanced electronic warfare integration (Artificial Intelligence Arms Race, 2025). These technologies allow drones not only to evade detection but to jam communications, spoof radar, and relay geospatial intelligence in real time. In the hands of Russian FIS, such platforms extend the reach of traditional human intelligence operations. Agents on the ground no longer need to physically surveil convoys or infrastructure; UAVs can perform these tasks at scale and with reduced risk of exposure.

For counterintelligence practitioners, this creates an acute problem. Traditional defenses against espionage, i.e., surveillance detection routes, HUMINT penetration, or communications monitoring, offer little protection against autonomous airborne systems. The counterintelligence mission must therefore expand to integrate airspace monitoring, drone forensics, and rapid attribution capabilities.

Counterintelligence Implications and Policy Recommendations

The implications of Russian drone surveillance over NATO supply routes are dire. Should the intelligence prove accurate, it would mark an unprecedented breach of NATO’s rear-area security. The counterintelligence response must be multi-layered.

Counter-UAS infrastructure must be deployed along identified weapons corridors. This includes radar capable of detecting small drones, jamming systems, and rapid-response intercept platforms. Intelligence sharing among NATO allies must be seamless. The real-time nature of drone surveillance requires equally rapid information fusion to disrupt adversary collection. Diplomatic measures must be employed. German authorities should issue formal protests over violations of sovereignty, raising the political cost for Russia’s deniable operations. Operational concealment must be enhanced. Convoys must vary routes, timing, and visible signatures to degrade adversary pattern recognition. Further, counterintelligence awareness must expand. Russian drone surveillance must be treated as a core component of hybrid warfare, requiring doctrinal adaptation and interagency collaboration.

Russian drone flights over U.S. weapons routes are NOT isolated incidents but part of a systematic campaign to undermine NATO logistics and erode Western commitment and unity of purpose. These flights afford Russian FIS the intelligence required to interdict, disrupt, and ultimately degrade the flow of materiel sustaining Ukraine’s defense. They also reflect the broader hybrid warfare doctrine that Russia has employed across Europe since 2022. The peril lies not only in the intelligence collected but in the strategic precedent it sets. If adversary drones can operate with impunity over NATO supply lines, the security of the entire alliance is compromised. Counterintelligence must adapt expeditiously, integrating new technologies, reinforcing interagency coordination, and treating the drone threat with the gravity it demands.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

Bibliography

Anadolu Agency. 2025. “Russia Spies on US, NATO Weapons Routes in Germany with Drones: Report.” Anadolu Agency, August 28, 2025. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/russia-spies-on-us-nato-weapons-routes-in-germany-with-drones-report/3672622

Economic Times. 2025. “Russian Drones Are Keeping Close Surveillance Over U.S. Weapons Routes: What Does This Mean?” Economic Times, August 28, 2025. https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/us/russian-drones-are-keeping-close-surveillance-over-u-s-weapons-routes-what-does-this-mean/articleshow/123573356.cms

Kyiv Independent. 2025. “Russia Reportedly Flying Drones Over US Arms Routes in Germany.” Kyiv Independent, August 28, 2025. https://kyivindependent.com/russia-reportedly-flying-drones-over-us-arms-routes-in-germany/

Reuters. 2025. “Kremlin Says Report of Russian Drones Over US Weapons Routes in Germany Looks Like Fake News.” Reuters, August 28, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/kremlin-says-report-russian-drones-over-us-weapons-routes-germany-looks-like-2025-08-28/

Wikipedia. 2025. “Russian Hybrid Warfare in Europe (2022–Present).” Wikipedia, last modified August 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_hybrid_warfare_in_Europe_%282022%E2%80%93present%29

Wikipedia. 2025. “Artificial Intelligence Arms Race.” Wikipedia, last modified August 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_intelligence_arms_race

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Cibermilicias y la Lucha por la Primacía en el Espacio de Batalla Informativa

ciber, cibermilicia, inteligencia, espionaje, contrainteligencia, contraespionaje, c. constantin poindexter

Llegué a la madurez profesional en una comunidad de inteligencia que todavía concebía la línea de frente (“teatro principal de operaciones”) como un lugar al que uno podía acceder, cartografiar y asegurar. Ese mundo ha desaparecido. Hoy, adversarios no militares, organizados de manera laxa en cibermilicias de propagandistas, piratas informáticos patrióticos, emprendedores de la influencia y amplificadores remunerados o voluntarios disputan la iniciativa no con blindados ni artillería, sino colonizando la atención, deformando la percepción y acelerando la división social a gran escala. Nuestra doctrina ha comenzado a reconocer este cambio. En 2017, el Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos elevó la información a función conjunta, formalizando lo que los operadores llevaban años observando. Reconocemos que las campañas modernas dependen de crear y explotar la ventaja informativa. La Estrategia de 2023 para Operaciones en el Entorno Informativo del Departamento de Defensa EEUU lo expone de manera explícita: la Fuerza Conjunta debe estar organizada, adiestrada y dotada de recursos para integrar efectos informativos junto con fuegos y maniobra (DoD, 2023).

Por cibermilicias entiendo a actores no uniformados, a veces dirigidos por el Estado, a menudo tolerados por él o subcontratados a la multitud, que combinan acciones cibernéticas con guerra narrativa en plataformas sociales. Reclutan y radicalizan, acosan en enjambres, hostigan y exponen datos personales, siembran falsificaciones digitales y teorías conspirativas, e inundan el espacio con memes emocionalmente persuasivos. Su mando y control suele ser plano e improvisado, su logística se basa en la nube y su ritmo operacional lo marcan los algoritmos de las plataformas y los ciclos informativos. Hemos visto efectos militares de tales formaciones en teatros diversos. La llamada Internet Research Agency (IRA) ejemplificó una milicia de influencia vinculada al Estado que escaló intentos de persuasión y movilización fuera de línea a través de plataformas sociales estadounidenses. Investigaciones rigurosas han matizado posteriormente las afirmaciones maximalistas sobre cambios medibles en actitudes, pero el hecho operacional permanece: los adversarios pueden alcanzar a millones de objetivos, a un coste marginal casi nulo, con narrativas adaptadas y sincronizadas con objetivos geopolíticos (Eady et al., 2023).

En el extremo opuesto, el IT Army of Ukraine constituye un caso de movilización cibernética defensiva: una formación voluntaria que ejecuta ataques DDoS, búsqueda de vulnerabilidades y operaciones psicológicas en paralelo con esfuerzos estatales. Esto ilustra tanto la potencia como las ambigüedades jurídicas y éticas que surgen cuando civiles se convierten en combatientes en el dominio informativo (Munk, 2025).

Las organizaciones terroristas comprendieron hace tiempo el poder de las redes sociales. El ISIS combinó la brutalidad en el campo de batalla con una maquinaria propagandística meticulosamente diseñada en línea, optimizada para reclutamiento, intimidación y fijación de agenda en múltiples lenguas y plataformas. Análisis revisados por pares detallan cómo ISIS explotó las funcionalidades de las plataformas para mantener su alcance incluso cuando se eliminaban cuentas (Done, 2022). El actual aluvión de proclamaciones de victorias en el teatro de guerra palestinas es igualmente ilustrativo.

Por qué las Redes Sociales Pueden Rivalizar con la Fuerza Física

La respuesta sencilla es la escala y la velocidad. La propaganda computacional aprovecha la automatización, la amplificación y la microsegmentación para saturar los canales informativos más rápido de lo que la verificación de hechos o el debate pueden alcanzar. Revisión sistemática tras revisión sistemática enmarcan esto como un ecosistema sociotécnico en evolución más que como una táctica puntual (Bradshaw y Howard, 2019).

La asimetría es un segundo factor crucial. Los bots y las conductas inauténticas coordinadas otorgan a pequeños operadores una influencia desproporcionada, especialmente en los primeros minutos del ciclo de vida de una narrativa, cuando las señales de interacción iniciales pueden inclinar los sistemas de clasificación de las plataformas. Estudios demuestran que las cuentas automatizadas amplifican de forma desproporcionada contenido de baja credibilidad en esas fases críticas (Shao et al., 2018).

Los efectos sobre el terreno humano deben contemplarse. Incluso cuando la persuasión directa es modesta, los daños en zonas de conflicto son muy reales. Doxing, estigmatización, desplazamiento y profanación cultural se han vinculado a la incitación en línea durante conflictos armados. No se trata únicamente de charlas en Internet, es preparación operacional del entorno con consecuencias humanas (Ulbricht, 2024).

La integración con operaciones cinéticas constituye además un ingrediente imperativo. En Ucrania, las fuerzas rusas combinaron sistemas físicos, como el Orlan-10/Leer-3, con campañas masivas de mensajes de texto y redes sociales para inducir pánico y erosionar la cohesión. Esto recuerda que los fuegos informativos pueden acotar el espacio de batalla tan eficazmente como la artillería (GAO, 2022).

La maniobra memética es la última consideración. En los conflictos contemporáneos, las narrativas basadas en memes no son meras efímeras: constituyen maniobra en el dominio cognitivo. Estudios recientes sobre la guerra memética en el contexto Rusia-Ucrania sostienen que estos artefactos estructuran la atención, codifican marcos complejos y aceleran el reclutamiento hacia la propaganda participativa a gran escala (Prier, 2017).

Una Nota sobre la Evidencia y la Prudencia

La honestidad intelectual más rigurosa debe estar en primer plano. Un estudio en Nature Communications que vinculó datos de Twitter en Estados Unidos con encuestas no halló cambios estadísticamente significativos en actitudes o elección de voto atribuibles a la exposición a la IRA en 2016. Sin embargo, no debemos ignorar esto ni sobregeneralizar. El estudio no absuelve a las campañas adversarias, refina nuestra teoría del efecto. Muchas operaciones buscan el control de la agenda, la polarización, la intimidación y la distracción en tiempo objetivo más que el mero cambio de voto. En la guerra, incluso variaciones pequeñas en la participación, la percepción del riesgo o la moral de la unidad pueden ser decisivas (Eady et al., 2023).

El Imperativo: Tratar la Propaganda Adversaria como un Objetivo de Campaña

La OTAN enmarca ahora la guerra cognitiva como un desafío interdominios. La mente humana es terreno disputado donde los actores buscan modificar percepciones y conductas (Claverie du Cluzel et al., 2021). No es retórica inflamatoria, es realidad operacional en todo teatro que he observado. Nuestra respuesta debe abandonar la era de refutaciones improvisadas y avanzar hacia operaciones integradas en el entorno informativo con objetivos, autoridades y métricas explícitas de desempeño y efecto.

Qué Deben Hacer la Inteligencia y los Combatientes

  1. Construir un panorama de inteligencia fusionada del campo de batalla narrativo.
  2. Normalizar el entorno informativo junto con fuegos y maniobra.
  3. Disputar la iniciativa mediante prebunking y resiliencia, no solo eliminando contenidos.
  4. Imponer fricción a las cibermilicias hostiles.
  5. Clarificar autoridades y alinear con el derecho de los conflictos armados.
  6. Entrenar para el dominio cognitivo.
  7. Medir lo que importa, evitando indicadores de pura vanidad.

Conclusión Estratégica

En la guerra convencional, la ventaja es acumulativa. En la guerra informativa, es compuesta. El bando que penetra el ciclo de decisión del adversario establece el marco para todo lo que sigue. Nuestros adversarios ya juegan ese juego. Despliegan cibermilicias que operan a velocidad de máquina pero hablan en idioma humano, explotando incentivos de plataforma y sesgos cognitivos tan antiguos como la persuasión y tan novedosos como la inteligencia artificial generativa.

Como profesionales de inteligencia y combatientes, nuestra misión no es simplemente refutar mentiras una vez consumado el daño, sino negar la iniciativa adversaria en el entorno informativo, mapear y anticipar sus campañas, fortalecer nuestras poblaciones e integrar los efectos narrativos con la maniobra. Hacerlo bajo el imperio de la ley y con responsabilidad democrática será un reto. La Comunidad de Inteligencia y las fuerzas armadas no ignoran esta realidad: la Fuerza Conjunta ya reconoce la información como función central. Pero la doctrina sin recursos ni práctica es solo papel. Debemos construir los equipos, autoridades y hábitos para luchar y prevalecer allí donde ahora habita la gente, en sus feeds y chats, tanto como en el espacio físico. Si fracasamos, cederemos el terreno decisivo del conflicto moderno a adversarios no militares que comprenden que la primacía ya no se mide únicamente en metros conquistados, sino en mentes retenidas.

Una recomendación crucial es que la contrainteligencia está particularmente bien adaptada a esta misión. El oficio de la contrainteligencia, históricamente dedicado a identificar, engañar y neutralizar operaciones de influencia hostil, se traduce directamente a la lucha contra las cibermilicias. Los operadores de contrainteligencia aportan pericia en atribución adversaria, operaciones de doble agente, detección de desinformación y manipulación de redes clandestinas. Estas son exactamente las habilidades necesarias para desenmascarar conductas inauténticas coordinadas en línea. Estoy convencido de que integrar la contrainteligencia en la guerra informativa ofrece ventajas singulares, al combinar análisis técnico de señales con validación de fuentes humanas y la capacidad de explotar, interrumpir o cooptar operaciones adversarias de influencia de un modo que supera la mera moderación de contenidos (Hunker, 2010; Rid, 2020). Dejar las cibermilicias únicamente en manos de la diplomacia pública o de la autorregulación de plataformas equivale a luchar con un brazo atado. Incorporar la contrainteligencia en el núcleo de nuestras campañas informativas asegura que Estados Unidos no solo pueda defenderse de la propaganda adversaria, sino también disputar y desmantelar activamente las redes que la impulsan.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, M.A. en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, J.D., certificación CISA/NCISS OSINT, Certificación DoD/DoS BFFOC

Referencias

Bradshaw, S., y Howard, P. N. (2019). El orden global de la desinformación: Inventario mundial 2019 de la manipulación organizada en redes sociales. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute. [en inglés]

Claverie du Cluzel, F., et al. (2021). Guerra cognitiva. Comando Aliado de Transformación de la OTAN, Innovation Hub. Norfolk, VA. [en inglés]

Departamento de Defensa de los Estados Unidos. (2023). Estrategia para las operaciones en el entorno informativo. Washington, DC. [en inglés]

Done, A. (2022). La propaganda del ISIS y la radicalización en línea. Journal of Strategic Security, 15(3), 27–49. [en inglés]

Eady, G., Nagler, J., Guess, A., Zilinsky, J., y Tucker, J. (2023). Exposición a la campaña de influencia extranjera de la Agencia de Investigación de Internet rusa en Twitter durante las elecciones de 2016 en Estados Unidos y su relación con actitudes y comportamiento de voto. Nature Communications, 14(1), 367. [en inglés]

Oficina de Responsabilidad Gubernamental de EE. UU. (GAO). (2022). Entorno informativo: El Departamento de Defensa debería tomar medidas para ampliar sus evaluaciones de las operaciones de información. Washington, DC. [en inglés]

Hunker, J. (2010). Guerra cibernética y poder cibernético: cuestiones para la doctrina de la OTAN. Documento de investigación del Colegio de Defensa de la OTAN, núm. 62. Roma: Colegio de Defensa de la OTAN. [en inglés]

Maertens, R., Roozenbeek, M., van der Linden, S., y Lewandowsky, S. (2021). Eficacia a largo plazo de la inoculación contra la desinformación: tres experimentos longitudinales. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 27(1), 1–16. [en inglés]

Munk, T. (2025). El Ejército Informático de Ucrania: resistencia civil digital y derecho internacional. Crime, Law and Social Change, 83(1), 55–74. [en inglés]

Prier, J. (2017). Comandando la tendencia: las redes sociales como guerra de información. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 11(4), 50–85. [en inglés]

Rid, T. (2020). Medidas activas: la historia secreta de la desinformación y la guerra política. Nueva York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. [en inglés]

Roozenbeek, J., van der Linden, S., et al. (2020). El juego de las noticias falsas confiere resistencia psicológica contra la desinformación en línea. Palgrave Communications, 6(1), 65. [en inglés]

Shao, C., Ciampaglia, G. L., Varol, O., Flammini, A., y Menczer, F. (2018). La difusión de contenido de baja credibilidad por parte de bots sociales. Nature Communications, 9(1), 4787. [en inglés]

Ulbricht, M. (2024). Propaganda en línea y daño civil en conflictos armados. International Review of the Red Cross, 106(1), 67–94. [en inglés]

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Cyber-Militias and the Struggle for Primacy in the Information Battlespace

warfare and cyber militias, cyberwar, warfighter, intelligence, counterintelligence, c. constantin poindexter;

I came of age in an intelligence community that still treated the “front line” as a place one could step onto, map, and secure. That world is gone. Today, non-military adversaries, loosely coordinated “cyber-militias” of propagandists, patriotic hackers, influence entrepreneurs, and paid or volunteer amplifiers contest the initiative not with armor or artillery, but by colonizing attention, bending perception, and accelerating social division at scale. Our doctrine has begun to recognize this shift. In 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense elevated information to a joint function, formalizing what operators have seen for years. We note that modern campaigns hinge on creating and exploiting information advantage. The 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment makes the point explicitly: the Joint Force must be organized, trained, and resourced to integrate information effects alongside fires and maneuver (Department of Defense 2023).

By cyber-militias I mean non-uniformed actors—sometimes state-directed, often state-tolerated or “crowd-sourced” who blend cyber actions with narrative warfare on social platforms. They recruit and radicalize; swarm, harass, and dox; seed deepfakes and conspiracies; and flood the zone with emotionally sticky memes. Their command and control is typically flat and improvisational; their logistics are cloud-based, and their operational tempo is set by platform algorithms and news cycles. We have seen the military effects of such formations in diverse theaters. The so-called Internet Research Agency (IRA) exemplified a state-linked influence militia that scaled persuasion attempts and offline mobilization through U.S. social platforms. Rigorous research has since complicated the maximalist claims about measurable attitude change, but the operational fact remains: adversaries can reach millions of targets, at negligible marginal cost, with tailored narratives synchronized to geopolitical aims (Eady et al. 2023).

On the other end of the spectrum, the IT Army of Ukraine offers a case of defensive cyber-mobilization: a volunteer formation conducting DDoS, bug-hunting, and psychological operations in parallel with state efforts. This illustrates both the potency and the legal/ethical ambiguities that arise when civilians become combatants in the information domain (Munk 2025).

Terrorist organizations have long understood the leverage of social media. ISIS paired battlefield brutality with a meticulously engineered online propaganda machine, optimized for recruitment, intimidation, and agenda-setting across multiple languages and platforms. Peer-reviewed analyses detail how ISIS exploited platform affordances to sustain reach even as accounts were removed (Done 2022). The current flood of palestinian “claims of war theatre victory” are instructive.

Why Social Media Can Rival Physical Force

The simple answer is scale and speed. Computational propaganda leverages automation, amplification, and microtargeting to saturate feeds faster than fact-checking or deliberation can catch up. Systematic reviews now frame this as an evolving socio-technical ecosystem rather than a one-off tactic (Bradshaw and Howard 2019).

Assymetry comes a close second. Bots and coordinated inauthentic behavior give small and individual operators outsized influence, particularly in the first minutes of a narrative’s life cycle when early engagement signals can tip platform ranking systems. Studies show automated accounts disproportionately amplify low-credibility content at those critical early stages (Shao et al. 2018).

Human terrain effects must be contemplated. Even when direct persuasion is modest, harms in conflict zones are VERY REAL. Doxing, stigmatization, displacement, and cultural desecration have all been linked to online incitement during armed conflict. This is not just “online chatter”; it is operational preparation of the environment with human consequences (Ulbricht 2024).

Integration witrh kinetic operations is also an imperative ingredient. In Ukraine, Russian forces coupled physical systems (e.g., Orlan-10/Leer-3) with mass text and social campaigns to trigger panic and erode cohesion. This serves as a reminder that “information fires” can bracket the battlespace as surely as artillery (GAO 2022).

Memetic maneuver is a final consideration. In contemporary conflict, meme-based narratives are not mere ephemera. They are maneuver in the cognitive domain. Recent scholarship on memetic warfare in the Russia-Ukraine context argues that these artifacts structure attention, encode complex frames, and accelerate recruitment into “participatory propaganda” at scale (Prier 2017).

A Note on Evidence and Caution

Brutal intellectual honesty must be front and center. A Nature Communications study linking U.S. Twitter feeds to survey data found no overly significant changes in respondents’ attitudes or vote choice attributable to IRA exposure during 2016, however, we should neither ignore this nor overgeneralize from it. The study does not absolve adversary campaigns. It refines our theory of effect. Many operations seek agenda control, polarization, intimidation, and time-on-target distraction rather than simple vote-switching. In war, even small shifts in participation, risk perception, or unit morale can be decisive (Eady et al. 2023).

The Imperative: Treat Adversarial Propaganda as a Campaign Target

NATO now frames “cognitive warfare” as a cross-domain challenge. The human mind is “contested terrain” where actors seek to modify perceptions and behavior (Claverie du Cluzel et al. 2021). That is not inflammatory rhetoric. It is operational reality in every theater that I have observed. Our response must leave the era of ad-hoc rebuttals and move toward integrated operations in the information environment (OIE) with explicit objectives, authorities, and measures of performance and effect.

What Intelligence and Warfighters Must Do

1) Build a fused intelligence picture of the narrative battlespace.
We need SOCMINT and OSINT cells that map not just “what is trending,” but also why. The network topologies, amplification pathways, and cross-platform migration patterns by which malign content metastasizes. Computational propaganda research offers a starting taxonomy; we must operationalize it into collection requirements and analytic standards (Bradshaw and Howard 2019).

2) Normalize OIE alongside fires and maneuver.
Commanders should plan narrative lines of effort the way they plan suppression of enemy air defenses: with target systems, timing, sequencing, and joint enablers. The 2023 SOIE calls for exactly this, i.e., education, resourcing, and integration so that information effects are not an afterthought but embedded in campaign design (Department of Defense 2023).

3) Contest the initiative through pre-bunking and resilience, not just takedowns.
Content moderation is necessary but insufficient. The strongest evidence for population-level resilience points to psychological inoculation. Brief interventions that teach people to spot manipulation techniques before exposure reaps oversized dividends. Large field experiments on YouTube and cross-platform studies show significant gains in users’ ability to recognize manipulation, though effects attenuate without reinforcement (Roozenbeek et al. 2020; Maertens et al. 2021).

4) Impose friction on hostile cyber-militias.
Joint and interagency teams should target the infrastructure of amplification (maning botnet C2, SIM farms, and payment rails for “influence mercenaries.”) Early-cycle disruption pays outsized dividends given bots’ role in initial virality (Shao et al. 2018).

5) Clarify authorities and align with the law of armed conflict.
Volunteer cyber formations raise attribution and status-of-combatant questions. Scholars have argued for pragmatic frameworks that harness civic energy while mitigating escalation and civilian-combatant blurring (Munk 2025).

6) Train for the cognitive domain.
Treat cognitive security as tradecraft, not simply lip-service. This includes red-teaming our own narratives, pre-mission media terrain analysis, and SOPs for rumor control when adversaries seed panic. NATO-sponsored analyses emphasize that cognitive effects require skilled practitioners, clear objectives, and ethical guardrails (Claverie du Cluzel et al. 2021).

7) Measure what matters.
Intelligence and warfighter analysts must avoid over-indexing on vanity metrics. We need to build dashboards around indicators, i.e., time to adversary saturation, percentage of priority audiences inoculated, and suppression of inauthentic behavior during the “golden hour.” The ICRC’s typology linking online dynamics to offline harm provides a framework (Ulbricht 2024).

The Strategic Bottom Line

In conventional war, advantage is cumulative. Logistics, training, and combined arms competence pay off BIGLY. In the information fight, advantage is compounding. The side that gets inside the adversary’s decision cycle sets the frame for everything that follows. Our adversaries are playing that compounding game. They field cyber-militias that operate at machine speed but speak in human idiom, exploiting platform incentives and cognitive biases that are as old as persuasion itself and as new as generative AI.

As intelligence professionals and warfighters it is not merely to rebut lies after the damage is done. It is to DENY adversarial initiative in the information environment, to map and preempt their campaigns, to harden our populations, to integrate narrative effects with maneuver. Doing this all under the rule of law and democratic accountability will be a challenge. The I.C. and armed forces are not ignoring this, thankfully. The JF now names information as a core function, however, doctrine without resourcing and practice is just paper. We must build the teams, authorities, and habits to fight and win where people live now, in feeds and group chats as much as in physical space. If we fail, we cede the decisive ground of modern conflict to non-military adversaries who understand that primacy is no longer measured only in meters seized, but in minds held.

A crucial recommendation is that counterintelligence is particularly well-suited to this mission. Counterintelligence tradecraft, long dedicated to identifying, deceiving, and neutralizing hostile influence operations, translates directly into the fight against cyber-militias. C.I. operators bring expertise in adversary attribution, double-agent operations, disinformation detection, and the manipulation of clandestine networks, which are precisely the skills needed to unmask coordinated inauthentic behavior online. I firmly believe that integrating C.I. into information warfare provides unique advantages. It blends technical signals analysis with human-source validation and can “exploit, disrupt, or co-opt” adversary influence operations in ways that exceed mere content moderation (Hunker 2010; Rid 2020). To leave cyber-militias solely to public diplomacy or platform governance is to fight with one arm tied. Incorporating counterintelligence into the core of our information campaigns ensures that the United States can not only defend against adversarial propaganda but actively contest and dismantle the networks that drive it.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Bradshaw, Samantha, and Philip N. Howard. 2019. The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute.

Claverie du Cluzel, François, et al. 2021. “Cognitive Warfare.” NATO Allied Command Transformation, Innovation Hub. Norfolk, VA.

Department of Defense. 2023. Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment. Washington, DC.

Done, Alasdair. 2022. “ISIS Propaganda and Online Radicalization.” Journal of Strategic Security 15 (3): 27–49.

Eady, Gregory, Jonathan Nagler, Andrew Guess, Jan Zilinsky, and Joshua Tucker. 2023. “Exposure to the Russian Internet Research Agency Foreign Influence Campaign on Twitter in the 2016 U.S. Election and Its Relationship to Attitudes and Voting Behavior.” Nature Communications 14 (1): 367.

GAO (U.S. Government Accountability Office). 2022. Information Environment: DOD Should Take Steps to Expand Its Assessments of Information Operations. Washington, DC.

Hunker, Jeffrey. 2010. “Cyber War and Cyber Power: Issues for NATO Doctrine.” NATO Defense College Research Paper, no. 62. Rome: NATO Defense College.

Maertens, Rakoen, Melisa Roozenbeek, Sander van der Linden, and Stephan Lewandowsky. 2021. “Long-Term Effectiveness of Inoculation Against Misinformation: Three Longitudinal Experiments.” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 27 (1): 1–16.

Munk, Tine. 2025. “The IT Army of Ukraine: Digital Civilian Resistance and International Law.” Crime, Law and Social Change 83 (1): 55–74.

Prier, Jarred. 2017. “Commanding the Trend: Social Media as Information Warfare.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 11 (4): 50–85.

Rid, Thomas. 2020. Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Roozenbeek, Jon, Sander van der Linden, and others. 2020. “Fake News Game Confers Psychological Resistance Against Online Misinformation.” Palgrave Communications 6 (1): 65.

Shao, Chengcheng, Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Onur Varol, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2018. “The Spread of Low-Credibility Content by Social Bots.” Nature Communications 9 (1): 4787.

Ulbricht, Moritz. 2024. “Online Propaganda and Civilian Harm in Armed Conflicts.” International Review of the Red Cross 106 (1): 67–94.

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República Dominicana y Haití: Soluciones desde la Perspectiva Presidencial y de Inteligencia

República Dominicana y Haití

La relación entre República Dominicana y Haití constituye uno de los retos más graves y persistentes del Caribe contemporáneo. Dos países que comparten una misma isla están separados por profundas desigualdades históricas, sociales y políticas que han generado tensiones constantes. Mientras Haití enfrenta un colapso institucional con crisis humanitarias recurrentes, violencia de Barbecue y sus pandillas idiotas y una debilidad estatal extrema, República Dominicana busca proteger su seguridad nacional, mantener la estabilidad de su economía y preservar su soberanía. Desde la Presidencia, este desafío exige políticas que equilibren la solidaridad humanitaria con la defensa del interés nacional. Desde la comunidad de inteligencia dominicana, se requiere anticipar amenazas, gestionar riesgos transnacionales y proporcionar insumos estratégicos que permitan tomar decisiones informadas.

La primera dimensión crítica para la Presidencia es la política migratoria. El flujo irregular desde Haití hacia territorio dominicano ha aumentado debido al colapso del aparato estatal haitiano. Esta migración ejerce presión sobre los servicios de salud, educación y seguridad, pero también plantea retos humanitarios que la República Dominicana no puede ignorar. Un enfoque equilibrado demanda un sistema binacional de registro biométrico bajo supervisión internacional que permita controlar la movilidad transfronteriza y otorgue permisos laborales temporales en sectores donde la economía dominicana requiere mano de obra, como la construcción y la agricultura. Experiencias comparadas en otras regiones demuestran que el ordenamiento migratorio combinado con programas de inclusión económica reduce vulnerabilidades sociales y fortalece la seguridad interna (ONU, 2023).

La Presidencia impulsa correctamente una diplomacia activa y de alcance global. El Estado dominicano no puede ni debe hacerse con el peso de la crisis haitiana. Es imperativo movilizar organismos multilaterales (la ONU, la OEA y el CARICOM) para financiar proyectos de estabilización institucional en Haití. República Dominicana debe seguir insistiendo en que la comunidad internacional asuma su responsabilidad para evitar que el país se convierta en una suerte de contención migratoria sin respaldo ni recursos. Como advierte Fatton (2022), la ausencia de compromiso internacional perpetúa la fragilidad haitiana y multiplica los riesgos para sus vecinos.

Otra prioridad para la Presidencia consiste en el desarrollo fronterizo como política de Estado. El descuido histórico de las provincias limítrofes ha favorecido el contrabando, la migración irregular y la penetración de pandillas. Invertir en infraestructura, salud, educación y tecnología en esa zona fortalecería la presencia del Estado dominicano y reduciría la percepción de abandono que hace vulnerables a esas comunidades. Asimismo, se requiere una reforma de las fuerzas de seguridad que refuerce la cooperación entre las Fuerzas Armadas y la Policía Nacional, incorporando tecnología moderna de vigilancia (drones y sensores de movimiento, etc.) para garantizar una gestión fronteriza eficaz.

Desde la perspectiva de la comunidad de inteligencia nacional, el eje central de la respuesta debe ser la “anticipación”. Se necesita un sistema robusto de análisis político y social sobre Haití que permita prever el impacto de la violencia de pandillas, las redes criminales transnacionales y los actores políticos que promueven la inestabilidad. La inteligencia estratégica, como señala Baldwin (2020), no debe limitarse a recopilar información, sino también a construir modelos de escenarios futuros que faciliten decisiones presidenciales proactivas. Una crisis migratoria masiva debe detectarse con semanas o meses de antelación para activar protocolos diplomáticos y de seguridad fronteriza.

Otro campo clave (ignorado a nuestro propio peligro) de la inteligencia dominicana es la contrainteligencia frente a actores externos. El vacío de poder en Haití atrae tanto a organizaciones criminales como a intereses internacionales que pueden instrumentalizar la crisis. Vigilar los intentos de infiltración extranjera es esencial para evitar que Haití se convierta en plataforma de actividades ilícitas como narcotráfico, tráfico de armas y trata de personas. Esto implica reforzar la capacidad dominicana de proteger infraestructura crítica, instituciones financieras y corredores comerciales.

La inteligencia (social) debe analizar percepciones, tensiones étnicas, discursos de odio y campañas de desinformación que puedan exacerbar las divisiones entre dominicanos y haitianos. Una narrativa negativa no controlada podría alimentar conflictos sociales internos y minar la cohesión nacional. En este sentido, el monitoreo de redes sociales y el estudio de dinámicas comunitarias resultan tan importantes como el análisis militar. Además, la inteligencia dominicana debe buscar aumentar su cooperación regional con agencias de Estados Unidos, Francia y organismos de seguridad del Caribe para coordinar la interdicción del narcotráfico y el control del tráfico de armas que se canaliza a través de la frontera.

Las soluciones que emergen de esta doble perspectiva deben ser integrales. Una gestión migratoria moderna basada en registros biométricos y permisos temporales de trabajo permitiría equilibrar control y humanitarismo. Una diplomacia activa movilizaría recursos internacionales indispensables para estabilizar Haití. El desarrollo fronterizo sostenido corregiría la histórica desigualdad territorial y reforzaría la presencia del Estado. La modernización del sector defensa, con apoyo tecnológico, garantizaría la seguridad de la frontera. A nivel de inteligencia, se requiere consolidar sistemas de alerta temprana, contrainteligencia frente a amenazas externas, inteligencia social para mantener la cohesión interna y cooperación internacional para enfrentar el crimen transnacional.

La República Dominicana enfrenta un dilema. Combina soberanía, seguridad y responsabilidad humanitaria. Desde la Presidencia, se necesitan políticas públicas firmes, visionarias y respaldadas por la comunidad internacional. Desde la inteligencia, se exige previsión estratégica, capacidad de análisis complejo y alianzas regionales. El futuro de la isla de La Española dependerá de la habilidad de ambos países, junto a la comunidad internacional, de transformar la crisis en una oportunidad para la construcción de seguridad compartida, desarrollo fronterizo y estabilidad regional. Solo a través de un enfoque integral y coordinado será posible avanzar hacia una relación dominico-haitiana más equilibrada, sostenible y pacífica.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA en Inteligencia, Certificado de Posgrado en Contrainteligencia, JD, Certificación OSINT CISA/NCISS, Certificación BFFOC del DoD/DoS

Referencias

Baldwin, D. (2020). Intelligence and Anticipation in Small States. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(4), 567-589.
Fatton, R. (2022). Haiti’s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Organización de las Naciones Unidas (2023). Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Haiti. New York: United Nations.
Riveros, F. (2021). Seguridad y Migración en el Caribe: Desafíos para la Gobernanza Regional. Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 127, 115-134.
Sánchez, J. (2019). La frontera dominico-haitiana: dinámicas de seguridad y desarrollo. Santo Domingo: Instituto Global de Estudios Sociales.

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Can I.C. HUMINT Operators Counter Facial Recognition Supercharged by A.I.?

HUMINT, facial recognition, intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, counterespionage, c. constantin poindexter;

The WAPO article in May of this year (“CIA chief faces stiff test in bid to revitalize human spying”) revealed a peril that has been on my radar for a few years. Writers Warren P. Strobel and Ellen Nakashima reported that the CIA is facing ‘unprecedented operational challenges’ in conducting human intelligence (HUMINT) missions, particularly in “denied areas” such as China, Russia, and other heavily surveilled states. The central premise is that advances in artificial intelligence–powered facial recognition, combined with integrated surveillance networks are making it extremely difficult for intelligence officers and sub-handlers to operate covertly. Maybe, . . . but maybe not.

As I.C. agencies grapple with the proliferation of AI-enhanced facial recognition in denied areas, human intelligence (HUMINT) operators must seek new tradecraft to elude detection. Exploiting the inherent bias vulnerabilities and adaptive learning mechanisms within facial recognition systems, HUMINT operatives can deliberately degrade their reliability, more specifically, by flooding systems with inputs that are not identical but very similar thereby “poisoning” the recognition algorithm. Operators can broaden acceptance thresholds and reduce fidelity. Drawing a parallel with Apple’s iPhone Face ID system, whose adaptive mechanism occasionally grants access to similar-looking individuals (e.g., family members), here is how HUMINT practitioners could deliberately introduce adversarial noise to AI surveillance systems to slip through.

Algorithmic Bias in Facial Recognition

Facial recognition systems are susceptible to algorithmic bias rooted in uneven training data. For instance, the now-classic “Gender Shades” study revealed error rates up to 35 % for darker-skinned women versus < 1 % for lighter-skinned males. More broadly, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has documented that commercial face recognition systems misidentify Black and Asian faces 10 to 100 times more often than white faces. These disparities not only expose systemic flaws but also point to the system’s sensitivity to subtle variations. Adversarial machine learning research has demonstrated that imperceptible perturbations can dramatically mislead facial recognition models. These adversarial examples exploit “non-robust” features, patterns perceptible to AI but invisible to humans that induce misclassification. Studies in the domain have confirmed that even small alterations in pixel patterns can force erroneous outputs in face recognition systems.

Adaptive Learning: The iPhone Face ID Example

Apple’s Face ID serves as a real-world instance of an adaptive facial recognition mechanism. The system uses a detailed infrared depth map and neural engine adaptation to adjust to users’ appearance changes over time, i.e., aging, makeup, glasses, or facial hair. Critically, Face ID “updates its registered face data” when it detects a close match that is subsequently unlocked via passcode, effectively learning from borderline inputs. This adaptability can lead to misrecognition in practice. A widely reported case involved a ten-year-old boy unlocking his mother’s iPhone X on the first attempt, thanks to their similar features. The system adapted sufficiently that the child could consistently unlock the device in subsequent attempts even though he was neither registered nor the primary user. Apple’s own user disclosure acknowledges that Face ID is statistically more prone to false positives with twins, siblings, and children under thirteen owing to underdeveloped, similar facial features.

HUMINT Application: Poisoning Recognition Systems

HUMINT operators, aware of such adaptive vulnerabilities, could deliberately exploit them when entering denied areas monitored by AI facial recognition cameras or checkpoints. How would that work?

Creating “near duplicate” appearances: Operators could train the system by repeatedly presenting faces that are not identical but nearly identical. Sending similar-looking collaborators through passport control wearing slight variations in makeup, glasses, lighting, or facial hair is a good example. Over time, the system’s adaptive threshold would widen, accepting a broader range of inputs as belonging to the same identity.

Adversarial perturbation via “morphing”: Using adversarial machine learning techniques, operatives could create morphs (digital or printed images blending two individuals) so that the system’s recognition vector drifts toward both identities. The DHS has documented such “morphing attacks” as a real threat to face recognition systems. Not a perfect solution as adversarial C.I. might simply surveil them ALL.

Feedback loop poisoning: With systems that incorporate user feedback (e.g., unlocking after near matches), HUMINT operators might deliberately trigger false acceptances or input other authentication data after near matches, feeding the system mis-labelled data and amplifying its error tolerance. That’s the way siblings or children inadvertently taught Face ID to accept them in the previous example.

Ethical, Operational, and Technical Defense

Is the approach technically plausible or ethically defensible? Technically, the literature on adversarial attacks and adaptive biases confirms that recognition systems can be deliberately misconfigured through controlled input poisoning. Operationally, such techniques must be deployed after careful risk assessment. If a HUMINT operating group consistently “trains” a system in advance, the likelihood of detection increases, perhaps dramatically. However, in dynamic environments with rotating operators and multiple lookalikes, the system can deteriorate in reliability over time without drawing attention to a single individual. Ethically, these strategies are defensible under the doctrine of necessity and deception inherent to espionage. The goal is not harm but evasion in hostile surveillance contexts.

Limitations and Countermeasures

The approach is not foolproof. Highly calibrated systems may lock after repeated unlock failures or require emergency analysis and supervisory resets. Advanced systems may isolate per identity representations, preventing cross-contamination. Systems without adaptive learning or those that guard against morphing remain immune. Nonetheless, many real-world systems are not designed for adversarial resistance, . . . yet. Authoritarian regimes with bulk “brute” surveillance networks, less than state-of-the-art platforms and/or resource constraints may nullify robust defense against poisoning.

In the escalating arms race between AI surveillance and clandestine operations, HUMINT tradecraft must evolve. By exploiting biases and adaptive flaws in facial recognition systems (ex., through near identical inputs, morphing techniques, and feedback poisoning) operators can subtly degrade recognition fidelity. The iPhone Face ID example underscores the viability of such tactics in practice, i.e., a system designed for convenience can become a liability when its adaptability is weaponized. As surveillance proliferates, understanding and manipulating AI’s algorithmic susceptibilities will be indispensable for evasion and operational success.

Facial recognition is not the only sophisticated peril to HUMINT operations. Per Thomas Claburn’s recent report in The Register, “Researchers in Italy have developed a way to create a biometric identifier for people based on the way the human body interferes with Wi-Fi signal propagation. The scientists claim this identifier, a pattern derived from Wi-Fi Channel State Information, can re-identify a person in other locations most of the time when a Wi-Fi signal can be measured. Observers could therefore track a person as they pass through signals sent by different Wi-Fi networks – even if they’re not carrying a phone.” (Claburn, 2025) Tradecraft and countermeasures will likewise have to evolve to address this threat, but I’ll leave that subject for a future piece.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

References

Buolamwini, J., & Gebru, T. (2018). Gender Shades: Intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender classification. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research, 81, 1–15. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algorithmic_bias

National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2019). Face recognition vendor test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic effects (NIST Interagency/Internal Report No. 8280). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-facial_recognition_movement

Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., & Szegedy, C. (2015). Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. International Conference on Learning Representations. https://www.wired.com/story/adversarial-examples-ai-may-not-hallucinate

Vakhshiteh, A., Alparslan, F., & Farokhi, F. (2020). Adversarial attacks on deep face recognition systems. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.11709

Apple Inc. (2024). About Face ID advanced technology. Apple Support. https://support.apple.com/en-us/102381

Greenberg, A. (2017, December 14). A 10-year-old unlocked his mom’s iPhone X using Face ID. Wired. https://www.wired.com/story/10-year-old-face-id-unlocks-mothers-iphone-x

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2023). Risks and mitigation strategies for morphing attacks on biometric systems. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/23_1222_st_risks_mitigation_strategies.pdf