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A Pier Walk, an Encrypted App, and a Trail of Receipts: The Wei Espionage Case, Counterintelligence and PRC Tradecraft

china, PRC, PLA, espionage, spy, spies, counterespionage, counterintelligence, intelligence, C. Constantin Poindexter, counterespionage;

The two-hundred-month federal sentence imposed on U.S. Navy sailor Jinchao Wei, also known as Patrick Wei, is not merely a cautionary tale about a single insider’s betrayal. It is a contemporary, well documented case study in the People’s Republic of China’s persistent espionage campaign against U.S. defense entities, executed through an operational pattern that has become all too familiar to counterintelligence practitioners, i.e., low friction spotting and assessment via online platforms, cultivation under plausible non-official cover, incremental tasking that begins with seemingly innocuous collection, and compensation methods that leave a financial signature even when communications are migrated to encrypted channels (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a). The Wei matter is also a reminder that insider threats rarely begin with the theft of a crown jewel. They begin with ego, attention, a sense of being chosen, and the seductive illusion that the handler is impressed and that the target is smarter than the system.

Public reporting and Department of Justice releases describe Wei as having been arrested in August 2023 as he arrived for duty at Naval Base San Diego, where he was assigned to the amphibious assault ship USS Essex (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, 2026b). The arrest timing and location are operationally significant. Counterintelligence cases often culminate when investigators can control the environment, secure devices and storage, and prevent further loss of national defense information while preserving evidentiary integrity. The government’s narrative, as presented publicly, reflects a mature, documentable case anchored in communications and payment records rather than exotic or highly sensitive sources. The Department of Justice has been explicit that not every investigative step can be disclosed and I don’t intend to do so here, but it has been equally clear that the evidentiary core included intercepts of communication between Wei and his PRC handler, and documentation of how Wei was rewarded for his betrayal (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a).

The recruitment vector in this case aligns with PRC modus operandi in insider targeting. Wei was approached through social media by an individual presenting as a “naval enthusiast” who claimed a connection to China’s state-owned shipbuilding sector, a cover story designed to appear adjacent to legitimate maritime interest while still close enough to naval affairs to justify pointed questions (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a; Associated Press, 2026). That presentation is instructive. It reduces the psychological barrier to engagement, provides a rationale for curiosity-driven dialogue, and permits gradual escalation from general discussion to tasking. A handler does not need immediate access to classified networks to create damage. He needs a human source who can provide operationally relevant details, and then he needs to keep the source talking long enough to normalize betrayal.

Once engaged, Wei’s operational security behavior demonstrates both awareness and complicity. He told a Navy friend that the activity looked “quite obviously” like espionage and, after that realization, he shifted communications to a different encrypted messaging application that he believed was more secure (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a; USNI News, 2026). This is an important marker for investigators and security managers. When a cleared person acknowledges illicit intent yet continues, the motivation is not confusion. It is volition. The move to a “more secure” platform is also characteristic of PRC handling in HUMINT collection. Chinese FIS does not need to provide sophisticated technical tradecraft if the target will self-generate it. Public charging language indicates agreed steps to conceal the relationship, including deletion of conversation records and use of encrypted methods, which reflects basic but purposeful counter-surveillance and denial behavior (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023).

Tasking, as described in public releases, combined opportunistic collection with specific collection requirements. Wei was asked to “walk the pier” and report which ships were present, provide ship locations, and transmit photos and videos along with ship-related details (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a). From a counterintelligence perspective, these are not trivial asks. Pier-side observations can support pattern of life analysis, readiness inference, and operational planning, particularly when fused with open source material and other clandestine reporting. The case officer’s methodology is “incrementalism”. A handler begins with items that feel observational and deniable, then pulls the source toward more sensitive materials by normalizing the exchange relationship and introducing compensation.

The most damaging element is the alleged transfer of classified technical and operational documents. DOJ accounts state that over an approximately 18-month relationship, Wei provided approximately sixty manuals and other sensitive materials, including at least thirty manuals transmitted in one tranche in June 2022, some of which clearly bore export control warnings. The materials were related to ship systems such as power, steering, weapons control, elevators, and damage and casualty controls (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a; U.S. Department of Justice, 2026b; Associated Press, 2026). In counterintelligence risk terms, technical manuals provide adversaries with a low-cost blueprint for exploitation. They can inform electronic attack planning, maintenance and sustainment targeting, and vulnerability discovery. They also enable synthetic training and doctrine development for adversary operators. A single manual can be operationally relevant for years because systems and procedures often evolve incrementally, not continuously.

Compensation details illuminate tradecraft and investigative leverage. Wei received more than $12,000 over the course of the relationship, including an alleged $5,000 payment connected to the June 2022 manual transfer. The DOJ has described the use of online payment methods (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a). This is common in modern espionage involving HUMINT assets who are not professional intelligence officers. Financial transfers create documentary evidence, establish quid pro quo, and provide prosecutors with a corroborating narrative that is legible to a jury. For counterintelligence professionals, this observation is instructive. When communications shift to encrypted platforms, payment flows often remain discoverable through records, device artifacts, and third-party reporting. The operational discipline required to truly eliminate financial signatures is rarely present in an insider unless he or she is COMSEC sophisticated.

Public disclosures describe the case’s investigative architecture in broad but meaningful terms which are instructive even in the absence of the classified story. The FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service conducted the investigation. The DOJ characterized the matter as a “first of its kind” espionage investigation in the district, language that signals a substantial investigative effort and a prosecutorial commitment to proving the national security dimension in open court (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a). The described evidence set emphasizes calls and electronic and audio messages with the PRC handler, payment records and receipts, and a post-arrest interrogation in which Wei admitted to providing the materials and described his conduct as espionage (U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a). Those elements are not glamorous, but they are decisive. They reflect the fundamentals of counterintelligence case building: document the relationship, document tasking and exchanges, document intent and benefit.

This IS PRC modus operandi! The Wei case fits a familiar pattern. The approach was enabled by digital access to targets, the cover identity was plausibly adjacent to the target’s professional interests, and the relationship was escalated through a play on Wei’s ego, . . . a mix of attention, manipulation, and money to compromise him. Tradecraft relied on human psychology, not advanced technical means. The Chinese FIS officer did not need to defeat a classified network. He convinced an insider to carry information out through routine channels and to do so voluntarily. This is a good example of why insider threat programs cannot focus only on clearance adjudication and periodic training. They must incorporate behavioral indicators, targeted education about online elicitation, and strong reporting pathways that reward early disclosure rather than stigmatize it (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a).

There is also a supervisory and cultural lesson embedded here. Wei voiced suspicion to another sailor. That disclosure was a moment when the damage could have been immediately contained. Peers often see the first signs of a peril, yet peers hesitate, either because they do not want to “ruin someone’s career” or because they assume someone else will act. Counterintelligence operators should treat this as a design requirement. Reporting must be made psychologically easy, procedurally simple, and institutionally supported. A peer report should trigger a calibrated and coordinated response, not an immediate public spectacle. The goal is to get ahead of compromise, not to create an environment where personnel conceal concerns to avoid attention.

The Wei case is a well-evidenced illustration of PRC espionage tradecraft against the United States. Chinese FIS spots and contacts potential insiders at scale through social platforms, cultivates via plausible identity, normalizes secret communications, introduces tasking that begins with the innocuous then escalates to classified materials, and pays through channels that are convenient to the target while still supporting handler control and a firm compromise of the asset (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023; U.S. Department of Justice, 2026a; USNI News, 2026). In my professional judgment, this is another textbook example of ego as the primary driver beneath the surface rationalizations. Even when loneliness, financial temptation, or grievance are present, the consistent psychological engine in treasonous espionage is the ego’s appetite to feel important, chosen, liked, befriended and exceptional. Wei’s conduct underscores that dynamic. He recognized the espionage for what it was, believed he could manage his exposure by encrypted applications, and continued down the road of betrayal. That is not naïveté. It is a belief that rules apply to others, that risk can be controlled by personal cleverness, and that the handler’s attention is a validation of one’s importance in the world. In very few espionage cases, money is the hook. The I.C. likes to think that examples like the Ames Case was a money-motivated treason. It was only partially. Likewise, the I.C. report on Ana Montés lays the blame at the feet of “ideology”. That really wasn’t it. Ego is the line that keeps the source from walking away when conscience and common sense offer an exit. It is almost ALWAYS ego.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Associated Press. (2026, January 12). Former Navy sailor sentenced to 16 years for selling information about ships to Chinese intelligence.
  • U.S. Department of Justice. (2023, August 3). Two U.S. Navy servicemembers arrested for transmitting military information to the People’s Republic of China.
  • U.S. Department of Justice. (2026a, January 13). Former U.S. Navy sailor sentenced to 200 months for spying for China.
  • U.S. Department of Justice. (2026b, January 14). U.S. Navy sailor sentenced to more than 16 years for spying for China.
  • USNI News. (2026, January 13). Sailor to serve 16 year prison sentence for selling secrets to China.
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Legal Remedies Open to Minnesota: ICE Operations and Redress for Civilian Deaths

justice, alex pretti, renee good, ICE, C. Constantin Poindexter

I am a patriot. I have always felt it a privilege to be American and very proud of what we represent to the world. Times have changed, and something strickingly ugly has happened to us. The Renee Good, Keith Porter and Alex Pretti homicides are the last straw. If our President will not step in to stop this, the state(s) must. Minnesota’s ability to halt federal immigration enforcement is constrained by federal supremacy, but it is not null. A state cannot nullify or physically obstruct federal law enforcement acting within lawful federal authority, because immigration enforcement is a core federal power and the Supremacy Clause preempts contrary state action (U.S. Const., art. VI; Arizona v. United States, 2012). The practical and legally durable approach is to distinguish between lawful federal immigration enforcement and allegedly unlawful operational conduct, including unconstitutional crowd control, unreasonable seizures, excessive force, and agency action that exceeds statutory or constitutional limits. Within that framing, Minnesota and its political subdivisions can pursue aggressive, legally cognizable remedies that combine federal court equitable relief, state sovereign measures that deny logistical support and eliminate state entanglement, evidence preservation and independent investigations for lethal force incidents, and damages pathways structured around the Federal Tort Claims Act and carefully pleaded individual capacity claims.

A decisive early step is to build the record and procedural posture for emergency relief. Minnesota’s Attorney General and major cities have already placed this template into the federal docket by seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against what they characterize as an unprecedented surge operation, and by pleading constitutional and Administrative Procedure Act theories (State of Minnesota v. Noem, Complaint, 2026; Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, 2026a). Contemporary reporting describes civilian deaths during the surge, including Alex Pretti on January 24, 2026, and notes that a federal judge ordered preservation of evidence connected to that incident (CBS Minnesota, 2026; The Guardian, 2026). Reporting also documents a prior death earlier in the month and recurring force allegations tied to the surge environment (The Marshall Project, 2026). These allegations and procedural developments are central to remedy selection, because courts are materially more willing to restrain specific unconstitutional tactics than to enjoin immigration enforcement as a category.

A primary remedy is immediate federal court equitable relief. Minnesota’s fastest lawful braking mechanism is a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction focused on unlawful conduct rather than federal authority in the abstract (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201–2202). Minnesota can seek a declaratory judgment that discrete federal practices violate the Constitution or exceed statutory authority, coupled with injunctive relief that prohibits specified behaviors, mandates training and supervision changes, and compels evidence retention and production schedules (State of Minnesota v. Noem, Complaint, 2026). Evidence control is not merely ancillary. In lethal force disputes, preservation orders can be the most attainable short-term relief and can materially influence later liability outcomes. Reporting indicates a preservation order in the Pretti matter, and allegations of obstruction in gaining access to the scene, which underscores why Minnesota should continue to press targeted preservation and access relief for body-worn camera footage, dispatch logs, chain of custody documentation, and third-party video sources (CBS Minnesota, 2026).

On the merits, Minnesota can plead multiple constitutional theories that are cognizable in equity even when actions for damages against federal actors are limited. First Amendment claims can be framed as retaliation and viewpoint discrimination, and as a chilling regime when federal agents are alleged to use force against peaceful expressive activity (Hartman v. Moore, 2006; Nieves v. Bartlett, 2019). Fourth Amendment claims can be framed as unreasonable seizures and excessive force. Those claims support injunctive relief to change practices governing stops, detentions, and use of force, particularly where plaintiffs can show a pattern, policy, or command structure rather than a one-off incident (Graham v. Connor, 1989; Tennessee v. Garner, 1985). Fifth Amendment due process framing can supplement where conduct is alleged to be arbitrary or conscience-shocking in a civil enforcement setting (County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 1998). In each lane, the remedy posture should be calibrated to what courts will enjoin. The goal is not a sweeping ban on federal presence, but enforceable constraints and oversight mechanisms that prevent unconstitutional practices and preserve evidence.

Statutorily, the Administrative Procedure Act remains a central lever when the dispute can be characterized as unlawful agency action, ultra vires deployment, or a final agency policy that is arbitrary and capricious, contrary to constitutional right, or adopted without required procedure (5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706). Even where the government frames the operation as discretionary, plaintiffs can target categorical rules and structured practices that resemble policy rather than case-by-case discretion, including deployment criteria, operational directives, and deviations from articulated enforcement protocols (State of Minnesota v. Noem, Complaint, 2026; Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, 2026a). The APA posture also aligns with remedy realism. Courts often resist ordering how to enforce immigration law, but will restrain agency actions that lack lawful procedure, exceed statutory authority, or violate constitutional limits.

Separately, Minnesota’s structural state power is strongest in disentanglement. The anti-commandeering doctrine bars the federal government from compelling states or localities to administer or enforce federal regulatory programs (Printz v. United States, 1997; Murphy v. NCAA, 2018). This doctrine does not permit obstruction, but it does permit Minnesota to prohibit state and local employees from participating in certain federal immigration activities, such as honoring civil detainers absent judicial warrants, providing nonpublic data access beyond what federal law requires, and using state resources for federal tasking. Operationally, Minnesota can reinforce disentanglement through statewide policies governing state facilities and state-controlled information systems. The objective is to ensure that federal operations must stand on federal resources and federal legal authority alone, while Minnesota maintains compliance with any narrow federal preemption requirements and avoids discrimination against federal officers as such.

For redress of deaths and serious injuries, Minnesota’s investigative and prosecutorial tools matter, but they are bounded by Supremacy Clause immunity principles. Homicide and assault are state crimes, and Minnesota agencies can investigate shootings within Minnesota’s territory. However, federal officers may assert a Supremacy Clause-related immunity against state prosecution for actions taken within the scope of federal duties and authorized by federal law (In re Neagle, 1890). That doctrine is not absolute. If facts indicate actions outside lawful authority, or actions that no reasonable officer could regard as necessary and proper to execute federal duties, state prosecution becomes more plausible. Even where prosecution is foreclosed or removed, robust state investigation is still consequential. It establishes an independent factual record, constrains narratives, supports federal civil remedies, and can trigger institutional accountability mechanisms. In this context, contemporaneous reporting about contested accounts and video evidence underscores the importance of independent scene processing where possible, preservation of third-party footage, coordinated witness interviewing, and transparent public reporting (CBS Minnesota, 2026; The Guardian, 2026).

For damages, Minnesota must separate who can sue and under what theory. Wrongful death damages generally belong to estates and statutory beneficiaries under state law, but the state can support and, in some contexts, pursue recovery for sovereign and proprietary harms. The principal damages route for torts committed by federal employees is the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives sovereign immunity for certain torts and applies the law of the place where the act occurred (28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680). The FTCA law enforcement proviso permits claims for specified intentional torts, including assault and battery, when committed by investigative or law enforcement officers (28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). Lethal force cases frequently litigate as operational conduct rather than protected policy discretion, though the United States regularly pleads discretionary function defenses and other exceptions (28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)). Plaintiffs must also satisfy the FTCA’s administrative presentment, exhaustion, and limitations requirements, which makes early evidence preservation and record building essential.

If plaintiffs sue individual officers under state tort theories, the Westfall Act frequently triggers substitution of the United States as the defendant for acts within scope, routing the matter back into FTCA exclusivity (28 U.S.C. § 2679). That substitution fight can be dispositive, and it makes careful pleading and factual support crucial, including any evidence that conduct was outside the scope of employment or otherwise not in furtherance of federal duties. Constitutional damages claims against federal officers under Bivens remain theoretically available for some Fourth Amendment paradigms, but the Supreme Court has sharply limited extensions into new contexts, particularly those touching immigration and national security adjacent environments (Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 1971; Hernández v. Mesa, 2020; Egbert v. Boule, 2022). As a result, victims’ counsel should treat Bivens as a high-risk vehicle and pair any constitutional damages strategy with FTCA claims and equitable relief that does not depend on implying a new damages remedy.

The phrase “stop operations in their tracks” should be operationalized into legally enforceable outcomes: a court-ordered prohibition on unconstitutional suppression of protest, restrictions on unreasonable stops and seizures, strict evidence preservation and production directives for lethal force incidents, and APA-compliant justification and process for any mass surge policy. Minnesota’s existing litigation posture already seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and frames the surge as extraordinary, which positions the state to pursue precisely this kind of targeted judicial control rather than an unattainable blanket prohibition (State of Minnesota v. Noem, Complaint, 2026; Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, 2026a). When paired with disciplined state non-cooperation grounded in anti-commandeering doctrine and meticulous state-level investigation of lethal force incidents, Minnesota can constrain the operational environment, preserve accountability evidence, and position victims’ families for meaningful damages recovery.

In short, the strongest legal tools are not physical resistance or nullification. They are rapid federal court equitable relief, disciplined state disentanglement, evidence-centered litigation, and damages architectures that convert unlawful force into enforceable liability under the FTCA and related doctrines, while recognizing the Supreme Court’s narrowing of implied constitutional damages remedies.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
  • Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
  • CBS Minnesota. (2026, January 25). Judge grants restraining order against DHS after Border Patrol kills Alex Pretti in Minneapolis.
  • County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
  • Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022).
  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
  • Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006).
  • Hernández v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93 (2020).
  • In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
  • Minnesota Attorney General’s Office. (2026a, January 12). Attorney General Ellison and cities of Minneapolis and Saint Paul sue to halt ICE surge into Minnesota.
  • Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018).
  • Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019).
  • Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
  • State of Minnesota v. Noem, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, Case No. 0:26-cv-00190 (D. Minn. filed 2026, January 12).
  • Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
  • The Guardian. (2026, January 24). Report on the killing of a U.S. citizen in Minneapolis during federal agent activity.
  • The Marshall Project. (2026, January 7). Report on use of force allegations connected to immigration enforcement activity in Minneapolis.
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When Counterintelligence Did Not “Catch” Jonathan Soong

espionage, counterespionage, intelligence, counterintelligence, spy, spies, C. Constantin Poindexter

When Counterintelligence Did Not “Catch” the Bad Guy: How Export Compliance and Oversight Stopped an Illicit Transfer

As a counterintelligence guy, I would love to claim one for the team, telling you a story of how counterintelligence “caught” Jonathan Soong. The question presumes a familiar arc: a clandestine plot detected by a vigilant counterintelligence service, followed by an investigative takedown. In practice, many of the most consequential national security cases in the defense industrial base begin elsewhere. They begin in the unglamorous terrain of export controls, contractual oversight, documentation requirements, and compliance escalation. The Soong matter is best read not as a story of counterintelligence brilliance at the point of origin, but as a demonstration that a robust compliance mechanism can function as a practical counterintelligence force multiplier, surfacing deception through audit friction, verification, and internal accountability (U.S. Department of Justice 2025a).

Jonathan Yet Wing Soong worked under a University Space Research Association arrangement supporting NASA, where he helped administer licensing and distribution of U.S. Army-owned aviation and flight control software subject to U.S. export controls. Public charging and plea materials describe a pattern that is familiar to any counterintelligence professional who has studied insider-enabled technology transfer. A trusted administrator leveraged authorized access to facilitate improper export to a prohibited end user, while using misrepresentation and intermediaries to reduce detection risk and sustain the activity long enough to monetize it (U.S. Department of Justice 2022; U.S. Department of Justice 2023; U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 2022).

Export compliance as counterintelligence by another name

In the contractor ecosystem, counterintelligence is no longer confined to investigations and briefings. It is built into controls that regulate who can access what, who can receive what, and what documentation must exist to justify a transfer. Export compliance is the legal expression of strategic technology denial. When an export compliance program is mature, it creates a perimeter of verification around controlled software, technical data, and sensitive know-how. It does this through end-user screening, licensing checks, record retention, and the expectation that representations are auditable, not merely asserted (U.S. Department of Justice 2025a).

Soong’s conduct, as publicly described, involved providing controlled U.S. Army aviation software to the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, commonly known as Beihang University, an end-user on the U.S. Entity List. The Entity List designation matters because it transforms what might otherwise be a complicated compliance decision into a bright-line restriction: an elevated risk recipient that generally requires licensing and heightened scrutiny. In counterintelligence terms, it is a government signal that a recipient is associated with activities of concern and therefore must be treated as a strategic risk, not just a commercial counterparty (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security 2022; U.S. Department of Justice 2022).

The decisive tripwire was oversight, not classic counterintelligence detection

The core point that the public often misses is timing. The publicly documented narrative indicates that the scheme was not halted because counterintelligence detected hostile tasking in real time. Rather, the activity began to unravel when NASA asked questions about software licensing activity involving China-based purchasers. That inquiry triggered internal examination at USRA, which then forced Soong’s process, documentation, and representations into a higher scrutiny environment (U.S. Department of Justice 2025a).

From a former operator’s perspective, that is the moment the system displayed its value. Oversight created heat. Heat compelled review. Review compelled proof. Proof created contradictions. Contradictions produced admissions and preserved evidence. That sequence is not incidental. It is the operational logic of compliance as an investigative engine. When a compliance system is designed to verify rather than merely record, it becomes difficult for an insider to sustain a cover story indefinitely.

The cover story failed under verification pressure

Public DOJ descriptions emphasize that Soong initially lied and fabricated evidence to make it appear that purchaser diligence had been conducted. In my experience, this is the most common failure mode for organizations that treat compliance as a box-checking function: insiders learn the minimum artifacts that satisfy superficial review. The Soong case illustrates what happens when counsel and compliance do not accept the first answer. DOJ accounts describe further investigation by USRA’s counsel, confrontation with contradictions, and Soong’s eventual admissions, including that he knew the end user was on the Entity List and that an export license was required (U.S. Department of Justice 2025a).

That is not just a legal detail. It is the fulcrum that turns suspicion into provable intent. Counterintelligence professionals care about intent because intent distinguishes mistake from exploitation and distinguishes weak governance from an insider who is actively enabling a strategic competitor or worse, adversarial FIS. Admissions anchored to documented contradictions are highly durable. They are not dependent on classified sources or contested analytic judgments. They are built for court cases.

Intermediaries and misdirection are a compliance evasion pattern

The public record also describes the use of an intermediary to obscure the true end user and facilitate the commercial pathway. This is a standard concealment vector. Intermediaries can be used to launder payment trails, shift transactional geography, and create plausible deniability within internal processes that rely on surface-level end-user statements. If a program relies on the integrity of a single administrator’s “screening,” the administrator becomes the control. If the administrator is compromised, the system is compromised. In this case, public materials describe intermediary involvement and a transfer pathway that, when examined, revealed the underlying restricted recipient (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service 2023; U.S. Department of Justice 2025a).

For counterintelligence practitioners, the lesson is straightforward: third party structures are not merely procurement conveniences. They are also tradecraft. In an export controls environment, every intermediary should be treated as a potential concealment method unless diligence is independently verifiable.

Voluntary self-disclosure converted an internal discovery into a national security case

Once internal discovery occurred, the matter moved from corporate governance to national security enforcement. DOJ’s public declination notice emphasized that USRA self disclosed export control offenses committed by its employee and cooperated, which shaped the government’s posture toward the company while leaving the individual to face prosecution (U.S. Department of Justice 2025a). That sequence is important for practitioners because it demonstrates how compliance maturity affects outcomes. Prompt internal escalation, self disclosure, and remediation can separate an organization’s institutional exposure from the conduct of a rogue insider, while also strengthening the government’s ability to build a case against the perpetrator.

DOJ also identified the investigative constellation, including Commerce export enforcement, the FBI, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, NASA Office of Inspector General, and U.S. Army elements including Army counterintelligence and investigative components. In other words, counterintelligence was present and relevant, but it was not the initial tripwire. It was part of the enforcement and investigative consolidation phase after compliance mechanisms surfaced the issue and the company disclosed it (U.S. Department of Justice 2025a; U.S. Department of Justice 2023).

Compliance “caught” the act and counterintelligence helped finish the job

If we insist on the verb “catch,” my professional assessment is that counterintelligence did not “catch” Jonathan Soong in the popular sense of the term. The decisive early detection function was performed by oversight and export compliance mechanisms. NASA’s questions triggered organizational scrutiny. Scrutiny demanded documentation. Documentation collapsed under verification. Verification produced contradictions and admissions. Those admissions and records enabled self-disclosure and a multi-agency investigation that culminated in a guilty plea. Counterintelligence contributed where it often contributes most effectively in the contractor environment: by supporting the investigative and enforcement architecture once a compliance tripwire has surfaced misconduct, and by helping translate a technical compliance failure into a national security narrative that the government can prosecute (U.S. Department of Justice 2025a; U.S. Department of Justice 2023).

This is not a criticism of counterintelligence. It is an argument for modernizing how we describe counterintelligence effectiveness. In the defense industrial base, export compliance is not adjacent to counterintelligence. Export compliance is frequently counterintelligence in operational form. When built correctly, it makes illicit transfer hard to hide, expensive to sustain, and likely to fail under audit pressure. The Soong case is the quiet proof that governance, oversight, and export controls can stop a technology transfer plot even when no one is running a classic counterintelligence operation at the beginning.

~ C. Constantin Poindexter, MA in Intelligence, Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence, JD, CISA/NCISS OSINT certification, DoD/DoS BFFOC Certification

Bibliography

  • Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, Defense Criminal Investigative Service. 2023. “Defendant Admits Using Intermediary to Funnel Payments for United States Army Aviation Software Exported to Beihang University.” Press release, January 17, 2023.
  • U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security. 2022. “South Bay Resident Charged with Smuggling and Exporting American Aviation Technology to Beijing University.” Press release, May 26, 2022.
  • U.S. Department of Justice. 2022. “South Bay Resident Charged with Smuggling and Exporting American Aviation Technology to Beijing University.” Press release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of California, May 26, 2022.
  • U.S. Department of Justice. 2023. “Castro Valley Resident Pleads Guilty to Illegally Exporting American Aviation Technology.” Press release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of California, January 17, 2023.
  • U.S. Department of Justice. 2025a. “Justice Department Declines Prosecution of Company That Self Disclosed Export Control Offenses Committed by Employee.” Press release, Office of Public Affairs, April 30, 2025.